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ELEMENTARY 



PSYCHOLOGY 



OR 



FIRST PRINCIPLES OF 

MENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE 



FOR 



HIGH, NORMAL, AND OTHER SECONDARY SCHOOLS, AND 
FOR PRIVATE READING 



■/ 



BY 



DANIEL PUTNAM, M.A. 

PROFESSOR OF MENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE, AND OF THE THEORY AND ART OF 
TEACHING IN THE MICHIGAN STATE NORMAL SCHOOL 



^ r ; WXTH AN INTRODUCE ^ ^ ^^ 

BY 




JOHN M. B. SILL, M.A.. 

PRINCIPAL OF THE MICHIGAN STATE NORMAL SCHOOL 



181889 




Copyright, 1889. by 

A. S. BARNES & COMPANY 

NEW YORK AND CHICAGO 



PREFACE 



"Know thyself" is a very ancient maxim. The affirmation 
that, "The proper study of mankind is man," is less ancient, 
more poetic, and equally worthy of acceptance. 

To know one's self is to know man ; to know man is to 
know mind, since mind alone constitutes the real man. 

It is coming to be felt by students and teachers that the 
science of mind has claims upon their attention equal, at least, 
to those of the physical sciences, of history, or of language and 
literature. In this feeling the writer shares very fully. 

One serious obstacle to the study of psychology in secondary 
schools has been the lack of text-books adapted to the degree of 
development and attainments of the pupils, to modern methods 
of investigation and instruction, and to the attainment of re- 
sults which should be secured by such study. 

This book owes its existence and its form to the long ex- 
perience of the author as a teacher of the elements of mental 
and moral science in schools of different grades, but especially 
to an experience of many years in such teaching in the Michi- 
gan State Normal School. 

It contains the substance of the instruction which has been 
found most profitable in such an institution. An attempt has 
been made to treat of the powers and activities of the mind in 
a manner easy and familiar, and adapted particularly to stu- 
dents of Normal Schools, High Schools, and other institutions of 
similar rank and character. 

No claim to originality of thought is put forth. Materials 
have been gathered from all accessible sources. These sources 
are so numerous that special acknowledgments are impossible, 
excepting as they have been made in the body of the work. 



IV PREFACE. 

No single master has been consciously followed. The right 
to differ from even recognized authorities has in all cases been 
reserved, and, in some cases, exercised. 

The conviction is growing in the minds of all intelligent and 
thinking people that moral instruction and training, — instruction 
in right principles and training to right conduct, — are absolutely 
necessary in our public schools. The demand for such instruc- 
tion and training is becoming imperative, and must be heeded 
if the school system is to retain its hold upon the people. 

Effective moral instruction can be given only in connection 
with the study of the laws of mind. A basis for moral teaching 
and training must be found in the soul itself, and in those 
everlasting and unchanging principles of justice; beneficence, 
mercy, and forgiveness which commend themselves alike to 
men of all classes and creeds. 

With their already crowded courses of studies, time can not 
be claimed in the schools for separate classes in both mental 
and moral science. Separate classes are unnecessary. Since 
both subjects are included in the more general science of psy- 
chology, they should be studied and taught together. The inten- 
tion has been to embrace in this work the elementary essentials 
of both. Consequently the sensibilities have been treated more 
fully than they would otherwise have been, and a classification 
has been adopted suited to the end in view. The moral nature 
and the fundamental principles of right have been discussed at 
sufficient length to furnish the needed groundwork for moral 
instruction and training. Special attention has also been given 
to the nature, power, and importance of habit. 

It is hoped that the work may prove to be adapted to fill 
the place of a text-book in mental and moral science in Normal 
Schools and in High Schools and other institutions of secondary 
instruction ; and that it may also be of service to private read- 
ers, especially to teachers in the common and graded schools. 



Note.— A blank leaf has been put in at the close of each chapter of the 
book for the convenience of teachers, students, and readers in making notes 
and in taking the names of books of reference, etc. It is believed that this 
will be found of considerable value. 







y~^^ 



CHAPTER 



I. 
II. 

III. 

IV. 

V. 

VI. 

VII. 

VIII. 



IX.— 



X. 

XI. 

XII. 

XIII. 

XIV. 

XV. 

XVI. 

XVII. 
XVIII. 



PAGE 

Preface ......... iii 

Introduction v 

Methods of Study 1 

Study of the Body 7 

Sensation and Perception .17 

Intuition. Intuitive Ideas and Truths . . 27 

Representative Activities 35 

Memory. Laws of Association .... 45 

The Elaborative or Thinking Activities . . 73 
Elaborative or Thinking Activities — Continued. 

Reason and Reasoning 89 

The Feelings. General Characteristics and 

Classes 107 

Feelings— Continued. The Affections , . 127 

Feelings — Continued. Desire 149 

The Will 163 

The Moral Nature 173 

Origin and Nature of Moral Law . . . 187 

Some Conditions of Effective Mental Work . 209 
Automatic, Impulsive, Reflex, and Instinctive 

Activities 227 

Imitation and Habit . 247 

Motives and Character ...... 269 

Index 279 



INTRODUCTION. 

The claims of Psychology to a place as a subject of study 
in schools of secondary instruction are, at the present time, re- 
ceiving more general and more favorable attention than has here- 
tofore been accorded to them. With us, the High School, whose 
final year corresponds nearly to the twelfth year of advance- 
ment in the academic life of the average American youth, is the 
type of this class of schools. Until a recent date it has not been 
deemed practicable nor desirable to present this subject to stu- 
dents until their powers had been strengthened by a more widely 
extended course of disciplinary training. The traditions of a sup- 
posed sequence of studies, which has from time immemorial dom- 
inated the minds of those to whom it fell to construct courses 
of instruction, have insisted that this most useful and fruitful 
branch of study should have a place only in the most advanced 
grades of higher instruction as given in colleges and universities, 
and have forbidden it any recognition in High Schools. Of 
late years it is coming to be more clearly seen that there is 
a sequence not only as to subjects of study, but also a sequence, 
quite as worthy of attention, that has to do, not with the order 
of subjects, but with the phases of each particular subject. 
That is to say, that there is an order and sequence, not only in 
the different lines of study, but also another and more impor- 
tant sequence, that deals with the order in which the several 
aspects of each of these subjects shall be presented. The ques- 
tion of precedence between, for instance, arithmetic and gram- 
mar is found to be of less importance than the question of 
precedence between the objective and subjective phases of arith- 
metic and grammar. Mathematics, -the science of quantity and 
magnitude, which in its advanced phases weighs the planets, 
and measures their inconceivable distances from us and from 
each other, reaches down to the very cradle and determines the 



Vlll INTRODUCTION. 

choice of the babe when it first manifests a desire for two 
desirable things rather than for one. 

Now, there can be no question as to the pre-eminent value 
of Psychology as a subject of study. Studied in that vicious and 
sterile text-book fashion, which marks progress by pages and 
chapters and tests advancement by the power to reproduce 
definitions and to repeat ancient and musty illustrations, it is, 
like every thing else, so studied, of little value. Studied intel- 
ligently and by reasonable methods, in which the deliverances 
of consciousness are examined and classified, in which the rela- 
tion of the three great activities of the soul are investigated and 
defined, and the laws which govern their interaction are brought 
to light and formulated, it becomes exceedingly fruitful and full 
of immediate and of prospective value. In its value as a dis- 
ciplinary study, giving insight and power to determine the rela- 
tions between things not revealed by sense-perception, it neces- 
sarily takes front rank. As a culture study it comes fully up 
to the excellent definition formulated by Dr. Payne in his essay 
on Education Values ; for it results in the mental satisfaction 
coming from the conscious possession of knowledge. It may 
seem extravagant, as it certainly is contradictory to the popular 
judgment, to press its claims as a ''practical study." But I 
have no hesitation in doing so. It is, in my judgment, emi- 
nently practical, — a branch of study invaluable for guidance in 
the affairs of life. It deals with springs of action hidden from 
those ignorant of the science of the soul. It supplies higher 
and nobler motives for right thinking, right feeling, and right 
doing. It reveals what lies back of the overt act, and places 
responsibility upon its only true logical ground. It gives to men 
the power of truthful discrimination in matters of motive and 
choice, and gives its due dignity to that which is spiritual and 
eternal. It lessens the danger of self-deception, that most piti- 
ful condition of the soul, and teaches how to be just to our- 
selves and righteously charitable toward our fellows. 

It is conceded that no teacher, ignorant of mental science, 
can possibly be completely equipped for the work of training 
the minds of the young. Is this less true of the parent, on 
whom rests a still larger responsibility for the right use of the 
years of early childhood ? Once concede the large utility of 



INTRODUCTION. ]X 

Psychology as a part of a course of education that can justly 
be called in any degree liberal, and but one question remains — 
viz., at what point in such a course should it receive formal 
recognition and serious attention? Now, Psychology, whether 
studied through the soul's own experiences or through the out- 
ward manifestation of the spiritual activity of others, must 
always have its real basis in subjectivity, because we can inter- 
pret such manifestations in others only by comparing them with 
our own experiences made known to us by consciousness. It is 
therefore true that this subject should be deferred until the 
mind is able to make successfully what Mr. Bain happily calls 
the "momentous transition from concrete to abstract." But it 
will hardly be denied that this ability is not, in the psychical 
history of a student, postponed until complete and ripe maturity. 

I find no difficulty in discovering its place among the more 
advanced studies pursued in High Schools. My judgment, based 
upon reason and fortified by careful observation, is that Psy- 
chology in its simpler and more elementary forms can be com- 
prehended by any student who finds himself able to see clearly 
the relations of quantity as exhibited in algebra, or the neces- 
sarily obscure dependencies of words as shown in the intelligent 
grammatical analysis of connected discourse. 

The degree of insight necessary for these is adequate to the 
demands of a first general but yet formal exploration of the 
contents of the field occupied by consciousness. It seems to me 
a grave mistake to allow graduates of our High Schools, the 
vast majority of whom go no further in strictly academic life, 
to be ignorant of at least the elements of the science of the 
soul, — to go into the activities of the world with eyes open only 
to the tangible, the material, and by consequence the temporal, 
while no serious effort has been made to open the eye of the 
soul upon what is spiritual and eternal. 

It is well to note at this point another fact having practical 
bearings. A very considerable proportion of the graduates of 
our High Schools, desiring to enter upon the practice of teach- 
ing, seek the necessary professional training in Normal Schools. 
It would be a great advantage if such could come equipped 
with a knowledge of at least the elements and of the common 
terminology of mental science. Lacking this knowledge, there 



X INTRODUCTION. 

must be, while this ground is being covered, an expensive delay 
before beginning a critical study of methods in the several 
branches and receiving instruction in the general theory and 
practice of teaching ; for the invariable sequence in pedagogical 
training must be (1) Psychology, (2) Pedagogics (or the science 
of education), and (3) Pedagogy (or the art of teaching). The 
last two may be pursued synchronously to reasonable advan- 
tage, but it is in the nature of things that Psychology must 
precede them. 

It is a matter of congratulation that the authorities of a 
considerable number of High Schools have already taken this 
view of the value of mental and moral science, for these two 
branches of Psychology are of course indissolubly linked to- 
gether. One of the chief difficulties encountered in the intro- 
duction of psychological study into courses of secondary instruc- 
tion has been the lack of suitable text-books. A careful perusal 
of the manuscript of Professor Putnam's book has convinced me 
that it will amply meet this want. I expect to see it widely 
and advantageously used in High Schools and in Normal 
Schools. It is impossible in the space allotted for this intro- 
duction to set forth its rightful claims to favorable consideration. 
It is the outcome of large and thoroughly successful experience 
in teaching the subject considered, and the fruit of sound 
scholarship and patient conscientious labor. I have full con- 
fidence in its value in the field for which it is designed, and 
I believe that a fair and thorough examination of its pages will 
bring intelligent teachers to the same conclusion. 

JOHN M. B. SILL, 
Principal Michigan State Normal School. 



CHAPTER I. 

METHODS OF STUDY. 

Subject of Study. — The subject of our study is 
mind. Of the substance of mind, we know nothing. 
We do not seek to learn what mind is, but what it 
does. We study its activities, its states, its powers. 
Several methods of study are open to us. 

First Method of Study — Study of Self. — We may 
study ourselves. We know that we think, feel, and 
will ; that we see, hear, taste, smell, and touch ; that 
we perceive, imagine, remember, judge, and reason. 
That within us which knows, feels, and wills, we 
call the mind or soul. We do not know mind, as 
we do matter, by means of our senses. We can 
neither see, nor hear, nor touch our minds. Mind 
is not material and tangible. 

Consciousness. — The mind knows itself, and 
knows its own activities and states. The mind 
knowing itself and its oivn activities and states, 
we call consciousness. We know through conscious- 
ness what we think, and how we feel, and when we 
imagine and remember ; we say we are conscious 
of these acts of our minds. We study ourselves, 
therefore, through consciousness. In this way, we 
can investigate all our mental processes. We may 
by careful self-observation discover how we learn of 



2 CAUSES, CIRCUMSTANCES, ETC. 

form, color, distance, size ; of odor, flavor, and the 
great multitude of objects all about us. We may 
gain some insight into the wonderful processes of 
imagining, retaining, and recalling what we have 
once learned. 

Causes, Circumstances, etc. — We can find out 
under what circumstances we feel joy and sorrow, 
pain and pleasure, good-will and ill-will, pity and 
indignation, and the marvelous variety of other feel- 
ings. We can discover the causes which excite these 
feelings in our minds ; the circumstances under 
which they arise, and the means by which they can 
be controlled, allayed, and entirely removed. We 
may observe how we are influenced to determine, or 
will to do or not to do, any act which is proposed 
to us, and how the will moves all the other powers, 
both of body and mind, to action. We can learn 
something of the relation between our thinking and 
our feeling and willing. We discover that if we 
think in a certain way, we have a particular kind of 
feeling ; if we think in a different way, we have a 
different sort of feeling. These and many other 
things in relation to mind we learn by studying our- 
selves. This is one of the methods which should 
always be pursued. Consciousness must be the final 
judge to decide all disputed questions concerning the 
action of mind. If consciousness deceives us, we 
have no way of detecting the deception. We always 
accept and believe that of which we are conscious. 

Second Method — Observation. — We may also 
study mind by observation. Children are all about 



SECOND METHOD — OBSE K V AT 10 N . 3 

us. They can be observed and studied in the home, 
on the playground, on the street, in the school. An 
intelligent observer may commence this form of 
study at the very beginning of a child's life, watch- 
ing for the first indications of intelligence in the 
infant, and noting when and how the senses, one 
after another, exhibit signs of activity. An observer 
may discover what forms of mental activity first 
manifest themselves, and what the order of mental 
development is, and what is the rate of progress. 
The mind of a young child may thus be learned to 
a certain extent, and also the relation of the devel- 
opment of the mind to the growth of the body. 
The external indications, — the movements of the 
limbs, the hands, the head, and the eyes, — of mental 
acts and states can be detected and described. These 
observations may be kept up through the whole period 
of childhood and youth, and into the period of matu- 
rity. All the steps of a child's progress in physical, 
mental, and moral development may be noted and 
registered, together with the apparent influence of 
times, circumstances, and environment generally. In 
the school, such observations may be made by any 
teacher who has made mind a subject of careful 
study. The effects upon the mind of pursuing dif- 
ferent objects and topics of study, the results of dif- 
ferent methods of instruction and management can 
be compared. From such comparisons valuable prac- 
tical conclusions may be derived. 

This method of studying mind and its modes of 
activity is at the service of every parent and of every 



4 CAUTION AS TO BOOKS. 

teacher. This method must be employed, to a greater 
or less extent, by every student of mental science. 

Third Method — Books. —A third method is the 
study of books which treat of the powers and activ- 
ities of mind, and of its modes of manifestation. 
This method is a necessary one, but it is often used 
too exclusively. The study of books should be ac- 
companied always by self-observation and the study 
of mind as manifested in children, and in all with 
whom we come in contact. One method supple- 
ments another. No one method alone is sufficient. 
The information derived through one method enables 
us to confirm or to correct that obtained by another. 
Truths learned and conclusions reached by the use 
of all the methods may be regarded as established 
beyond doubt or successful contradiction. Every 
genuine student will combine, as far as possible, these 
three methods ; and will not be over-hasty in draw- 
ing inferences, or over-positive in making assertions 
based upon only a single method of investigation. 

Caution as to Books. — A wise caution should be 
exercised in the selection and use of books upon 
psychology. Some very learned and valuable works 
would be simply confusing and bewildering to an 
immature student at the commencement of his 
studies in mental science. They are written for 
those who have bestowed profound thought and long 
attention to the subject. Some writers, in striving 
to be deeply philosophical, have succeeded in becom- 
ing hopelessly obscure to the ordinary reader. It 
takes the common mind a long time to find its way 



OBSTACLES. 

to the ideas of these writers through their involved 
sentences and peculiar selection of words. Consider- 
ing the brevity of human life, it is hardly worth 
while to waste efforts in trying to study books of 
this kind. The young student will usually find it 
best to consult the judgment of some competent 
friend, or other adviser, in respect to the selection 
of books to be studied upon this subject. If reading 
alone, read slowly, re-read frequently, think patiently, 
and make notes, with pen or pencil, of passages 
which are of special importance. 

Obstacles. — There are some obstacles and diffi- 
culties peculiar to each method of study. These, 
if anticipated, can be guarded against and partially 
avoided. It is the unexpected difficulty which per- 
plexes and discourages us. 

In First Method. — By the first method, the mind 
must observe its own states while they exist, and its 
own activities while they are going on, or it must 
study them through recollection. As soon as the mind 
pauses, so to speak, to examine and analyze its states 
and acts, these are, to some extent, interrupted and 
cease to be entirely natural. If the observation is 
made through memory, after the states and acts have 
passed, some elements will probably escape notice. 

In Second Method. — In the second method, the 
chief difficulty in the way of reaching trustworthy 
conclusions, is the limited field open to any one ob- 
server. The contents of the minds of young children, 
and their modes of mental activity, are determined 
very largely by their immediate environment. Gen- 



6 DEFINITIONS. 

eralizations will have but little value unless the ob- 
servations have extended through considerable time, 
and over a pretty wide field. The field should em- 
brace as many varying conditions and circumstances 
as possible. 

In Third Method. — In the third method, a diffi- 
culty is often found in the nomenclature employed. 
Some authors use terms peculiar to themselves ; 
others use common terms with a peculiar meaning. 
The reader will most readily overcome this difficulty 
by translating the author's ideas into familiar, every- 
day forms of speech. One is not sure that he has 
fully mastered and comprehended the thoughts of 
another until he can clothe these thoughts in words 
of his own selection and arrangement. 

SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER — DEFI NITIONS. 

1. Subject of study, not the substance of mind, but its powers 

and activities. 

2. First method of study — Self-observation. 

3. What mind is. What consciousness is. 

4. What can be discovered by study of self. 

5. Second method — Observation. 

6. Observation of the young child. 

7. Observation in the school. 

8. Third method — Study of books. 

9. Methods should be combined. 

10. Caution as to the selection of books to be read. 

11. Obstacles. 



Mind or Soul. — That in man which knows, feels, and wills. 
Consciousness. — The mind knowing itself, and knowing its 

own activities and states. 
Psychology. — The science which treats of the soul or mind. 



CHAPTER II. 

STUDY OF THE BODY. 

Man Complex. — Man is a complex being, made 
up of body and mind or soul. The terms mind and 
soul will be used as synonymous in our study, un- 
less a distinction is indicated for some reason in par- 
ticular cases. Of the substance of mind, as already 
stated, we have no knowledge. It is assumed to be 
immaterial, and capable of existing separate from 
the body. In our present state of existence, the 
mind manifests itself and its activities only through 
the bodily organism. For this and other reasons 
the body, the physical part of man, becomes an 
important subject of investigation to the student of 
mind. 

Knowledge of the Body Important. — The work of 
physical education, either in the home or the school, 
can not be properly performed without a tolerably 
good knowledge of the anatomy of the human frame 
and of the laws of health. The various organs of 
the body, their functions, and the essential condi- 
tions of natural and vigorous activity, must be under- 
stood. Some knowledge of the most common dis- 
eases of childhood, and of the best treatment of 
persons in cases of sudden illness or of accidents, 
when the aid of a physician can not be immediately 



8 THE CE REBRO-SPINAL SYSTEM. 

obtained, is very desirable. It is assumed that stu- 
dents have mastered as much of anatomy, physiology, 
and hygiene as the common text-books embrace 
upon those subjects. Attention will, therefore, be 
given here only to that part of the body most inti- 
mately connected with the operation of the mind ; 
that is, the nervous system. 

Recommendation. — It is recommended that, at 
this point, a review be made of the nervous system, 
as described in some good text-book, unless the sub- 
ject is quite familiar and tolerably fresh in memory. 
The manifestations of mind through the various or- 
gans of sense will be much more readily and fully 
comprehended if the mechanism of the brain, of the 
spinal cord, and of the nerves, is clearly understood. 
Through these the mind appears to act and to be 
acted upon. Without them, so far as we can now 
discover, it would be like a prisoner confined in some 
dungeon, with walls so deep and thick and high, 
that no ray of light nor any sound could enter, and 
from which no sign or sound could come. The mind 
would dwell, if it could thus exist, in perpetual 
silence and darkness. Through the brain and nerves 
it makes itself known, and learns of the world by 
which it is surrounded. The nerves and organs of 
sense have been most appropriately called " the gate- 
ways of the soul." Through them the mind and the 
outer world meet and hold intercourse. 

The Cerebro-Spinal System. — The general nervous 
system, called the cerebro-spinal system, consists of 
the brain, the spinal cord, and the nerves proceeding 



THE BRAIN. 9 

from these. The position, form, and general charac- 
ter of the brain and spinal cord are presumed to be 
understood sufficiently well for our present purpose. 
Only a few statements, therefore, will be presented 
here, borrowed from sources readily accessible. 

The Brain. — The brain, as a whole, includes the 
cerebrum, the large central mass ; the cerebellum, or 
little brain ; the pons varolii, or bridge ; and the 
medulla oblongata, an enlarged continuation of the 
spinal cord within the skull. In a restricted sense, 
the term brain is often confined to the cerebrum, 
both on account of its greater size and of its prob- 
ably superior position, in connection with manifesta- 
tions of mind. Supposing the entire brain mass to 
weigh 50 ounces, of these, the cerebrum is said to 
make 44, the cerebellum 5, and the other parts 1. 
Among adult Europeans and Americans, the average 
weight of the male brain is 49 to 50 ounces, and of 
the female brain, 44 to 45 ounces. The weight of 
the brain, as compared with the weight of the whole 
body, is about the same in both sexes. This relative 
weight differs considerably at different periods of life, 
being greatest at birth and in childhood. 

Intellectual Power and Size of Brain. — Great in- 
tellectual power is usually associated with a large 
brain ; but many exceptions are found to this gen- 
eral rule. Evidently quality, although not easily 
defined when predicated of the brain, is as important 
as quantity. If, however, the weight of the adult 
brain falls below thirty ounces, imbecility may be 
anticipated. The brain attains nearly its full size as 



10 THE SYMPATHETIC SYSTEM. 

early as the eighth year, but the weight continues 
to increase slowly until the fortieth. A slight dimi- 
nution of weight takes place in old age, usually ac- 
companied by a loss of mental vigor and activity. 
A healthy development of the brain in a child is a 
necessary condition of the exhibition of intellectual 
energy. The immature brain should be only lightly 
taxed, and precocious mental activity should be 
wisely and cautiously checked rather than encour- 
aged and intensified. JSTo regular and severe mental 
labor can be safely imposed until the brain has 
attained nearly its maximum size ; and the age for 
entering any school, except a kindergarten or some 
similar institution, should be fixed at about this 
period. The teachings of physiology and experience 
upon this point are in perfect accord. Considerable 
development of body, and more particularly of brain, 
is a necessary prerequisite to effective work in the 
school. 

The Sympathetic System. — In addition to the 
cerebro-spinal system is the so-called sympathetic 
system, consisting of nerves and nervous matter in 
the form of ganglia. As this system has but little 
direct connection with the phenomena of mind, it is 
unnecessary to give it consideration here. 

The Nerves. — The brain, the great center of 
nervous force, exerts its own power from within, 
and is reached by agencies and influences from with- 
out, through nerves which have their origin in it, or 
in the spinal cord. These nerves are small cords of 
grayish-white color, composed of numerous minute 



PECULIAE OFFICE OF THE NERVES. 11 

fibers and bundles of fibers, terminating externally 
in the skin, muscles, and all parts of the body. Con- 
nected in many places with these cords, are collec- 
tions of nerve cells, called ganglia, which appear to 
be important auxiliaries to the nerves, re-enforcing 
and intensifying their action, and, in certain cases, 
intercepting the direct movement, and producing 
what is called reflex action. 

Peculiar Office of the Nerves — The peculiar prop- 
erty of r^erve fibers is a susceptibility of being im- 
pressed or excited by certain causes or influences 
called stimuli, and of transmitting or conducting 
such impressions or excitations with very great 
rapidity. Comparison has often been made between 
the office of the nerves and that of the telegraphic 
and telephonic wires. Thoy serve as means of in- 
stantaneous communication between the various 
parts of the body, between the extremities and the 
internal nerve centers and the brain, and, by a pro- 
cess of which nothing is yet known, between the 
external world and the mind. If they are paralyzed 
by disease, or severed by accident, all communica- 
tion ceases, as it does when the telegraphic wires 
are cut. 

Sensory and Motor Nerves. — Some nerves receive 
impressions or excitations only upon their external 
terminations, and convey these excitations within to 
the nerve centers and the brain. These are named 
afferent and sensory nerves. Other nerves are ex- 
cited by causes or stimuli within, and transmit such 
excitations to their outward extremities. These are 



12 KNOWLEDGE PRESUMED. 

called efferent and motor nerves. Through the ac- 
tion of these nerves upon the muscles all movements 
of the body are effected. It is possible that some 
nerve fibers are capable of transmitting impressions 
in both directions. 

Nerves and Organs of the Special Senses. — A few 
nerves are capable of being excited by only one kind 
of stimulus, and of transmitting only one kind of 
excitation. Such nerves and the external parts in 
which they terminate constitute the organs of the 
special senses. These are of peculiar interest to 
the student of mind and the teacher, as they 
are pre-eminently the avenues of communication 
between the external world and the center of in- 
telligence within, and the only media through which 
the materials of knowledge can be given and re- 
ceived. 

Knowledge Presumed. — The structure of the or- 
gans of the special senses, and the location and 
forms of the terminal ends of the associated nerves, 
are presumed to be well known. It will, therefore, 
be necessary here only to refer to the kind of stim- 
ulus by which these nerves are affected, and to the 
character of the impressions which they convey, 
and the peculiar knowledge consequently derived 
through them. 

Smell. — The olfactory nerves, the nerves of smell, 
terminating in the nasal passages, are excited by 
odors. The excitement is produced by the inhala- 
tion of air filled with floating particles of odorous 
matter. These particles, coming in contact with the 



TASTE, HEARING, SIGHT. 13 

extremities of the nerves, make an impression or irri- 
tation which is instantly conveyed along the nerve 
fibers. The final result is a knowledge of the vari- 
ous kinds of smells. 

Taste. — The gustatory nerves, the nerves of taste, 
have their terminations in papillae, found chiefly on 
the tongue. The ends of these nerves are excited by 
the contact of matter passing over the tongue in a 
state of solution. The transmission of this condition 
of irritation results finally in a knowledge of flavors 
or tastes. The activities of smell and taste are 
often very closely connected, and then the conclusion 
reached depends upon the concurrent or united tes- 
timony of both senses. 

Hearing. — The auditory nerves, the nerves of 
hearing, terminate in the cavities of the complex 
internal ear. They are affected by the vibrations of 
the medium in which their ends are distributed, and 
this medium is set in motion by the vibration of 
the air and of other external substances. These ex- 
citements of the auditory nerves, conveyed inward, 
are at last translated into a knowledge of the almost 
infinite variety of sounds. 

Sight. — The optic nerves, the nerves of sight, with 
their terminations in the retina of the eye, are af- 
fected only by the action of light, and primarily 
appear to give us knowledge of color and form. As- 
sisted by touch and hearing, sight, undoubtedly, 
gives us notions of distance, size, roughness, smooth- 
ness, and of some other qualities of objects, at a very 
early period of life. It is not easy to draw clearly 



14 BODILY FEELINGS. 

and positively the boundary lines of the province of 
this sense. 

Touch, etc. — The nerves of touch, unlike those 
previously named, do not consist of a single pair, 
but are very numerous and widely distributed. In 
fact, it might be said that they include all the nerves, 
excepting those just described, which have their ter- 
minations at or near the external surface of the 
body, and also within the mouth. The information 
derived by means of these nerves is very extensive 
and most diverse in its nature, and might well be 
divided and assigned to different nerves, if physiol- 
ogy would permit us to do so. Touch, proper, in- 
volves pressure, and this necessitates muscular exer- 
tion, consequently muscular and nervous action 
become united and confused, and the resulting 
knowledge is due to this combined activity. By the 
tactile nerves and associated muscular exertion, we 
learn softness and hardness, roughness and smooth- 
ness. Within narrow limits, we are also made ac- 
quainted with size, shape, position, and distance. 
Contact, also, involves temperature, the notion of 
heat and cold. This, however, affects us without 
actual contact with the hot or cold body, by radia- 
tion and the circulation of air. 

Bodily Feelings. — There are many bodily feelings, 
the knowledge of which can not be referred directly 
to any of the special nerves, nor to the more widely 
extended nerves of touch. Such are the feelings of 
hunger and thirst, of comfort and satisfaction attend- 
ing the proper digestion of food, and generally the 



CONNECTION OF BODY AND MIND. 15 

ordinary activity of the physical organism in a state 
of health, the discomfort and dissatisfaction attend- 
ing fatigue, indigestion, ill-health, and unnatural and 
constrained positions of the body. All these feelings, 
and many others of similar character, have their 
origin, without doubt, in impressions made by some 
means upon some part of the nervous system. They 
are sometimes grouped together under the general 
name of organic feelings. 

Intimate Connection of Body and Mind. — This 
brief review of the nervous system reveals, to some 
extent, the intimate connection between its activities 
and the activities of the mind. The brain and 
nerves appear to be the physical mechanism through 
which, in its present mode of existence, the soul is 
touched and affected by the surrounding world, and 
also the means through which, in turn, the soul 
makes known its powers and activities. The perfec- 
tion and good condition of the mechanism must 
naturally increase the efficiency of the force work- 
ing through it. 

SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER. 

1. Man complex — body and mind, or soul. 

2. Assumptions as to the soul. 

3. How only the mind can now manifest itself. 

4. Knowledge of the body important and necessary. 

5. Review of nervous system recommended. 

6. Condition of mind without the nerves of sense. 

7. The cerebro-spinal system. The brain. 

8. Relation of intellectual power to size of brain. 

9. The sympathetic system. 



16 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER. 

10. The nerves — peculiar office. 

11. Sensory and motor nerves. 

12. Nerves and organs of special sense. 

13. Smell, taste, hearing, sight, touch. The general knowledge 

derived through each of the senses. 

14. Some bodily feelings, and the source of these. 



CHAPTER III. 

SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

Position of the Child. — With the nervous organ- 
ization which has been partially described in a pre- 
vious chapter, the child, in the weakness and igno- 
rance of infancy, finds itself in the midst of a world 
of material objects, and of influences and forces. 
These act upon the sensitive nervous organization, 
particularly upon the nerves of the special senses. 
At every turn, some object or influence irritates, 
stimulates, excites, or, in some way, impresses the 
nerves of smell, taste, hearing, sight, or touch. These 
irritations, or impressions, made upon the outer ex- 
tremities of the afferent nerves, are transmitted by 
some action of the nerve fibers inward to the nerv- 
ous centers, and finally, in some unknown and mys- 
terious way, to the great center and seat of intelli- 
gence, the mind. They produce a peculiar state of 
mind, or a change of state, which can be named, 
but can not, in the proper sense of the word, be de- 
fined. These states, or changes of state of mind, 
are known only by consciousness. 

Sensation. — This state, or change of state of mind, 
caused by impressions upon the nerves of sense, is 
called sensation. 

First Conscious Mental Activity. — At this point, 



J8 CONSCIOUS MENTAL ACTIVITY. 

without doubt, the first conscious activity of mind 
begins. This activity is that of discrimination and 
comparison. The mind is conscious of a change of 
state ; a sensation of sight, hearing, taste, or smell 
is experienced. Sensations are repeated, and differ- 
ent sensations are experienced through the various 
senses, and through the same sense, different sensa- 
tions of color, sound, touch, and taste. These repe- 
titions of the same sensation, and the different sen- 
sations, are immediately known in consciousness ; 
are examined, compared, and pronounced to be alike 
or unlike, similar or dissimilar, as the case may be. 
The resemblances and differences, the likenesses and 
unlikenesses, are very slowly and gradually noted 
and fully distinguished, and by degrees are perma- 
nently fixed in memory, so that a sensation when 
repeated is recognized as having been previously 
experienced. The child's early activities of discrim- 
ination, comparison, and reproduction or recollection, 
are undoubtedly very feeble and imperfect, but that 
such activities commence here is beyond question. 

Illustration. — The physical and mental processes 
may be readily illustrated. A pin pricks the finger 
of a child. The nerve fibers of touch are irritated, 
and the feeling of irritation is conveyed along the 
nerve. A sensation is experienced by the child. The 
prick is repeated with a similar result ; another sen- 
sation is felt. The sensations are discriminated as 
two, and the second is declared to be like the first. 
There is a consciousness of the relation of likeness 
resulting from comparison. 



SENSATION. 19 

Memory Begins to Act. — Evidently the knowledge 
of the peculiar characteristics and nature of the first 
sensation must have been retained, or no comparison 
could have been made. If some time, however little, 
intervenes between the two pricks, then clearly the 
activity of reproduction and representation, or mem- 
ory, must also have begun. 

Illustration. — Suppose a rose, concealed from sight, 
to be brought into the room, or near a child who 
has hitherto had no acquaintance with the smell of 
flowers. The odor, floating in the air, touches the 
nerve of smell, and the child is conscious of a sen- 
sation, though he can give it no name. The rose is 
removed, and a fragrant lily is brought in its place. 
The child recognizes at once a difference between 
the two sensations, while utterly unable to name or 
describe either. The two have been compared, and 
a decision pronounced that they are unlike. The 
knowledge of the first must have been retained and 
reproduced, or the comparison could not have been 
made. These processes must be going on continu- 
ally in the mind of a child from the moment when 
the nerves of sense began to be impressed by objects 
and influences about him. 

Only Sensation at First. — At first, sensations must 
exist entirely alone. They are simply states of mind, 
internal experiences, for which no causes are known. 
The child is merely conscious of states of soul. 
Every thing thus far is within ; acquaintance with 
the external world has not commenced. 

First Knowledge — First Step in Education. — The 



20 PEECEPTION. 

child's first acquisition must be a knowledge of sen- 
sations, and the first step in the process of education 
must consist in cognizing, comparing, and discrim- 
inating, sensations. 

Second Step. — Sensations are, so to speak, the 
raw material of knowledge. The conscious activity 
of the mind begins as soon as these are experienced. 
Until they are felt, no mental life or activity can be 
discovered in the child. Through them the mind 
learns of the existence of an external world and 
comes into acquaintance with it. 

What Follows. —Very soon after the mind be- 
comes conscious of sensations, it begins to attribute 
them to external objects as causes. How early, or in 
what way, this process commences it is impossible to 
determine, nor is it possible to determine the nature 
of the process. We know that in some way, through 
the organs of sense, the soul learns of the existence, 
position, size, form, color, and other qualities and 
characteristics of material things. 

Perception. — This act of the mind in knowing 
external objects immediately and directly, is called 
perception. Since this knowing is through the senses, 
it is often called sense-perception. The ability of 
the mind to perforin this act of knowing is usually 
called the faculty or power of perception. It may 
properly be called the perceptive activity, or the 
activity of perceiving. 

A Percept. — The complete mental product of the 
act of perceiving is called a percept, while the object 
perceived is present. The percepts of sight, when 



CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION. 21 

recalled, appear as perfect pictures or images in the 
mind ; those of touch are pictured or imaged, but 
less clearly and distinctly than those of sight. It is 
doubtful if the percepts of taste, smell, and hearing 
can be imaged. They are designated by an indefinite 
term, as ideas. 

Conditions of Perception. — The conditions of per- 
ception are (1), a physical organism capable of being 
excited or impressed by external objects and influ- 
ences, and of conveying these impressions. Such an 
organism is called the sensorium ; (2), objects or 
agencies to impress or excite the sensorium, so as to 
produce sensations ; (3), a mind immediately con- 
scious of the sensation, and ready to attribute it to 
the external cause, or to know the object in conse- 
quence of the sensation. 

Conditions — Physical and Psychical. — The con- 
ditions are partly physical and partly psychical (or 
mental), and they are so intimately associated as to 
be incapable of complete separation. 

Relation of Sensation and Perception. — The activ- 
ity of mind in perception is much greater and more 
productive than in sensation ; but sensation is the 
necessary antecedent of perception ; and perception, 
in most cases, is the necessary and immediate re- 
sult of sensation. The mature mind, unless so pre- 
occupied as to be practically unconscious of impres- 
sions from without, instantly refers sensations to 
their cause, and perceives the exciting object. The 
rapidity with which this is done is, without doubt, 
the result of experience. 



22 ACTIVITIES INVOLVED. 

Rapidity of Action. — In many cases, no apprecia- 
ble time intervenes between the sensation and the 
perception. This happens when sensations have be- 
come familiar by frequent recurrence. A new and 
strange sensation can not be instantly localized, or 
referred to its source, even by an adult. The reason 
is obvious. 

Activities Involved. — The process of perception 
involves the fundamental activities of mind, already 
mentioned in connection with sensation. Percepts 
and images must be discriminated and compared, 
and this comparison frequently makes retention and 
reproduction necessary. 

Illustration. — For illustration, an object of sight 
is presented to me, which I affirm to be a peach. 
This affirmation is an act of judgment, and must 
result from a comparison of my present percepts 
with former percepts retained and reproduced. To 
use a common mode of speech, I must remember 
the appearance, smell, and taste of some peach pre- 
viously examined, and must compare the object now 
before me with my recollection of that. The young 
child, in order to recognize distinctly to-day an ob- 
ject like one seen yesterday, must go through the 
same process ; and his inability to make the recog- 
nition readily is owing partly to the feebleness of 
the power of memory, and partly to lack of distinct- 
ness in his previous percepts. 

Perception Complex. — It will be noticed that the 
mental activity of perception, though apparently 
simple, is really very complex. It involves the in- 



FIRST WORK OF THE TEACHER. 23 

cipient activity of some of the highest intellectual 
powers. 

Second Step in Education. — Perception is evi- 
dently the second hind of conscious psychical activity 
of the child, and the second step in the process of 
his education. 

First Work of the Teacher. — The first step, so 
far as the teacher is concerned, must consist in 
developing and training the perceptive power to 
act readily, accurately, and rapidly. Such develop- 
ment and training form the basis of all subsequent 
progress and acquisition. The senses are the ex- 
ternal organs of the perceptive activity, and their 
proper cultivation is the main work of the primary 
school. 

Original and Acquired Power of the Senses. — 
Each of the special senses has original or native 
power to furnish a species of knowledge peculiar to 
itself, and not given by any of the other senses. 
The knowledge originally supplied by each sense has 
already been stated. 

Acquired Perceptions. — An important fact, with 
which we are all familiar, remains to be noticed. 
We find one sense doing the original ivork of 
another sense by an acquired power. The possibil- 
ity of the acquisition of such power is a most benefi- 
cent provision. Without it, the loss of any sense 
would be an irreparable misfortune. As things are, 
one sense can, to a considerable extent, take the 
place of another, and perform its special duties. 
Touch and hearing come to the aid of the blind, 



24 EXAMPLES OF THIS ACQUIRED POWER. 

and touch and sight to the help of the deaf. Smell 
and taste, in a less degree, may exchange offices. 

Examples of this Acquired Power. — Examples of 
the use of this acquired power are so common that 
they scarcely need to be mentioned. We are con- 
stantly and often unconsciously employing it in the 
every-day business of life. We say an object looks 
rough or smooth, heavy or light, hot or cold, judg- 
ing by sight, in respect to qualities which were 
originally learned by touch and muscular exertion. 
We tap lightly with a hammer the wall of a room, 
and pronounce it hollow or solid ; we strike the end 
of a barrel with a stick, or touch it with the foot, to 
determine whether it is full or empty, employing the 
ear to gain information which the eye at first gave 
us. The processes by which a very high degree of 
this wonderful power can be attained, as illustrated 
in the education of the deaf, dumb, and blind, are 
exceedingly interesting, and should be carefully 
studied by every teacher. 

Laura Bridgman. — One of the most remarkable 
and interesting illustrations of the power of one sense 
to supply the place of another, and even of two or 
three others, is found in the story of the life and 
education of Laura Bridgman. At a very early age 
she was deprived of the sense of sight and the sense 
of hearing, and almost entirely of the sense of smell. 
Through the sense of touch alone she mastered all 
the common branches of study. She learned to rec- 
ognize her friends by even the slightest touch of their 
hands, or of their dress, and to do a great number 



DEFINITIONS. 25 

of other things which seemed to require perception 
through sight. Her biographer says : " She knows 
how different people laugh, and often speaks of the 
sweet smile of one and another. It may be thought 
that she must be always feeling of the face, and 
thus make herself disagreeable ; but this is not so, 
she rarely touches it, and yet judges correctly." 

Helen Keller. — The most remarkable illustration 
of the rapid acquisition of knowledge through the 
sense of touch is seen in the recently reported case 
of Helen Keller, a young girl living in Alabama. At 
the age of about nineteen months she lost the senses 
of sight and hearing. No special efforts were made 
for her education until she entered her seventh year. 
At that time she was placed in charge of a very 
competent teacher. Her progress was almost beyond 
belief. Within four months she learned "more than 
four hundred and fifty common words which she 
could use correctly, and spell with perfect accuracy." 
A careful study of the methods employed in teach- 
ing the blind and the deaf and dumb and the results 
of these methods will give the parent and the ordi- 
nary teacher much very valuable knowledge. 

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER III. AND DEFINITIONS. 

1. Position of the young child in the world. 

2. Process by which sensations are produced. 

3. Sensation defined. 

4. First conscious mental activity of the child. 

5. Process illustrated. 

6. Beginning of the activity of memory. 

7. Illustration by use of flowers. 



26 DEFINITIONS. 

8. Sensation must stand alone at first. 

9. First step in education. 

10. What follows sensation immediately. 

11. Perception defiDed. Percept denned. 

12. Conditions of perception— the three. 

1.3. Kelations between sensation and perception. 

14. Rapidity of mental action. 

15. Activities involved in perception. 

16. Illustration of a peach. 

17. Perception as a process complex. 

18. Second step in education. 

19. First work of the teacher. 

20. Original and acquired powers of perception. 

21. Importance of the acquired powers. 

22. Examples from e very-day observation. 

23. Laura Bridgman. 

24. Helen Keller. 



Sensation. — A state of mind, or change of state, caused by an 
impression upon a sensory nerve. 

Perception. — (1.) As a power, the ability of the mind to know 
immediately and directly the external world, or objects 
outside of itself. 

(2). As an act, the mind knowing immediately and 
directly the external world, or objects outside of itself. 

A Percept. — A complete mental product of the act of per- 
ceiving. 

The Sensorium. — That part of the physical organism which is 
capable of receiving and conveying impressions from 
external objects and influences to the mind. 



CHAPTER IV. 

INTUITION. -INTUITIVE IDEAS AND TRUTHS. 

Knowledge Obtained through Consciousness. — 

Through consciousness, we know ourselves and. the 
activities and states of our own minds. It is in- 
ner perception, the perception of our thoughts and 
feelings. 

Knowledge through the Senses. — Through the 
senses, we know the external world, — the colors, 
forms, and other qualities of material objects. 

Another Form of Mental Activity. — Intimately 
associated with consciousness and sense-perception, 
is another form of mental activity. The power of 
the mind to exercise this form of activity has re- 
ceived various names, no one of which is perfectly 
satisfactory. 

Related Knowledge. — The knowledge given us 
by this activity, although altogether unlike that fur- 
nished by perception, is nevertheless very closely 
related to that knowledge. Consequently, this activ- 
ity is most naturally and properly put into the same 
class with consciousness and sense-perception. 

The Relation. — The knowledge gained through 
perception seems to be a necessary preparation for 
obtaining and understanding that of which this 
activity is the source. When the first has been 



28 IDEA OF SPACE. 

acquired, the second appears to come of itself by 
some law of mind, but not by any process of reason- 
ing. We notice a few of the ideas derived through 
this mental activity. 

Idea of Space. — A book is on the table before me. 
I move this book to another place. What is now 
where the book was ? What was where the book is ? 
What is it which I myself occupy, and all the ob- 
jects about me? If none of these objects existed, 
what would be where they now are? We call that 
which we and the objects about us occupy, space, 
and when the objects are removed, we call the place 
where they were, empty space. 

But what is space? Has it qualities by which 
any one of the senses can know it ? Can it be 
touched, seen, or tasted? Evidently, space is not 
known through the senses. The idea of it must 
come into consciousness in some other way, and 
from some other source. 

How the Idea Comes. — It seems to come of itself. 
It springs up, so to speak, spontaneously as soon as 
there is need of it or use for it. The nature of the 
mind is such that when it learns of the existence of 
matter, of objects which occupy space, it imme- 
diately has the idea or notion of space. It comes 
intuitively, or by intuition, and the idea is called in- 
tuitive, or an intuition of the soul. The power or 
activity of mind which produces it is called intui- 
tion, or the intuitive power. 

Space Measured. — By force of necessity, we speak 
of space as having extension, but we are unable to 



IDEA OF DURATION. 29 

tell what it is which is extended. No other quali- 
ties or attributes can be applied to it. Space is sup- 
posed to be unlimited in extent, but the mind can 
not comprehend the unlimited. We speak of meas- 
uring portions of space, as we speak of measuring 
bodies, and give it three dimensions. No natural 
units for measuring space or bodies have yet been 
discovered. 

Idea of Duration — Changes within Us. — During 
our waking hours, we are conscious that ideas and 
thoughts are constantly coming and going in our 
minds. Just now we had such an idea ; it is gone. 
We have another, and presently still another. This 
process is ever repeating itself. Changes take place 
within us. 

Changes about Us. — We look out into the world 
about us. One person passes along the street, and 
then another. Clouds appear and disappear above 
us. Day and night follow each other ; the seasons 
come and go in regular order. We discover changes 
taking place every-where. 

Succession. — Thus, both by consciousness and per- 
ception, with the aid of memory, we become familiar 
with the fact of succession. We know that thoughts 
within the mind and events in the world are ever 
following each other. 

How the Idea of Duration Comes. — Having 
learned so much, the idea of what we call duration 
immediately appears in the mind. This, evidently, 
is another intuitive idea ; and, without question, the 
same power of the soul which gave us the notion of 



30 UNITS OF DURATION. 

space has also given us the notion of duration/ since 
it has no qualities by which the senses can know it, 
or bring it into the mind. 

Time. — Like space, duration is believed to be un- 
limited, but some convenient natural units have 
been discovered by which it may be divided or sep- 
arated into limited portions. These limited portions 
are called time, and they are subdivided in various 
ways and for various purposes. 

Units of Duration. — These units of measurement 
are obtained by the observation of certain regularly 
recurring events in the natural world. The daily 
revolution of the earth on its axis affords one unit. 
The annual movement of the same body in its orbit 
around the sun furnishes a larger unit. Other move- 
ments among the stars may supply still larger units. 
By these means we have divisions of duration, called 
days, weeks, years, centuries, and cycles of time. 

Other Intuitive Ideas. — Many other ideas seem to 
have the same intuitive origin. Among these, are 
the ideas of cause and effect, of personal identity, of 
right and wrong, and probably that of a great, first 
Cause of all things. 

Ideas and Truths Distinguished. — Truths, as well 
as ideas, are intuitive in character. The two should 
be carefully distinguished from each other. An idea, 
as the term is here employed, denotes a single men- 
tal notion, image, or picture, as that of space, or 
time, or that of a tree, a book, or a house. The 
notion or picture stands alone ; nothing is affirmed 
or denied of it. It has no relation to any thing else. 



INTUITIVE TRUTHS. 31 

Expression of Truths. — On the other hand, the 
expression of a truth must contain at least two 
notions or ideas, and must form a proposition or full 
sentence. Something must be affirmed or denied. 
When I say an apple, a tree, I express only ideas ; 
nothing is affirmed of the apple or the tree. Each 
picture stands alone. When I say an apple is a 
fruit, two ideas are expressed, — one of a something 
which is called an apple, the other of something 
called fruit, and a relation is declared to exist be- 
tween the two. If the relation is correctly stated, a 
truth is expressed ; since the truth of all statements 
consists in this, that the relation affirmed to exist 
really does exist. 

Intuitive Truths. — Now, the relations between 
some things are of such a nature, are so obvious, 
that the mind recognizes them as true as soon as 
they are affirmed, and assents to the statement of 
them instantly without reserve or hesitation. Such 
truths are called axioms. They are also called intui- 
tions of the mind, or intuitive truths. The intuitive 
power or activity of the soul recognizes, accepts, and 
holds fast to them, whenever there is occasion for 
their recognition and use. 

Characteristics. — Such truths have certain easily 
recognized characteristics, some of which are the 
following: (1.) They are simple; that is, they can 
not be resolved into other truths. The propositions 
by which they are expressed can not, by any analysis, 
be made clearer or more simple. (2.) They are 
necessary ; that is, a denial of them involves an ab- 



32 INTUITION DEFINED. 

surdity. (3.) They are universal ; that is, we can 
conceive of no time or place in which they will not 
be true. (4.) They are, consequently, primary and 
fundamental ; they admit of no proof ; they are not 
reached through observation or experience. 

Examples. — It is impossible, for example, to think 
that a person or thing exists and does not exist at 
the same moment of time ; that two things can oc- 
cupy the same space at the same time ; that the 
whole is greater or less than the sum of all its 
parts ; or that there is no distinction between right 
and wrong. Truths of this kind constitute the ulti- 
mate basis of all reasoning. If they are denied, no 
common starting-point can be found, and, conse- 
quently, no progress can be made in the acquisition 
of new knowledge. All such truths are called intui- 
tive and self-evident. 

Intuition Defined. — Intuition may be defined as 
the power of mind which makes us acquainted with 
simple, primary ideas and truths. 

Important to the Teacher.— It is of high impor- 
tance in the education of children that the teacher 
understand clearly the origin and nature of such 
fundamental truths. The intuitive activity is not 
susceptible of culture in the sense in which the per- 
ceptive activities are. It does not require such cult- 
ure, since it is sure to act, in every normally consti- 
tuted mind, whenever circumstances call for such 
activity. This is to be assumed, and instruction 
should proceed upon this assumption. The ideas of 
cause and effect, of space and time, and others of 



DEFINITION. 33 

similar character, will occur to a child when they 
are needed. Simple axiomatic truths will be recog- 
nized and accepted, and used at the proper stage of 
mental development. They may require illustra- 
tions, but not proof. Attempts to prove the self- 
evident only result in bringing it into the region of 
doubt and uncertainty. The mind of the learner is 
confused thereby, and positive harm is done. 

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER IV. AND DEFINITION. 

1. Knowledge derived through consciousness. 

2. Knowledge derived by sense-perception. 

3. An activity of mind associated with these. 

4. Relation of the knowledge obtained by it to that derived 

through perception. 

5. Idea of space. 

6. Idea of time. 

7. Divisions of duration and units of measurement. 

8. Cause and effect. 

9. Some other intuitive ideas. 

10. Difference between ideas and truths. 

11. Characteristics of intuitive truths. 

12. Results of trying to prove the self-evident. 

Intuition. — The power of mind which makes us acquainted 
with simple, primary ideas and truths. 



SUMMARY OF MENTAL POWERS THUS FAR STUDIED. 

Similarity of these Activities. — The mental powers thus 
far considered have certain common characteristics, and may be 
grouped into one class. Through all of them we acquire knowl- 
edge directly and ' immediately. They bring us, so to speak, 
face to face with the things to be learned. There is no round- 



34 



SUMMARY OF MENTAL POWERS. 



about process, no inferring, concluding, or reasoning. We 
know by a single effort, without any mediating or intervening 
agencies. 

Original Sources of Knowledge. — They are thus original 
and primary sources of knowledge. That which is learned 
through them is the basis of all other acquisitions in knowledge. 
They furnish the material upon which all the other mental 
powers act. And the information which they give us, when in 
a normal condition, can not be doubted. Men trust implicitly 
in the evidence of their senses, in the testimony of conscious- 
ness, and in the teachings of intuition. From their decisions, 
no appeal can be made successfully. Various names have been 
given to these psychical activities. A distinct idea of the 
nature and office of a power is of more importance than its 
name. We will call them perceptive and presentative activities, 
and associate them in the order following : 



Perceptive and presentative 
activities of the mind. . 



1. Consciousness, inner perception, 

2. Sense-perception, outer perception. 

3. Intuition, intuitive perception of pri- 

mary ideas and truths. 



Sensation is not counted as a distinct form of mental ac- 
tion, but is considered as the means through which sense-per- 
ception takes place, and as a part of that complex process. 



CHAPTER V. 

REPRESENTATIVE AND REPRODUCTIVE 
ACTIVITIES. 

Other Mental Activities. — In connection with con- 
sciousness and perception, other activities of mind 
have been referred to, but not described in detail. 
These activities are of such a character that they 
can not manifest themselves until material upon 
which they can act has been furnished through sen- 
sation and sense-perception. The natural order of 
mental development and action may be here ob- 
served. 

Recognition of Objects by the Child. — The child 
first sees objects, hears sounds, touches, tastes, and 
smells things which affect these senses. As objects 
of sight, touch, and so forth, are brought again and 
again before him, he comes, after a little time, to 
recognize them as having been previously seen, 
touched, or tasted. He is now said to know them. 
This recognition of objects must involve a compari- 
son of the present sensations and percepts with 
previous ones recalled and pictured, imaged, or in 
some way represented in the mind. The present 
percept of a white rose, for instance, now seen, 
must be mentally placed alongside the recalled or 
remembered percept of the same rose previously 



36 RECOGNITION BY THE NAME. 

seen. The two are compared, and if they seem to be 
the same, the rose is recognized. The same process 
is involved in the recognition of sounds, smells, and 
tastes, and of all objects of sense-perception. 

Recognition by the Name. — Another and a little 
more difficult exercise of this representative activity 
is manifested when the child becomes able to recog- 
nize objects by their names when the objects them- 
selves are not present. In this case, when the name 
is pronounced, an image, notion, or some representa- 
tion of the object must be formed in the mind. A 
child who has been taught the primary colors and 
their names, when directed to go to another room 
and bring a red card, selecting it from a number of 
cards of various colors, must be able to represent to 
himself the color red before he can make the selec- 
tion. The same is true of fruits, flowers, and all 
other objects which are to be recognized when 
named. In these and similar cases, the former per- 
cepts are recalled and represented by having been 
associated with the names, and the immediate per- 
cepts of the objects, when brought before the senses 
again, are compared with the recalled percepts. The 
principle by which this association takes place will 
be considered in another connection. 

Process in Listening or Reading. — A similar but 
more extended process of reproduction and represen- 
tation takes place whenever one listens to conversa- 
tion, stories, or any description, or reads for himself 
from the printed page. As the speaking or reading 
goes on, the pictures, images, ideas, or notions pre- 



EXAMPLE BY A^ ORANGE. 37 

viously associated with the words, are mentally re- 
produced and represented. Unless this can be done, 
the speaking or reading is not intelligible. In this 
case, we do not represent the precise objects which 
we ourselves have personally known, but persons, 
places, scenes, and events new to us, but similar to 
those which we have known through our own expe- 
riences. In this way, we represent in mind cities, 
landscapes, mountains, and other objects which we 
have never visited. 

Example by an Orange. — A common, every-day 
process of reproduction and representation may be 
illustrated by placing an orange before us. We learn 
by sight its color, form, size, and the appearance of 
its outer surface. By touch, we discover whether it 
is smooth or rough, hard or soft, and, by muscular 
exertion, whether it is light or heavy. By smell, we 
learn its odor, and by taste, its flavor. We have 
partial percepts of sight, touch, smell, and taste. 
Combining all these, we have a complete and full 
percept of the orange. 

The Representation. — Let the orange now be 
taken away. We find ourselves able, by a little 
mental effort, to form a picture or image "in the 
mind's eye" of the orange. We seem to see its color, 
form, size, and the peculiar appearance of the rind. 
All that we learned by sight appears to be perfectly 
pictured ; what we learned by touch, partially so. 
We find ourselves unable to form an image or pict- 
ure of the smell or taste. Nevertheless, we have a 
represented idea or notion of these qualities with 



38 THE REPRESENTATIVE POWER. 

which we can readily compare the smell or taste of 
another orange, or of any other fruit brought before 
us. This mental picture represents to us the orange. 
It appears to be the reproduced percept. 

The Representative Power, or Simple Concep- 
tion. — This mental activity which forms pictures, 
images, ideas, or notions, of things not present to 
the senses is the representative power or represen- 
tation. It may also be called simple conception, the 
term simple being employed to distinguish it from 
conception proper, which is described further on. 
The mental products of this activity may be called 
images, simple concepts, and ideas. Concepts proper, 
expressed by such terms as animal, man, horse, flower, 
and other common names, are considered elsewhere. 

Feelings not Represented. — Feelings are appar- 
ently incapable of reproduction and representation. 
The idea of a feeling, or, in common language, the 
recollection of a feeling, can be brought before the 
mind. I can represent to myself the fact that I was 
angry, and the circumstances connected with the 
feeling, but the anger itself refuses to be reproduced. 

Effect of Ideas. — Under some peculiar conditions, 
the revived idea and the reproduced image of the 
cause of the feeling may bring about a recurrence of 
the feeling itself. It is said that a very vivid repre- 
sentation of an object which has caused nausea, will 
sometimes produce a return of that feeling. The 
same is probably true of some mental feelings. 

Retention. — Reproduction necessarily presupposes 
retention. The differences of opinion in respect to 



REAL REPRESENTATION. 39 

the subject of retention are very wide, but are of 
little practical importance. We know that by some 
means, and upon certain conditions in the acquisi- 
tion, the mind keeps what it learns. It will be suffi- 
ciently definite for our purpose to consider retention 
as the holding by the mind, out of consciousness, of 
that which it has acquired, subject to reproduction 
when called for. 

Real Representation. — In the examples of repre- 
sentation thus far considered, the images, ideas, or 
concepts, are believed to be truthful and accurate 
mental representations of the objects, scenes, persons, 
places, and other things represented. The purpose 
of the psychical activity is to reproduce, if reproduc- 
tion is necessary, and to image things just as they 
are, or are supposed to be. This is not the office of 
imagination. This form of representation may, there- 
fore, be called real representation to distinguish it 
from another form to be presently described. 

Another Kind of Representation. — We are con- 
scious of an activity of mind which, in some cases, 
gives us products closely resembling real represen- 
tations, but, in other cases, very unlike these. The 
psychical activity of simple conception or real rep- 
resentation furnishes us with a great variety and an 
almost infinite number of truthful pictures, images, 
and representations. This activity of mind takes 
these truthful concepts, groups and combines them to 
form complex images and pictures unlike any single 
existing original. Such products are called ideal 
pictures or representations. 



40 IMAGINATION PROPEK. 

An Illustration. —For illustration, a painter selects 
accurate pictures of individual objects and scenes 
from a number of widely separated localities. From 
one he takes a mountain, from another a valley, 
from a third a grove and hill, from the fourth a lake 
and river, and so on, until he has all the materials 
which he desires. These he combines into a beauti- 
ful ideal landscape. Each individual feature of this 
ideal picture is true to nature, but the groupings 
and arrangements of the parts are made according 
to the taste and will of the artist. He has created, 
not the material, but the design or plan. 

Another Illustration. — A writer gathers accurate 
descriptions of persons, events, and places, from differ- 
ent sections of a country, or even from different 
countries. These various persons, events, and places 
are in no way connected or related to each other. 
Out of this material, he produces a consistent and 
entertaining story, in which every part appears to 
sustain a natural relation to all the other parts. 
Each person, each event, each scene, falls into its 
own proper place, and the whole story proceeds as 
naturally as if it were a narrative of real life. This 
is an ideal literary production, as the other was an 
ideal painting. 

Imagination Proper. — The activity of mind by 
which ideal pictures and writings are produced is 
ideal representation or imagination proper. This 
form of imagination is a creative power only in one 
respect. It does not create the material which it 
uses ; it selects, modifies, arranges, and combines. It 



IMAGINATION SUBJECT TO LAW. 41 

does create new plans and combinations. In this 
way, it seems to make a new world, and to place us 
amid new surroundings and in new relations. Its 
work may be compared to that of the builder, who, 
out of a shapeless mass of stone, iron, and wood, 
gathered and heaped up by others, constructs a 
grand and beautiful palace, bringing order out of 
confusion ; grace, beauty, and symmetry out of ugli- 
ness and deformity, and rendering attractive that 
which was before repulsive. 

Two Activities Confounded. — Imagination is often 
confounded with fancy or phantasy. The two names 
are frequently used to denote the same mental 
power. This usage can claim the support of much 
and good authority. It is better, however, to make 
a distinction, and to employ the two terms to indi- 
cate two different but closely related activities of 
mind. Imagination and fancy, alike, select and com- 
bine individual percepts, concepts, ideas, and images 
to fashion from them complex ideal products. 

Imagination Subject to Law. — But imagination 
combines and arranges within the limits of possi- 
bility. It is subject to law. It can be said of any 
legitimate creation of the imagination : " This is pos- 
sible ; such a thing may be, or *may have been." 
The work may border hard upon the improbable, 
but it is not beyond the limits of what can be con- 
ceived. 

Fancy Lawless. — On the other hand, fancy com- 
bines according to its oivn will and pleasure. It 
regards neither law, order, nor possibility. It pro- 



42 DIFFERENT FORMS OF IMAGINATION. 

duces the incongruous, the fantastic, and absurd. It 
revels in the wildest and strangest scenes, and amid 
the most grotesque and ridiculous surroundings. 
Fancy might be regarded as imagination run mad, 
and roaming unchecked and uncurbed. The vagaries 
of fancy sometimes bring discredit and reproach 
upon the imagination, which, when properly em- 
ployed, is one of the highest and nobles activities of 
the soul. 

Different Forms of Imagination. — That form of 
imaginative activity, just described, is often called 
the poetic or cestlietic imagination. Its activity, how- 
ever, takes other and more practical directions. It 
finds legitimate employment in mathematical and 
scientific studies, and in the processes of invention 
and construction. It combines ' isolated and barren 
facts, scattered without order or value, into ingenious 
and plausible hypotheses ; and out of such hypoth- 
eses builds bridges across the gulf which separates 
the known from the problematical and possible. By 
and by, many of these hypotheses are gradually 
transformed into theories, and later into accepted 
scientific knowledge. 

Other Uses. — Imagination is one of the great agen- 
cies of discovery both in the material world and in the 
realm of thought and reason. It is serviceable alike 
in the school and the workshop. With the help of 
imagination, under the guidance of skillful teaching, 
the child creates a real world from the dull and un- 
interesting lines and marks upon maps and globes. 
With the same assistance, he reproduces from the 



DEFINITIONS. 43 

pages of history thriving villages, crowded cities, 
populous kingdoms, and all the varied activities of 
real individual and national life. 

These Activities Manifested Early. — The activities 
of simple conception, imagination, and fancy mani- 
fest themselves very early in the child's life ; but, at 
first, in very crude and imperfect forms. The activ- 
ity of real representation, or simple conception, must 
follow close upon that of sense-perception. Imagina- 
tion and fancy soon begin to use, in a very imper- 
fect way at first, the materials furnished by this 
power. 

Teacher's Work. — The proper development and 
training of these representative activities constitute 
the second great division of the teacher's work. 

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER V. AND DEFINITIONS. 

1. Other forms of mental activity observed. 

2. Recognition of objects by the child. 

3. Process of recognizing from the name. 

4. Mental action when listening or reading. 

5. When reading is intelligible. 

6. Example of mental action by use of an orange. 

7. This power, called the representative power, or simple con- 

ception. 

8. Names given to the products of this activity. 

9. Feelings not reproduced and represented. 

10. Retention presupposed. 

11. How retention may be described. 

12. Real representation defined. 

13. Real representation furnishes material. 

14. Another kind of representation described. 

15. The product, ideal pictures or representations. 

16. Illustrations, — The painter, The novelist. 



44 DEFINITIONS. 

17. Ideal representation, or imagination, defined. 

18. In what respect imagination is creative, and examples of 

its power. 

19. Differences between imagination and fancy. 

20. Some different forms of the activity of the imagination. 

21. Its value to the pupil and the teacher. 

22. The representative activities begin to manifest themselves 

in early life. 



Representation. — The picture or image-making power of the 
mind. 

Real Representation, or Simple Conception. — The mental 
activity which forms pictures, images, and notions of 
individual absent objects of perception, and of other in- 
dividual things as they are, or are supposed to be. 

Ideal Representation, or Imagination. — The mental activity 
which forms ideal pictures, notions, etc., within the 
limits of possibility. 

Fancy or Phantasy. — The mental activity which forms pict- 
ures, notions, etc., without regard to law, order, or 
possibility. 



CHAPTER VI. 

MEMORY. -LAWS OF ASSOCIATION. 

Memory Defined. — The power of the mind to 
retain, to reproduce, and to recognize its previous 
acquisitions, is called memory. It is evident, how- 
ever, that the processes of reproduction and repre- 
sentation are, in many cases, so intimately connected 
that no line of separation can be drawn between 
them. 

Retention. — Retention is a fact; so much we 
know. How it is accomplished is not yet under- 
stood. Theories and conjectures here are unprofit- 
able. 

Importance of Reproduction. — Reproduction de- 
mands especial consideration on account of its great 
importance in the work of education, as well as its 
importance in the business and other affairs of life. 
Acquisitions, however great and varied, are of little 
service to us unless they can be recalled with readi- 
ness and accuracy whenever desired. It concerns 
us to know how this process of reproduction can be 
made most easy, immediate, and sure. 

Two Supposed Varieties. — We are conscious that 
in some cases the reproduction seems instantaneous. 
A question is put to memory, and the answer conies 
at once. Only a single mental effort has been nee- 



46 LAWS OF ASSOCIATION. 

essary. In other cases, indeed in most cases, the 
answer is delayed for a longer or shorter period of 
time. Several successive efforts have been put forth 
in order to reach the desired result. The process is 
apparently a roundabout and complicated one. From 
this observed difference it has been hastily inferred 
that the mental processes in the two cases are un- 
like, and that there is an absolute or independent 
memory and memory by association of ideas. A 
closer analysis shows that this inference is errone- 
ous. The process of reproduction is in all cases 
essentially the same, and depends upon a few gen- 
eral laws of mental activity. 

An Observed Fact. — We observe, in a voluntary 
effort to recall some past acquisition, that one idea, 
image, thought, fact, or circumstance comes into 
mind, then another, then still others, and finally, if 
the effort is successful, the thing desired comes. The 
ideas, thoughts, events, circumstances, follow each 
other so regularly and orderly, that we can not escape 
the conclusion that they are bound together by some 
potent, though unseen, relations. 

Laws of Association. — These relations are named 
laws, principles, or conditions of association, and are 
sometimes divided into two classes, called objective 
and subjective. The objective, also called primary, 
refer to relations existing between the different 
thoughts or the different things themselves ; the sub- 
jective, called also secondary, merely refer to condi- 
tions of mind or body tvhich contribute to fix the asso- 
ciation of ideas more thoroughly and permanently, 



OBJECTIVE LAWS. 47 

and consequently to facilitate retention and repro- 
duction. 

Objective Laws. — In an ultimate analysis, the 
objective laws may probably be reduced to two, — the 
law of similarity and the law of contiguity. It will 
be of service, for purposes of study, to make some 
further subdivisions. 

(1.) Law of Similarity. — This may be stated in 
two forms : Similar things and thoughts are mutu- 
ally suggestive, or similar mental activities and states 
tend to revive each other. This law is familiar, and 
its value is well understood. It is capable of very 
wide application in the school-room and elsewhere. 

A More Fundamental Law. — The law probably 
has its source in another underlying and more fun- 
damental law of mind, which is the basis of mental 
habits also, namely, the tendency of the mind to re- 
peat any activity once exercised, the tendency increas- 
ing with the number and frequency of the repetitions. 
Similar objects excite similar activities, or the same 
activity. Similar activities or the same activity re- 
peated must give the same, or a similar, mental 
product. 

Illustration. — For illustration, I s.aw yesterday a 
specimen of a peculiar kind of flower. To-day an- 
other specimen of the same variety is given to me. 
It causes me to recall the appearance of the one I 
saw yesterday by exciting a repetition of the former 
psychical activity, and thus brings about the repro- 
duction of the percept of yesterday. 

Examples. — Examples and illustrations of the 



48 EXTERNAL RESEMBLANCES. 

workings of this law are very abundant. It acts 
regardless of place or time, with only the exception 
which is common to all the laws of association, — 
that the lapse of a long period of time weakens the 
power of suggestion. We know that one face often 
suggests another, though that other may not have 
been seen for years. One landscape, mountain, val- 
ley, lake, river, or tree, frequently calls to mind an- 
other, even though thousands of miles intervene be- 
tween the two. The solution of one mathematical 
problem suggests the solution of other similar prob- 
lems. One principle of science recalls other related 
principles. All comparisons in writing and speaking 
are based upon this or the next named subordinate 
law. 

External Resemblances. — The resemblance be- 
tween things is sometimes external, and obvious to 
one or more of the senses. This is the case with 
forms, colors, tastes, odors, and many other points 
of likeness. Cities may resemble each other in 
location, climate, population, industries, and archi- 
tecture. States may be similar in population, prod- 
ucts, and employments of the people. 

Resemblances of Influence. — There are other 
more subtle resemblances not discoverable by the 
senses, and still recognized as effective in causing 
association and suggestion. The resemblance is that 
of influence or effect, generally connected with emo- 
tion or some other feeling. The similarity has been 
called the " analogy of feeling." 

A writer says, "My brethren have dealt deceit- 



LAW OF CONTRAST. 49 

fully as a brook, and as the streams of brooks they 
pass away." Friends and summer brooks have no 
points of resemblance to the eye or ear in their 
forms of activity. The resemblance was in the feel- 
ing of disappointment occasioned by both alike. 
The brook dried up, and thus cheated the expecta- 
tions of the tired and thirsty traveler ; false friends 
cheated the heart longing for pity and sympathy. 
Abundant illustrations of this kind of similarity will 
occur to those familiar with general literature. 

(2.) Law of Contrast. — This is not a distinct 
law, but merely a special case under the more gen- 
eral law of similarity. This also may take two 
forms : contrasted things and thoughts are mutually 
suggestive, or contrasted mental activities and states 
tend to revive each other. The basis of the law is 
obvious. The process of seeking and observing like- 
nesses necessarily comprehends the discovery and 
observation of direct contrasts or opposites. It does 
not include giving attention to all sorts of differ- 
ences, but only to those which stand immediately 
over against the resemblances. 

Illustrations. — Sweet suggests sour ; the rough 
suggests the smooth ; the beautiful suggests the 
ugly ; the strong suggests the weak. An individual 
with some marked peculiarity puts us in mind of 
another person with a peculiarity of just the oppo- 
site character. Starving men are said to be tor- 
mented or tantalized with mental visions of tables 
loaded with richest abundance ; and freezing men 
are haunted with recollections of oppressive heat. 



50 LAW OF CONTIGUITY. 

Practical Suggestions. — This law indicates that, 
in many cases, contrasted objects, forms, qualities, 
and general characteristics, should be brought to the 
attention of the learner in connection. In geo- 
graphical and historical studies, also, the principle of 
contrast does most valuable service. 

(3.) Law of Contiguity. — The substance of this 
law may be stated in various forms : things and 
thoughts co-existent or immediately successive in time 
or place are mutually suggestive, or mental activities 
and states co-existent or immediately successive tend 
to revive each other. 

Underlying Law. — This law evidently has its 
origin in the broader and more fundamental law of 
mind, that the presence of any part of a complex 
thing or thought, previously known, immediately sug- 
gests the whole; or the revival of any portion of a 
complex mental activity or state, previously experi- 
enced, tends to revive the whole. This law of con- 
tiguity is of very wide application, and embraces a 
number of related but tolerably distinct cases. 

(a.) The relation of time. We associate events 
because they occurred upon the same day, or within 
the same week, month, year, or century. Men born 
at the same time, or living during the same period, 
are naturally grouped together, and the name of one 
calls up the names of others ; the events and the 
men of the same age are linked together and are 
mutually suggestive, especially if the men were 
actors in the events. Columbus, Ferdinand and Isa- 
bella, the discovery of America, and the year 1492 



THE TWO UNITED. 51 

are so united in the minds of students of history 
that the mention of any one of them recalls all the 
others. In this and most similar examples, other 
relations exist, and are operative, beside that of time. 

(b.) The relation of place. Places contiguous to 
each other or to some common object, as the ocean, 
a large river or lake, a commercial center, or an im- 
portant line of railroad, are associated in the study 
of geography and in matters of business. Men are 
associated with the places where they were born, 
where they resided, where they performed important 
and noteworthy acts, and where they died and were 
buried. Events are associated with the places where 
they occurred ; industries with the localities where 
they are carried on, and natural productions with 
the countries which produce them. Associations of 
place are of the first importance, in connection with 
geography and history. 

The Two United. — The two relations of time 
and place are frequently united, and the strength of 
the association is thus largely increased and inten- 
sified. 

(c.) The relation of cause and effect. The idea 
of cause has been attributed to intuition as its 
source. When of two events, one regularly and in- 
variably succeeds the other, either would suggest the 
other if the relations between them were only that 
of time. But in such a case, the mind can hardly 
escape the conclusion that the relation is deeper and 
more intimate than that of time. The more inti- 
mate the connection is believed to be, the stronger 



52 EXAMPLES. 

becomes the bond of mental association. The ap- 
pearance of one event not only suggests the other, 
but puts the mind to searching for it, if it is not 
readily discovered. This principle of association is, 
for this reason, peculiarly valuable and fruitful in 
results. It finds its most obvious field of activity in 
the study of the physical and other experimental 
sciences. The fact of the rise and fall of the mer- 
cury in the tube of the thermometer and barometer 
is naturally and almost unavoidably associated with 
both the causes and the events likely to follow. 
Opportunities for this kind of association are almost 
equally abundant in geography and history. 

(d.) The relation of wholes and parts. As already 
suggested, it is possible that the relation of wholes 
and parts includes all the cases grouped under the 
head of contiguity, so far as the activities of the 
mind are concerned. Practically, however, in the 
work of learning and teaching, the subdivisions 
given are found desirable, since the habit of making 
profitable use of wide generalizations has not yet 
been formed in young students. 

Examples. — The external relation of wholes and 
parts is proved, in the school and elsewhere, to be 
very suggestive in matters of association. A single 
letter suggests the remainder of the word ; a single 
line or angle recalls the whole figure ; a single move- 
ment of the foot or hand brings back the entire 
series of complex movements ; a note or two re- 
peated enables the singer to recover the whole of a 
long piece of music ; the hesitating pupil repeats the 



OTHER RELATIONS. 53 

whole problem, or gives the entire statement, or 
makes a correct answer, if he can get only the first 
word. Other illustrations will readily suggest them- 
selves. 

Other Relations. — It is true that in some of these 
examples other relations beside that of whole and 
parts are involved, and help to render the associa- 
tion effective. The relations between a subject and 
its predicate, between an object and its qualities, 
between a container and its contents, and others of 
similar nature, are so closely akin to that of whole 
and parts, that they require no separate considera- 
tion. A little examination will disclose numerous 
associations growing out of these relations. 

(e.) Relation of sign and thing signified. This 
relation is of the highest importance in the early 
education of a child, and deserves more attention 
than it has usually received. Signs may appropri- 
ately be divided into natural and artificial. The nat- 
ural sign and its signification seem to be almost 
instinctively associated, and the occurrence of the 
sign scarcely ever fails to suggest at once its mean- 
ing. For practical purposes, it does not matter 
whether we regard the immediate recognition of this 
relation by the untaught child and by some animals 
as the result of original endowment, or of acquired 
and transmitted habit or tendency. 

Natural Signs. — Certain cries of children and of 
animals always suggest ideas of discomfort and pain. 
Peculiar movements of the limbs and of the muscles 
of the face suggest the same ideas. Some other in- 



54 ARTIFICIAL SIGNS. 

articulate sounds, uttered by children and by some 
animals, are invariably associated with ideas of com- 
fort, enjoyment, satisfaction, and pleasure. Certain 
movements of the hands, head, limbs, and other 
parts of the body appear to have a natural associa- 
tion with certain ideas. The sign is instantly inter- 
preted, and always in the same way by all persons, 
whether instructed or not. Education, consequently, 
has very little to do with the association of natural 
signs and their significations. 

Artificial Signs. — On the other hand, the associa- 
tion of artificial signs and their meanings is alto- 
gether a matter of education ; and the creation of 
this association, so that it shall be permanent, con- 
stitutes a very large portion of the educational work 
of the young child and his teacher. Written and 
printed words are entirely artificial signs ; spoken 
words, with possibly a few exceptions, are of the 
same nature. They are signs of objects, qualities, 
acts, ideas, and numerous other things, material and 
immaterial, physical and psychical. In learning to 
talk, the child, aside from the action of the phys- 
ical organs of voice and speech, is striving to 
form a permanent association of certain combi- 
nations of articulate sounds with persons, objects, 
acts, and other things which impress the senses. 
In learning to read, a double association is formed. 
Written and printed characters are associated both 
with the spoken words and also with objects and 
acts. 

Case of the Young Child. — The young child, 



CONDITION" OF RETENTION. 55 

both at home and in the school, is more concerned 
with this relation of signs and their significations 
than with any other of the laws of reproduction. 
Much the larger part of the real labor of the first 
year or two of school life is employed in forming a 
mental connection so intimate and perfect that the 
sign shall instantly suggest the right word to express 
its meaning, and the word, either heard or seen, 
shall as immediately call up the correct psychical 
picture, image, or idea. The young pupil can not 
profitably use a book for the purpose of reading, or 
studying by himself, until most of the words found 
in the book have been so associated. 

(f.) Mental and bodily conditions affecting repro- 
duction. The force of association and suggestion is 
only one of two or three important factors concerned 
in the retention and reproduction of knowledge. 
This force depends primarily upon the relations just 
described. Its efficiency, however, is greatly aug- 
mented by conditions of mind and body which are, 
to a considerable extent, under the control of the 
will, and are, for this reason, called subjective con- 
ditions or laws. 

Condition of Retention. — In order that a mental 
impression or product may be surely retained and 
readily recalled, it must be, to borrow a physical 
mode of speech, deep and distinct. Its accuracy is 
important to its value, and should be secured, but this 
is not a condition absolutely essential to reproduction. 
The conditions which secure depth and distinctness 
will, in most cases, also secure accuracy. In a few 



56 SUBJECTIVE CONDITIONS. 

obvious cases, depth is gained at the expense of both 
distinctness and accuracy. 

Examples. — A loud, piercing, overwhelming sound 
makes a deep but very confused impression. An 
exceedingly brilliant flash of light dazzles the eyes, 
and leaves an indistinct result. A taste or odor may 
be so sharp and pungent that the sensory organs 
are partially paralyzed, and can make no definite 
report of the impression. Touch may become a blow, 
and produce a state of complete or partial uncon- 
sciousness. Leaving such exceptional cases aside, 
depth, distinctness, and accuracy can be obtained at 
the same time by a skillful instructor. 

Subjective Conditions. — The following are the 
most important subjective conditions : 

(a.) Attention. The power to retain and reproduce 
knowledge depends very much upon the hind and de- 
gree of attention given in the acquisition. Attention, 
being in fact merely the concentration of the whole 
effective energy of the mind in one direction and upon 
one object, seems to act on the percept, image, idea, 
or thought, much in the same manner as a concen- 
trated and intensified physical force acts upon a 
material object. The effect is like that of a heavy 
blow as compared with the effect of a light one. 
The impression is made deeper and more permanent. 
If the attention becomes observation, in the true 
sense of the word, the impression is distinct ; and if 
the observation is careful and well directed, descend- 
ing to details and specific characteristics, the impres- 
sion will be accurate and truthful. 



ATTENTION SELECTS. 57 

Illustration. — For illustration, my perceptive activ- 
ity is turned, by some circumstance, to a flower. I 
notice that it is a flower, and, at first, this is all. 
But something in the flower attracts my attention, 
as we usually speak. I observe now that it is a rose. 
Something peculiar catches and holds my attention 
still more closely and firmly. I observe now that it 
is of a rare variety, of a peculiar form and color and 
fragrance. By this time the impression, the percept, 
has become deep, distinct, and accurate. To-morrow 
I can readily recall an image of the rose, and from 
this image can give a full description of all the 
peculiarities of the flower. 

Attention Selects. — It must be remembered, how- 
ever, that -attention, of necessity, selects some tilings 
and neglects or disregards others. In one aspect, it 
is like the object glass of a microscope, the higher 
the power, the smaller the field of view. The more 
intense and concentrated the attention, the fewer 
are the things observed ; the deeper, more distinct 
and accurate the impression, the more limited its 
extent. 

Attention Determines the Association. — In conse- 
quence of this necessary characteristic, attention 
determines, within certain limits, the associations 
which shall be made between objects and ideas. 
Every object or event has its surrounding and re- 
lated objects and events. Of these, there may be, 
and in most cases will be, a considerable number 
and variety. The attention can not be directed at 
once to all these, and the time for observation may 



58 WHAT THIS FACT EXPLAINS. 

be too limited to allow them to be taken one by one 
in turn. Some, therefore, will be passed by entirely 
unnoticed by one person, while another observer 
may give his whole attention to them. 

What this Fact Explains. — This fact accounts 
for the unlike, and sometimes contradictory, reports 
'made by different witnesses of the same occurrence. 
The observers may be equally intelligent, equally 
truthful, and equally attentive, but the attention of 
each took its own direction, and made its own selec- 
tion and its own peculiar associations to guide and 
determine future reproduction. 

Of two persons, objects, or events occurring at 
the same moment, the attention may be concentrated 
upon the points of resemblance only, and they will 
be associated by the relation of similarity as well as 
of time. They may have strong points of contrast, 
and these may form the bond of union, all other 
characteristics going unnoticed. The association may 
embrace nothing more than the consideration of 
time and place, if, for any reason, the attention was 
strongly directed to these. 

Of a single object, the only thing remembered 
may be the position, the size, the form, or the color, 
the recollection being determined by the direction of 
the attention. 

The importance of attention, in its relation to 
retention and reproduction, can hardly be over- 
estimated. 

(b.) Repetition. If the impressive force of atten- 
tion is compared to the effect of a single vigorous 



BEPETITION AND ATTENTION. 59 

blow, the impressive force of repetition may be com- 
pared to the effect of a succession of feeble strokes. 
Repetition is a natural ally of attention, and, to a 
considerable extent, a substitute for it during the 
first years of childhood. All the child's early efforts 
at learning, from his first attempts to control his 
hands until he becomes able to walk steadily with- 
out assistance, from his first effort to repeat the pet 
name of his mother until he can pronounce words 
readily at sight, are made successful only by a con- 
tinued series of repetitions. The natural order of 
mental development is such that no substitute can 
be found for this process ; and fortunately the young 
child does not appear to find it irksome, even in the 
school, if the teacher is fairly skillful in directing. 

Relation of Repetition and Attention. — While, at 
the beginning, attention determines what objects and 
ideas shall be associated, and by what relation they 
shall be united, repetition is required, except in 
some few peculiar cases, to render the union per- 
manent. If two objects or two persons are seen to- 
gether once only under very extraordinary circum- 
stances to which the attention is strongly and in- 
tently directed, the association may be permanently 
fixed. Usually, in the first instance, a tendency only 
to such association begins to be formed, and sev- 
eral repetitions of the observation will be neces- 
sary to complete the work, so that hereafter the 
sight of one of the objects or persons will be sure 
to cause an image of the other to appear in the 
mind. 



60 EFFECT OF LAPSE OF TIME. 

Examples. — The same fact is observable in other 
and different forms of mental activity. Under the 
spur of necessity, an actor may commit a new part 
of considerable length within a few hours by con- 
centrating the whole energy of the mind upon the 
task. It is simply a supreme effort of attention, and 
this gives immediate but temporary success. The 
part will soon be entirely forgotten, unless the work 
of attention is supplemented by repetition. 

Effect of Lapse of Time. — The effect of lapse of 
time is well known. An impression made yesterday 
is easily recalled to-day ; the reproduction is accom- 
plished with more difficulty to-morrow, with still 
more difficulty at the end of a week or a month. 
It is important, therefore, that repetitions begin 
directly after the first impression has been made, 
and that, for a time, they be very frequent. When 
by many iterations the impression has become thor- 
oughly fixed, longer and still longer intervals may 
be allowed to occur between the repetitions, until 
they become mere occasional reviews. 

The relation of repetition to the formation of 
habits and the acquisition of skill will require sepa- 
rate consideration and in another place. 

(c.) Associated feeling. This topic might, with- 
out impropriety, have been treated under the head 
of contiguity, since the influence of feeling upon 
reproduction depends upon the tendency of mind to 
recall and repeat the whole of any previous act or 
state whenever any part is reproduced. 

Mental Acts and States Complex. — Most mental 



THOUGHT AND FEELING. 61 

acts and states, especially in the adult mind, are 
highly complex. In almost all cases, perhaps in all, 
acts of knowing are accompanied by states of feel- 
ing. The acts and the states become intimately as- 
sociated, so that a particular act of knowing is 
habitually and immediately attended by a certain 
state of feeling. 

Illustrations. — This is illustrated by the remark 
frequently made by individuals, that they can not 
think of such and such persons or events without 
becoming angry, or without the feeling of con- 
tempt, or pity, or sorrow and sympathy. On the 
other hand, these feelings, when excited by other 
causes, have a tendency to recall to mind such per- 
sons and events. The relation is evidently similar to 
that of contiguity, if it is not the same. 

Relation Between Thought and Feeling. — The 
constitution of the soul is such that a natural re- 
lationship exists between thought and feeling. 
Thought produces feeling ; feeling, in turn, quickens 
the activity of thought. They appear to be neces- 
sarily co-existent. So far from being mutually ex- 
clusive, they are mutually helpful, except when one 
or the other becomes unnaturally excessive, and 
when they act in different directions, and are con- 
cerned about different objects. In these cases, they 
are mutually obstructive. 

Interest. — Teachers are exhorted to create an in- 
terest in the minds of their pupils. This means 
that they should, if possible, in some way excite 
certain feelings ; for what we call interest is only 



62 TWO EFFECTS OF FEELING. 

feeling of some sort. It may be simple emotion, or 
it may be some feeling of more definite and spe- 
cific character. 

Two Effects of Feeling. — Feeling seems to exert 
its influence chiefly in two directions. In the first 
place, it produces an effect upon the mind which 
may be compared to that produced upon iron by 
heat. It renders the soul more impressible, so that 
the same force produces more effect than it other- 
wise would. It also intensifies attention, and that 
increases very largely the energy and effectiveness 
of the force itself. The attention given to any ob- 
ject or any subject is proportionate to the interest 
felt, or to the degree of feeling excited. Attention, 
which is here only another name for the knowing 
activity, corresponds in degree with the degree of 
feeling. The result is a more rapid and more per- 
manent acquisition of knowledge, so long as a 
proper equilibrium is maintained. 

Retention Easy. — Acquisitions made under such 
conditions are ordinarily easily retained and readily 
reproduced, if due regard is had to the law of repe- 
tition. Under the influence of very intense, but not 
overwhelming feeling, an impression so deep and 
well defined may be made that no repetition will 
be necessary. A day, a place, or a scene of very 
strong and peculiar pleasure or pain, of joy or sor- 
row, may be vividly recalled, even years afterward, 
although none of the attending circumstances have 
e^er been revived by repetition or review. 

Lasting Associations. — Probably no associations 



LASTING ASSOCIATIONS. 63 

are more lasting or more constantly active in the 
work of reproduction than those into which feeling 
enters as a prominent or predominant element. A 
little memento, worthless in itself, calls up at once 
the home of one's childhood, the scenes and cir- 
cumstances of early life, the forms and faces of 
those long dead. The interest with which places 
are visited often has its origin wholly in this asso- 
ciation. Reverence and affection for Washington 
make sacred his home and resting-place, and deeper 
feelings of the same nature are associated with 
Nazareth and Bethlehem. 

This Principle should be Used. —Advantage 
should be taken of this principle of association in 
the instruction of young children. The power of 
voluntary attention is so weak that it needs to be 
re-enforced by the energy of appropriate feeling. 
Anecdotes and short stories about persons, places, 
inventions, books, articles of furniture, and other ob- 
jects of study, are of service in exciting and keep- 
ing alive such feelings. Care should be taken that 
only agreeable feelings be associated with processes 
of learning as far as this is possible. It is no slight 
misfortune when something good and beautiful in 
science, art, literature, or life is associated with feel- 
ings of pain, disappointment, anger, or some still 
worse feeling. 

(d,) State of body and mind. It is a familiar fact 
that at some times it is very difficult to fix the 
mind upon any subject of study, or to reproduce 
that which has previously been learned. With some 



64 SELF-CONTROL SUPPOSED. 

persons, this condition is the natural result of bad 
mental habits, and indicates no peculiar temporary 
state either of body or mind. They have never ac- 
quired the power to control the activities of the 
mind, and to concentrate them upon any object or 
purpose. In respect to attention, they are in the 
condition of children. The remarks under this head 
have no reference to such chronic cases of mental 
imbecility. 

Self-control Supposed. — The supposition is that, 
under ordinary circumstances, individuals have a 
good degree of control over themselves, and over 
their psychical activities, and that such a state of 
inability is exceptional. The condition is real and 
not imaginary, and, though it may be somewhat 
modified and relieved by force of will, it can be 
radically cured only by removing the cause. Efforts 
to do mental work at such times generally end in 
melancholy failures. 

Causes Obvious. — Sometimes the immediate cause 
is obvious. The mind may be preoccupied with 
other objects of thought which can not, for some 
reason, be dislodged ; may be overburdened with cares 
or anxieties which can not be laid aside at will ; 
may be overwhelmed with some affliction or sorrow, 
or may be exhausted by too long -continued labors. 

Cause may be Bodily. — The cause may be in the 
derangement of some of the organs or functions of 
the body. The processes of digestion may be de- 
ranged, the nervous system and the brain may be 
exhausted; some nerve may be tormented by acute 



ORIGINAL DIFFERENCES. 65 

pain, or general lassitude and weariness may affect 
the whole physical organism. 

Causes in the School. — In the school-room the 
immediate cause of this partial and temporary im- 
becility may frequently be discovered in the discom- 
fort arising from constrained and unnatural posi- 
tions, from a temperature too high or too low, from 
vitiated air, or from undue and unnecessary nervous 
irritation. 

Under such conditions of body and mind, very 
little healthy and vigorous psychical activity can 
take place. The feebleness of attention prevents 
the production of deep and well-defined mental im- 
pressions, or the formation of effective association 
of ideas ; and associations previously formed seem 
to lose their suggestive power. 

Original Differences. — Differences or varieties of 
memory. Under the head of subjective conditions 
affecting retention and reproduction, peculiarities 
and differences of mental constitution are sometimes 
reckoned. These are so radical, so permanent, and 
so slightly affected by efforts of the will or by tem- 
porary surrounding circumstances or immediate 
states of body or mind, that they constitute, in 
effect, original varieties of memory itself. 

Differences in General Power. — In some cases the 
differences are merely variations of degree in the 
general power or activity of memory. Some persons 
are able to retain and reproduce acquisitions of all 
kinds, relating to all subjects, much more surely and 
readily than others. In some cases a like difference 



66 SPECIAL DIFFERENCES. 

is observable in all the other psychical activities ; in 
other cases, the difference seems confined to the 
memory and its associated powers. 

Special Differences. — More commonly, however, 
the difference is not one of general but of special 
power. Some things and some classes of things are 
remembered and recalled without difficulty, perhaps 
with unusual facility, while other things and classes 
of things can be retained and reproduced only with 
extreme difficulty, or there may be, apparently, an 
entire inability to recall them. Such general and 
special original differences manifest themselves in 
childhood, and should be considered in the demands 
made upon pupils in all departments, but especially 
in the primary grades. 

Acquired Differences. — No causes can be assigned 
for original disparities of memory, or of other psy- 
chical activities, except natural or inherited pecul- 
iarities of mental constitution. Reasons can usually 
be discovered for differences appearing in mature 
life, or after the period of childhood. If the dis- 
parity is general, it probably results from good or 
bad training in the home and school, from proper 
or improper use of memory, from fortunate or un- 
fortunate personal habits of study and reading, or 
from a combination of circumstances. 

Causes of Specific Differences. —If the differences 
are specific, their causes are found in employments, 
professions, peculiar environments, the attention 
given to special studies, and other manifest condi- 
tions, Mental activity has been concentrated upon 



DIRECTING POWER OF THE WILL. 67 

particular objects or subjects ; other things have 
been partially or wholly neglected ; the mind has 
been constantly filled with one class of impressions 
until it has become peculiarly susceptible to these, 
and comparatively unable to be affected by those 
of a different character. The mental activities of 
perception, representation, and reproduction having 
been exercised so exclusively in one direction, pe- 
culiar associations of objects and ideas have been 
formed, and permanent mental habits have been 
created. 

Illustrations will readily occur of the influence of 
circumstances and occupations. The physician ob- 
serves and remembers one class of things ; the law- 
yer, the clergyman, the teacher, the journalist, the 
scientist, naturally notice and habitually recall other 
classes of things. The same is true of men en- 
gaged in all the various departments of professional, 
business, and mechanical activities. These, and all 
other similar variations in the power and direction 
of memory, are results of the influence of the gen- 
eral law of habit. 

Directing Power of the Will. — Passive reproduc- 
tion — Reverie. In ordinary cases of reproduction 
and representation, there is a conscious directing 
effort of the will. A desire is felt to make some 
particular mental picture or image, to recall some 
particular past acquisition, to reproduce material for 
immediate and special use, and the reproductive 
and representative energies are exercised according 
to this desire. 



68 ASSOCIATION LIMITS REPRODUCTION. 

Association Limits Reproduction. — It is true that 
previously formed associations will limit the total 
amount of matter which can be recalled, but, in 
most cases, it is only a small part of that which re- 
lates to any subject which is wanted at any one 
time or for any one purpose. Every object or idea 
is associated with a large number of other objects 
and ideas, any one of which may be brought into 
mental view when the reproductive process begins. 
Some of these associated objects and ideas are ger- 
mane to the subject under consideration, others are 
not. The irrelevant ones are instantly rejected ; the 
relevant ones seized upon and appropriated. In this 
way direction is given to the reproductive activity, 
and a selection is made of the train of ideas and 
thoughts which the mind will follow, or will allow 
to remain in consciousness. Practically, therefore, 
both memory and imagination are obedient to the 
will so far as the will chooses to exercise its prerog- 
ative. If it were otherwise, acquisitions of knowl- 
edge would be comparatively useless, since their 
recovery at any particular time would be almost a 
matter of chance. 

Undirected Reproduction and Representation. — 
At times the reproductive and representative proc- 
esses go on without interference or control by the 
will. The mind exerts no positive, voluntary ac- 
tivity. Some passing object or event " starts a 
train" of images or ideas, and the mind remains 
passive as they come and go, being merely conscious 
of their presence, and allowing them to crowd and 



REVERIE. 69 

jostle each other as they please. The result is ap- 
parent chaos, and the temporary combinations of 
images and ideas are generally incongruous, and 
often amusing from their very strangeness and ab- 
surdity. If the senses of a person in this condition 
remain subject to external impressions, these impres- 
sions mingle with the reproduced images, and prob- 
ably give some direction to the confused current 
flowing through the mind. 

Reverie. — If the senses are closed or inactive, the 
current is unimpeded by external influences, and 
takes, what seems to the observer, a random direc- 
tion. This state of mind has been called reverie ; it 
has some characteristics in common with the state 
called abstraction. The most marked difference be- 
tween reverie and abstraction is, that in the former 
state there is no continuity in the mental imagery, 
no apparent connection between successive mental 
pictures, while in the state of abstraction the mind is 
so completely possessed and occupied by some one 
subject that it is absolutely oblivious to every thing 
else, and especially to sense impressions. This auto- 
matic action of mind in reverie is properly classed 
with the reproductive and representative activities, 
since it has so many characteristics in common with 
them. By some it is regarded as a mode of imagi- 
native activity. It might more appropriately be 
called passive fancy or phantasy. 

Effect of Reverie. — Individuals of certain tem- 
peraments easily fall into this dreamy state of mind, 
particularly during the time when youth is changing 



70 DEFINITIONS. 

to maturity. The state may even become habitual ; 
in which case irreparable injury is inflicted upon the 
mind. It makes all continued and vigorous mental 
action distasteful, if not impossible. It weakens the 
power of attention, destroys the energy of the will, 
and, in fact, undermines the whole psychical fabric. 
The representative activity which is excited by read- 
ing some classes of books does not differ much from 
this unwholesome mental condition. The effect upon 
psychical vigor is exceedingly harmful. 

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER VI. AND DEFINITIONS. 

1. Memory defined. 

2. Retention. 

3. Importance of reproduction. 

4. Two supposed varieties of reproduction, not really two. 

5. Observed fact of associated ideas. 

6. What laws of association are. 

7. Primary or objective laws. 

8. Law of similarity. The underlying fundamental law. 

9. Illustrations and examples. 

10. External resemblances obvious to the senses. 

11. Resemblance of influence or effect. 

12. An illustration. 

13. Law of contrast. 

14. Illustrations. Practical suggestions. 

15. Law of contiguity. 

16. The underlying principle. 

17. Yarious applications of this law. — (a.) Relation of time; 

(6.) of place ; both these often united ; (c.) of cause and 
effect ; (d.) of whole and parts, and various others ; (e.) 
of sign and thing signified ; natural signs and artifi- 
cial signs ; work of the young child ; (/.) of mental and 
bodily condition. 

18. Conditions of retention. 



DEFINITIONS. 71 

19. Depth and distinctness of impressions. 

20. Examples of strong impressions. 

21. Subjective conditions, secondary laws. — (a.) Attention, ex- 

amples, and illustrations, attention determines associ- 
ation. (&.) Repetition; relation to attention; examples; 
effect of lapse of time, (c.) Associated feeling ; mental 
states complex ; illustrations ; relation between thought 
and feeling ; interest ; two effects of feeling ; retention 
easy ; lasting associations ; this principle should be em- 
ployed, (d.) State of body and mind ; causes frequently 
obvious ; condition in a school. 

22. Varieties or differences of memory. 

23. Differences in general power. 

24. Specific differences. 

25. Acquired differences. 

26. Causes of specific differences. 

27. Passive reproduction, — Reverie. 

28. Usual directing power of the will. 

29. Association limits reproduction. 

30. Undirected reproduction and representation. 

31. Reverie. Bad effects of this state of mind. 



Memory. — The power of the mind to retain, reproduce, and re- 
know its acquisitions. 

Attention. — The concentration of mental energy and activity 
upon any one object, either external or internal. 

Laws of Association. — The relations and conditions which 
cause objects, events, thoughts, ideas, etc., to be men- 
tally, associated or bound together. 

Primary or Objective Laws. — The relations which exist be- 
tween associated objects, events, thoughts, ideas, etc., 
and which cause them to be mutually suggestive. 

Secondary or Subjective Laws. — The conditions and states 
of mind and body which contribute to render the asso- 
ciation of objects, events, thoughts, ideas, etc., more 
certain and more lasting. 



72 SUMMARY OF MENTAL ACTIVITIES. 

Fundamental Law of Reproduction. — The mind has a nat- 
ural tendency to repeat any form of activity which it 
has once exercised, and the strength of this tendency 
increases with the number and frequency of the repe- 
titions. 

A Fundamental Law of Suggestion. —The presence of any 
part of a complex thing or thought, previously known, 
usually suggests the whole ; or the revival of any por- 
tion of a complex mental activity or state, previously 
experienced, tends to revive the whole. 



SUMMARY OF SECOND GROUP OF MENTAL ACTIVITIES. 



Representative and Re- 
productive powers. 



r 1. Real representation or simple 
conception. 
2. Ideal representation or imagi- 
nation. 
I 3. Memory. 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE ELABORATIVE OR THINKING 
ACTIVITIES. 

Thinking. — The term " thinking" is employed, in 
common speech, to denote any form of mental ac- 
tion. The word properly indicates, however, only 
those forms of psychical activity by which the ma- 
terials of knowledge, gathered up by perception and 
held ready for use by memory, are examined, com- 
pared, classified, and transformed into the condition 
of real knowledge. That which was at first little else 
than a crude mass, becomes an orderly collection of 
valuable matter. 

Illustration. — A crude illustration of the think- 
ing processes may be borrowed from the processes 
which go on in the conversion of the material re- 
ceived by the digestive organs into a nutritive form. 
Materials to be used for nourishing and building up 
the physical organism, are gathered from all direc- 
tions and all sources, and, after the preliminary 
operation of mastication, are deposited in the stom- 
ach. These materials are not so much food as they 
are the substances out of which food is to be manu- 
factured. By the processes of digestion, circulation, 
and assimilation they are transformed into real nour- 
ishment, and converted into blood, bone, muscle, and 



74 CHILDREN'S THINKING. 

nerve. Thinking does for the products of the ac- 
quisitive mental powers what these processes do for 
the raw materials of food. It mentally digests, 
transforms, and assimilates them. It converts them 
into forms in which they may be said to be com- 
prehended, or thoroughly known. The other activi- 
ties merely apprehend them ; that is, seize upon and 
hold them. 

Children's Thinking. — The thinking activities 
commence in children's minds at a very early pe- 
riod, as soon, evidently, as materials are furnished ; 
but the first efforts are exceedingly feeble, scarcely 
more than faint inceptions. That they are real be- 
ginnings of the highest and most complex of all 
psychical activities, is abundantly proved by the 
questionings of childhood. The ripe development of 
the thinking powers is attained only with the full 
maturity of both body and mind. 

General Notions, or Concepts. — Conception, The 
preliminary processes of thinking require the forma- 
tion of general notions, or concepts proper, and of 
those mental products called abstract ideas. These 
general notions are named by such terms as animal, 
man, horse, flower, fruit, rose, and others of similar 
nature, designated usually as common nouns. Ab- 
stract ideas are named by such words as virtue, vice, 
goodness, purity, honesty, and similar terms, com- 
monly called abstract nouns. General concepts and 
abstract ideas, although of somewhat similar origin, 
and frequently associated together, differ widelj r in 
some important features. These differences will be- 



FORMATION OF GENERAL CONCEPTS. 75 

come evident when the origin and peculiar charac- 
teristics of both have been examined. The origin of 
such notions and ideas, and the use of the terms by 
which they are named, will be best understood 
through illustrative examples. 

Formation of General Concepts. — I have before 
me a large number of apples. They differ somewhat 
in form, vary much in size, color, and taste. I ex- 
amine them one by one with great care, noting the 
qualities and characteristics of each. At the conclu- 
sion of the examination, I discover that some quali- 
ties and characteristics have been noted in connection 
with every apple. These are common characteristics. 
Each apple, or each variety of apples, has also 
qualities and characteristics peculiar to itself, and 
not found in any of the others, 

Analysis. — This process of examination is prop- 
erly enough called analysis. By reviewing this work 
of analysis, I observe that I have been able to select 
any one quality of an apple, separate it for purposes 
of examination from all other qualities, and devote 
my whole attention to that alone. I observe further, 
that I have been able to select any one of the char- 
acteristics common to all the apples, devote attention 
to it, and think of it not as belonging to any par- 
ticular apple, but to all apples. I find I have been 
able thus to separate all the common characteristics. 

Abstraction. — This process of selection and sep- 
aration is termed abstraction. It will be noticed 
that, in this case, abstraction is nothing more than 
concentrating the attention upon some particular 



76 GENERALIZATION. 

things and entirely disregarding, for the time, all 
other things. 

The Concept. — I discover now that I can take 
all the common characteristics, and combine them, 
or suppose them combined, in a single apple. The 
result is an apple containing all the common quali- 
ties and features, and no others. It is neither sweet 
nor sour ; neither red nor green ; neither hard nor 
mellow ; neither early nor late in ripening. No such 
apple actually exists, or ever did exist, or ever will 
exist. It is purely a mental product. It is the gen- 
eral notion, or concept, to which the common name 
apple is applied. This name I now extend, and 
make it embrace and designate all varieties of fruits 
which possess the few common characteristics. 

Generalization. — This application of a common 
name to a large number of individuals, because they 
all have certain things in common, is termed gen- 
eralization. In a similar way are formed the general 
notions, or concepts, called tree, fruit, flower, lily, 
animal, horse, man, house, table, chair, and all others 
to which common names are applied. 

Conception. • — The whole mental activity by which 
this complex process, including analysis, abstraction, 
and generalization is performed, receives the name 
conception. The mental products, as already stated, 
are general concepts or notions. 

Difference between Individual and General Con- 
cepts. — The difference between the use of the terms 
conception and concept here, and a previous use, will 
be readily observed. Simple concepts represent in- 



CLASSIFICATION. 77 

dividual things ; general concepts represent classes 
or large numbers of individuals. Having once care- 
fully observed a particular pear-tree, I can form a 
simple concept or image of that individual pear-tree. 
By the processes of analysis and abstraction, after 
observing many such trees, I am able to form a 
general concept or notion representing the whole 
class of pear-trees. 

Relation between the Two. — In many cases, a 
natural and interesting relationship can be discov- 
ered between the two kinds of concepts. A dim and 
shadowy picture, or mental image, can be formed of 
many general concepts ; but if a strong effort is 
made to render this confused image distinct and 
clear, with well-defined outlines, it becomes trans- 
formed into a simple concept of some individual of 
the class which it represents. 

Classification. — The processes above described, 
and included under the name conception, are essen- 
tially the processes involved in the work of classifi- 
cation as performed by the student of botany and 
other similar studies. The general concept constitutes 
the basis of the class in all cases; and the ordinary 
scholar finds this basis already provided and ready 
for use. The common qualities, or characteristics, 
have been abstracted, combined, and given to him 
in the form of a definition. The classes have been 
made, named, and described. The student has only 
two processes to perform instead of three. The 
most difficult part of the work has been done by 
the original investigators, and it would be worse 



/o NATURE OF A DEFINITION. 

than folly to insist that every student must do this 
over again for himself. The learner, in botany, for 
instance, must make the analysis and the generaliza- 
tion ; that is, he must examine each individual 
specimen presented to him, and place it in the 
proper class. In other words, he must examine a 
flower sufficiently to be able to name it correctly. 
Naming consists in stating the class, order or family, 
genus, species, and, in some cases, variety. 

Nature of a Definition. — A definition has been 
given to the student in his text-book of each of the 
divisions just mentioned. This definition is nothing 
more than a brief statement or enumeration of the con- 
tents of a general concept If the concept is very 
complex, and contains a large number of elements, 
the definition must be very long, or the less impor- 
tant elements must be omitted. A definition, for 
some purposes, consists in giving the name of the 
class, or genus, to which an object belongs, with a 
brief statement of its specific characteristics. For 
example, a rectangle is defined as "a four-sided 
figure, having only right angles." " Four-sided " 
names the genus or class of figures to which the 
rectangle belongs; " having only right angles," states 
how it differs from other four-sided figures, or names 
its species among the great variety of figures with 
four sides. 

Descriptions. — It is a matter of interest to dis- 
cover that our familiar descriptions of objects fre- 
quently take the form of classification. A. basket is 
brought to me, and I am asked to describe the con- 



EXAMPLES. 79 

tents. I say the basket contains fruit. This state- 
ment, if correct, puts the contents into the great 
class fruits, and separates them from all other 
products of the earth. I say, further, that they are 
grapes. This puts them into a genus, or particular 
kind of fruit, and distinguishes them from all other 
fruits. I add still further that they are Catawba 
grapes. This completes the description, and really 
completes the classification, by placing them in a 
species or variety of grapes, thus separating them 
from every other kind or variety. It is presupposed 
that the meanings of the terms fruit, grapes, Ca- 
tawba, are fully understood ; which is a familiar 
way of saying that the contents of the mental no- 
tions or concepts associated with these words, and 
called up by them, are instantly recognized and 
identified. 

Examples. — The descriptions by which absent 
objects are to be named in a game of guessing, are 
often tolerably correct scientific definitions. Any 
one at all familiar with natural history, would at 
once recognize as a gray squirrel an animal de- 
scribed as, "A small rodent of gray color, with a 
bushy tail, whose movements are very active and 
graceful." Here the class and order are given with 
certain family characteristics sufficient to enable a 
person, acquainted with the technical terms used, to 
identify the object with little danger of mistake. 

Abstract Ideas. — The notions indicated by such 
terms as virtue, vice, goodness, beauty, loveliness, 
and others of the same kind, as stated above, are 



80 EXAMPLES OF ABSTRACT IDEAS. 

called abstract ideas. They do not, like general con- 
cepts, denote a collection and combination of quali- 
ties, elements, or characteristics, common to a large 
number of individual objects, but rather a single in- 
tangible and indefinable quality or element, regarded 
as the essential and predominating characteristic of a 
large number of material objects, or of many different 
acts and states of sentient beings. By the process of 
abstraction this single element is mentally sepa- 
rated from the various objects, acts, and states in 
which it is supposed to be found, and is designated 
by a name usually derived from an adjective de- 
scriptive of the objects, acts, or states. 

Examples of Abstract Ideas. — Examples are 
abundant. From a number of objects called hard, 
we obtain, in this way, the abstract idea named 
hardness. From many objects regarded as beauti- 
ful, the idea of beauty is derived. From tough ob- 
jects, toughness ; from brittle objects, brittleness, 
and so on indefinitely. 

From acts and states of sentient beings, called 
virtuous, we get the abstract idea of virtue ; from 
benevolent acts, benevolence ; from kind acts, kind- 
ness ; from vicious acts and states, vice ; from mali- 
cious acts, malice ; and from selfish acts, selfishness. 
Illustrations might be multiplied to any extent. 

Difference between General Concepts and Abstract 
Ideas. — It was stated that, in many cases, general 
concepts might be dimly imaged in the mind ; ab- 
stract ideas can not be imaged in any degree, nor 
under any conditions. They are mere psychical crea- 



USE OF TERMS BY CHILDREN. 81 

tions of the thinking powers, and have no characteris- 
tics by which they can be described or directly made 
known to the senses. Consequently, ideas expressed 
by abstract terms can be learned only through con- 
crete examples of objects, acts, and states, in which 
such ideas are embodied, and to which they give 
character. The idea of hardness can be compre- 
hended only by becoming acquainted with hard ob- 
jects through the senses ; the idea of goodness, only 
by knowing immediately good beings, good actions, 
and good things of various sorts. 

Use of Terms by Children. — Children come to a 
full comprehension of abstract ideas very slowly, and 
not until the thinking activities are well developed. 
They form general concepts earlier, but at first, 
without doubt, very imperfectly. The fact that they 
use general terms does not prove the possession of 
general notions. Such terms are employed by them as 
names of individuals, and not of classes of things. 
The name man, when pronounced by a young child, 
means some particular individual; boy includes only 
a single person ; dog indicates but one animal of the 
dog kind. This is at first true of all common 
nouns. Very slowly, and probably by an uncon- 
scious process, the child begins to form general con- 
cepts. For a long time such notions embrace but 
few elements, and differ only slightly from sense 
concepts. 

Judgment. — One important form of psychical ac- 
tivity has frequently and necessarily been alluded 
to, but has not yet been carefully examined and 



82 COMMON EXPERIENCE. 

fully analyzed. It is the activity which compares and 
judges. It places objects and ideas, literally or figu- 
ratively, along side each other, and discovers their 
agreements and differences and relations, and makes 
decisions in respect to these. Two objects of sight 
may thus be compared in respect to form, size, 
color, and all other characteristics discoverable by 
the senses. The resulting decisions may be that the 
objects agree in form, differ in color, are of equal 
size, but of different material. 

Common Experience. — In the ordinary affairs of 
life, we are more familiar with this mode of mental 
activity than with almost any other. We are con- 
stantly comparing things, discovering resemblances 
and differences, coming to conclusions, making decis- 
ions, affirmations, and denials. All our real think- 
ing takes essentially this form. Even in question- 
ing, little else is done except to inquire what can be 
affirmed or denied in respect to some object of ob- 
servation or thought. 

The Judgment — A Judgment. — The mental 
power by which these processes of comparing and 
deciding are carried on, is called judgment, or the 
judgment. The psychical product is named a judg- 
ment. When expressed in words, this product is 
called a proposition. Every proposition must con- 
tain two parts or elements, — a subject, the name of 
that concerning which the affirmation is made, and 
the predicate, the words making the affirmation. 

Two Ideas. — Every judgment embraces two ideas, 
mental products of some sort. One of these is rep- 



JUDGMENTS. 83 

resented or expressed by the subject of the proposi- 
tion, the other by the predicate. In the simple 
proposition, "Iron is hard," we have, first, a concept 
of a substance called "iron," and, second, an idea of 
a quality named hardness, expressed concretely by 
the adjective "hard." In the proposition, "The man 
is guilty," there is a concept represented by the 
word "man," and an idea of a state or condition 
called guilt, attached here to man by the adjective 
"guilty." 

Affirmative Judgments. — In both these cases the 
judgments are affirmative, and the propositions are 
consequently affirmative. The assertion, in each case, 
is that the two ideas are consonant and may be 
united. The quality hardness properly belongs to 
iron ; the state of guilt is rightly fastened upon the 
man. In the proposition, the copula "is" expresses 
the union. 

Negative Judgments. — In the sentences, "Iron is 
not soft," and, "The man is not guilty," we have 
negative propositions, expressing negative judgments. 
The decision of the judgment, in each case, is that 
the two ideas are not compatible and can not be 
united. Softness can not be predicated of iron, nor 
guilt of the man. The negation is expressed by the 
little word "not." 

Belief. — In the formation of both affirmative and 
negative judgments, there is an accompanying state 
of mind called belief. 

Doubting. — The propositions, "Is iron malleable?" 
"Is the man guilty?" are interrogative. They indi- 



84 JUDGMENTS. 

cate that the judgment is in a state of suspense, 
and the mind in a condition of doubt. The data 
given are not sufficient to enable the judgment to 
reach a satisfactory conclusion. The state of sus- 
pense must continue until additional material for 
examination and comparison shall be obtained from 
some source. It is not the office of judgment to 
create or collect the matter upon which its activities 
are exercised. It examines, compares, sorts over, 
and arranges the acquisitions of the perceptive and 
representative powers. In this respect, it bears some 
resemblance to imagination. 

Singular and Universal Judgments. — Judgments 
are divided, for certain purposes, into singular and 
universal. Singular judgments are those made about 
individuals or single things, as, "This boy is in- 
dustrious " ; " This horse is valuable " ; " This book is 
mine." Universal judgments are those relating to 
classes, as, " Honest men are respected " ; " Birds are 
animals"; "Books are useful." 

Predicates Include more than Subjects. — It will 
be noticed that the predicates of the singular judg- 
ments, in these examples, denote classes of objects to 
which the subjects belong ; and that the predicates 
of the universal judgments also indicate classes larger 
than those denoted by the subjects, and include the 
classes named by the subjects. 

Resemblances and Differences between Concepts 
and Judgments. — The points of resemblance and 
difference between conception and judgment, and 
between a general concept and a judgment, can now 



TWO NOTIONS IN A JUDGMENT. 85 

be clearly seen. Both conception and judgment form 
combined and complex mental products, but the 
combinations are unlike. 

A Concept a Single Notion. — Conception unites 
a number, greater or less, of qualities or elements 
common to many individuals, and produces a single 
complex mental representative of all these individuals 
taken as a class. It is one complex notion standing 
apart from all other notions. In the formation of 
this concept, judgment has been constantly active, 
and has borne a large part. It has, in all cases, 
compared the qualities and characteristics of the dif- 
ferent individuals, decided as to their resemblances 
and differences, and determined what elements could 
enter into the final product. Conception has been 
guided by judgment in the whole work. 

Two Notions in a Judgment. — On the other 
hand, judgment, in its own peculiar activity, deals, 
in every case, tvith two distinct objects, ideas, or 
representations. These objects and ideas may them- 
selves be simple or complex, may be material things, 
percepts, sense-concepts, or general concepts. Judg- 
ment does not create them ; it uses them as it finds 
them. Taking two such objects or representations, 
it ascertains by comparison what relation exists be- 
tween them, and decides accordingly. If the relation 
allows, it unites them ; but in such manner that, 
after the union, each still remains a distinct object 
of perception or of thought. The combination bears 
no resemblance to that found in the general concept, 
in which the elements are inseparably united as in 



86 SUMMARY. 

a chemical compound. It will be observed in all the 
examples given of judgments that the ideas expressed 
by the subjects and predicates are merely united by 
a copula, and not blended together. Concepts are 
expressed by single words ; judgments, by complete 
sentences. 

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER VII. 

1. Meaning of the term "thinking." 

2. Illustration from the physical organism. 

3. The thinking of young children. 

4. Preliminary processes of thinking require the formation of 

general concepts. 

5. Illustration of the formation of general concepts. 

6. First step — Analysis. 

7. Second step — Abstraction. 

8. Third step — Generalization. 

9. Each of these explained and illustrated. 

10. Nature of a general concept. 

11. Conception defined. 

12. Difference between general concepts and sense-concepts, or 

images. 

13. The relation between the two kinds. 

14. The process of classification. 

15. Nature of a definition. 

16. What a description is. 

17. A familiar illustration. 

18. Nature of abstract ideas ; how they differ from general 

concepts. 

19. Use of general terms by children. 

20. Office of the activity called judgment. 

21. Experiences in common life. 

22. Judgment defined ; A judgment defined. 

23. Two ideas or notions in a judgment. 

24. Affirmative and negative judgments. 

25. Belief ; doubting. 

26. Singular and universal judgments. 



DEFINITIONS. 87 

27. Predicate includes more than the subject. 

28. Resemblances and differences between concepts and judg- 

ments. 

29. Use of the copula in judgments. 



DEFINITIONS. 

Conception. — The mental activity which forms general notions, 
or notions of classes. It involves analysis, abstraction, 
and generalization. 

Analysis. — The process of decomposing or separating any thing 
compound or complex, or heterogeneous in any respect, 
into its parts and elements. 

Abstraction. — The process by which one part, element, qual- 
ity, or attribute, of any thing compound or complex is 
taken away from the other parts, elements, qualities, 
or attributes, and made an object of special considera- 
tion. 

Generalization. — The application of a single general name to 
many objects, all of which possess certain common 
characteristics ; or grouping together under one general 
name many objects, all of which have certain common 
characteristics. 

A General Concept. — A mental product of the conceptive 
activity, or the mental notion of a class of objects ; 
such a notion as is indicated when any common noun 
is used. 

The Judgment. — The mental activity which compares objects 
of observation or of thought, and decides as to their 
resemblances and differences, their agreements and dis- 
agreements, etc. 

A Judgment. — The mental product of an act of the judg- 
ment. 

A Proposition. — A judgment expressed in words. 

Subject of a Proposition. — The name of that of which some- 
thing is affirmed or denied. 

Predicate of a Proposition. — The words used to affirm or 
deny something in respect to the subject. 



88 DEFINITIONS. 

Affirmative Judgments. — Judgments by which something is 

affirmed or asserted. 
Negative Judgments. — Judgments by which something is 

denied. 
Singular Judgments. — Judgments in which the subject is the 

name of an individual object or thing. 
Universal Judgments . — Judgments in which the subject is 

the name of a class of objects or things. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

ELABORATIVE OR THINKING ACTIVITIES. 

(Continued.) 

Immediate and Intuitive Judgments. — Reason and 
Reasoning. The individual judgments considered in 
the last chapter had no necessary relation to each 
other. They were obtained by direct and immedi- 
ate comparison of objects and ideas, and were pro- 
nounced true in consequence of the discoveries 
made during the examination and comparison, with- 
out explicit reference to other judgments. These 
may be called, properly, immediate judgments. All 
intuitive truths are intuitive judgments. The char- 
acteristics of such truths or judgments have already 
been learned. Immediate and intuitive judgments 
are the basis of all other judgments, and, consequently, 
the basis of all reasoning. 

Other Judgments. — A little observation of our 
own mental processes will make it evident that only 
a few of our judgments are immediate or intuitive. 
In most cases, they have a direct or an implied refer- 
ence to each other, and are discovered to have a neces- 
sary relationship. Some are found to depend upon 
others as their causes or conditions. The judgment 
affirms one thing because another has been previ- 
ously affirmed and accepted as true. It denies one 



90 EXAMPLES OF REASONING. 

thing because another has been denied, and the de- 
nial accepted as beyond question. In such cases, 
judgments or propositions are compared instead of 
individual concepts and ideas. This process of com- 
paring judgments is called reasoning. It is only a 
special and peculiar form of the activity of judg- 
ment. The peculiarity consists chiefly, if not en- 
tirely, in the matter compared. Illustrations will 
show that the process, in an abbreviated form, is 
very familiar. 

Examples of Reasoning. — A person says, "We 
shall have cooler weather, because the wind has 
changed to the North." This statement includes 
two judgments ; one of them, " The wind has 
changed to the North," is a fact of observation ; 
the other, "We shall have cooler weather," is an in- 
ference or conclusion, apparently based upon the 
fact stated. Really, however, it is based upon a 
third judgment tacitly understood, namely, " The 
weather is usually cooler when the wind changes to 
the North." The conclusion is, in this case, only a 
probability. 

Full Form of the Reasoning. — Written in full, 
this process of reasoning gives a regular series of 
judgments. (1.) When the wind changes to the 
North we usually have cooler weather. 

(2.) The wind has now changed to the North. 

(3.) Therefore, the weather will probably be 
cooler. 

Other Examples. — The dealer in produce affirms 
that " The price of wheat will be higher, because 



IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT REASONING. 91 

the crop promises to be below the average." This 
may be expressed in complete form with three judg- 
ments, like the preceding example. 

The teacher declares, " This boy will never be- 
come a good scholar on account of persistent idle- 
ness." 

Stating all that is understood by this affirmation, 
we have : 

(1.) Persistently idle boys never become good 
scholars. 

(2.) This boy is persistently idle. 

(3.) Therefore, he will never become a good 
scholar. 

Implicit and Explicit Reasoning. — These examples 
are sufficient to show that we are constantly reason- 
ing, in every-day affairs, by a series of expressed or 
implied judgments. When the grounds for the con- 
clusion are not fully stated, but are assumed as under- 
stood and admitted, the reasoning is called implicit. 
When the judgments are all formally expressed, the 
reasoning is termed explicit. 

Induction. — The mind has a natural tendency to 
pass from a number of particular judgments to a 
more general judgment, which expresses a law or 
principle embracing not only the cases named in 
the particular judgments given, but all similar cases. 
It is a mental operation, in which we infer that what 
is true in the few cases which we examine, is also true 
of all cases that agree with these in the respects or 
characteristics under especial consideration. 

Illustrations. — We observe that all the material 



92 INDUCTION DEFINED. 

things with which we are acquainted fall to the 
ground when not supported. We have never dis- 
covered a real exception to this rule. We infer that 
all material things, in all places upon the earth, 
will do the same. 

We observe that all perfect apples examined by 
us have five seed cells ; we infer that all perfect 
apples every-where will have the same number. 

We notice that dogs, cats, and all animals falling 
under our observation having a certain particular 
kind of teeth, eat flesh. We conclude that all ani- 
mals with similar teeth will eat flesh. 

Hasty Generalizations. — Examples might be mul- 
tiplied to any extent. The process is a species of 
generalization, into which children fall at a very 
early period. The tendency, both among children 
and older people, is to make too hasty generaliza- 
tions. The individual facts observed are not numer- 
ous enough to justify the inferring of a general law. 
Among such hasty inductions are the statements 
that, "All men are liars," that, "Every man has his 
price," and other similar careless affirmations. 

Induction Defined. — Such reasoning is named 
induction, and may be defined as the process of 
arriving at a general rule, law, or principle from 
examining a sufficient number of individual cases. It 
consists essentially in concluding that whatever can 
be truly said of a considerable number of individ- 
uals, may also be said of the whole class to which 
these individuals belong. 

Deduction. — Having reached general or universal 



ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENTS. 93 

laws and truths by personal inductions, or by in- 
struction, we naturally apply these to individual 
cases. This tendency of mind is as observable as 
the tendency to form general laws. 

Illustrations. — We say, (1.) All men are fallible. 

(2.) John Smith is a man, that is, one of the 
" all men." 

(3.) Consequently, John Smith is fallible, or : 

(1.) Honest men are trustworthy. 

(2.) This man is honest, that is, an honest man. 

(3.) Therefore, this man is trustworthy. 

Three Judgments or Propositions. — In these, and 
in all similar examples, we have three judgments or 
propositions. The first two are called premises, and 
the third is called the conclusion. Such a combina- 
tion of judgments is named a syllogism. 

Analysis of the Judgments. — In analyzing the 
judgments in one of these syllogisms, it will be ob- 
served that the first makes an affirmation in respect 
to a whole class of objects or persons. The second 
asserts that a particular individual belongs to this 
class. The third, the conclusion, declares that what 
has been affirmed of the class may be also affirmed 
of the individual, because he is included in the 
class. This is the simplest form of the syllogism, 
of which works upon logic give a great variety of 
forms. The same general law, however, pervades 
them all. 

Premises and Terms. — Of the two premises, the 
first, which makes an affirmation of the class, is 
termed the major premise ; the second, which merely 



94 BASIS OF DEDUCTIVE KEASONING. 

asserts that the individual belongs to the class, is 
called the minor premise. In logic, the subject and 
predicate of the judgments in a syllogism are named 
terms. Every judgment, consequently, has two terms, 
but an examination will show that the three judgments 
of any correct syllogism contain in all only three terms, 
these being repeated in the different propositions. 
One term is called the major, one the minor, and 
the other the middle term. The major term will be 
found in the predicate of the conclusion, and the 
minor term in the subject of the conclusion. The 
middle term is the one not found in the conclusion. 

Examples. — In the second syllogism given above, 
" trustworthy " is the major term, and names the 
largest class of persons spoken of in the syllogism ; 
"this man" is the minor term, denoting an indi- 
vidual. The middle term is " honest men," indi- 
cating a class which embraces "this man," and is 
itself included in the greater class of the " trust- 
worthy." 

Basis of Deductive Reasoning. — Deductive rea- 
soning rests upon the belief that, " whatever can be 
affirmed of an entire class can be affirmed of every 
individual of that class." 

Illustrations by Diagrams. — The nature of the 
syllogism may be conveniently illustrated to the eye 
by means of a diagram composed of circles. Take 
the syllogism : 

(1.) All articles made of gold are valuable. 

(2.) This ring is made of gold. 

(3.) This ring is, consequently, valuable. 



NEGATIVE MAJOR PREMISE 



95 




The first proposition, the major premise, affirms 
that all articles made of gold belong in the greater 
class of valuable things. The second proposition, the 
minor premise, places this ring in the class of articles 
made of gold. 

The largest circle, 
representing the major 
term, includes all valu- 
able things. The second 
circle, representing the 
middle term, embraces 
all articles made of 
gold, and consequently, 
by assumption, falls 
within the larger circle. 
The small circle, rep- 
resenting the minor term, this ring, is within the 
middle circle, and must, therefore, of necessity, be 
within the larger one. 

Negative Major Premise. — The major premise 
may be negative. The necessary result in such a 
case can be easily represented by a similar diagram. 
Take this example : 

(1.) Chinamen can not be American citizens. 

(2.) This man is a Chinaman. 

(3.) This man, therefore, can not be an American 
citizen. 

By the conditions assumed, the middle term, 
Chinaman, represented by the second circle, is en- 
tirely outside the larger circle, representing the 
major term, American citizens. Consequently, the 



96 



FALLACIES 



small circle, representing the minor term, this man, 
being within the middle circle, must be outside the 





large circle, and this man can not be among Ameri- 
can citizens. 

Fallacies. — A fallacy is an argument which, on 
its face, appears valid, while, in reality, it is not 
valid. If such an argument is employed with an 
intention to deceive, it is called a sophism. One 
very common form of fallacy is illustrated by the 
following syllogism and the attached diagram : 

(1.) Office-holders are corrupt. 

(2.) This person is an office-holder. 

(3.) This person is, consequently, corrupt. 

The fallacy here is perpetrated by employing a 
middle term, office-holders, which does not necessarily 
include every individual of the class which it names. 
It is tacitly assumed that all office-holders are cor- 
rupt, which is not true. The middle term must 
embrace, in at least one of the premises, the whole 



FALLACIES 



97 



class which it designates. This, in logic, is called 
the distribution of the middle term, and this kind of 
sophism is named "the fallacy of the undistributed 
middle." The diagram representing such a fallacy 
takes this form : 




Only a part of the circle representing the middle 
term, office-holders, falls within the large circle, 
which represents the major term, corrupt men. It 
is, consequently, impossible to determine whether 
the small circle, representing this man, should be 
placed within the large circle at A, or outside that 
circle at B. 

A very common form of fallacy consists in using 
ambiguous words, or words which, in the course of 
a long period of time, have lost their original mean- 
ing and have acquired a very different one. The 
term pagan originally denoted a villager, or a person 
living in some small country place. At present it is 
usually employed to designate a disbeliever in Chris- 
tianity. By confusing the two meanings in a syllo- 



98 FALLACIES, PROVING. 

gism one may readily prove that all country-people 
are pagans or heathen. 

To prevent originally signified to anticipate or 
to come before another, while it now means to hin- 
der or obstruct. By employing the term with its 
modern signification it may be logically proved that 
the writer of the Psalm hindered or obstructed the 
breaking of the day, because he says, " I prevented 
the dawning of the morning." It is not an uncom- 
mon thing for persons who have " a case to make 
out," to assume that an appeal to the original mean- 
ing of terms settles all questioning concerning their 
present signification. The fallacy involved in such 
an appeal is very obvious. 

The fallacy is often involved and partially con- 
cealed in the ambiguity or peculiar structure of a 
sentence, rather than in the equivocal character of 
individual words. A familiar illustration is found in 
the following trite syllogism : 

(1.) Nothing is heavier than lead. 

(2.) Feathers are heavier than nothing. 

(3.) Therefore, feathers are heavier than lead. 

The scope of this work does not allow more ex- 
tended illustrations of the various forms of fallacies. 

Proof, or Proving. — In many, probably in most, 
cases of reasoning in practical affairs, we announce 
only the conclusion. If this is questioned, we go on 
to give what we call reasons for the assertion. 
These reasons are merely the suppressed or omitted 
premises from which the conclusion has been drawn. 
This process is termed proving or making proof. In 



DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 99 

our own minds the premises preceded the conclusion, 
though, in many cases, nearly or quite unconsciously. 

Demonstrative Reasoning. — Reasoning has some- 
times been divided into demonstrative and probable. 
The division does not refer to the nature of the 
reasoning, which is the same in all cases, but to the 
subjects or objects concerning which the process 
takes place, and to the difference in the certainty of 
the conclusion. If the premises are absolutely and 
unquestionably true, and the syllogism is properly 
constructed, the conclusion will be true beyond ques- 
tion. When the judgments of the syllogism are of 
this kind, the reasoning has ~been called demon- 
strative. This will be the case when the proposi- 
tions are mathematical axioms, or other self-evident 
truths. 

Probable Reasoning. — In all practical affairs and 
in applied mathematics, the premises are not axioms 
or propositions which depend for their validity upon 
definitions alone, but statements about matters which 
may or may not be true. Such statements are prob- 
able truths, — that is, they are supposed and believed 
to be true. The conclusions, in all such cases, will 
be only probable truths, and the reasoning, when 
the syllogisms are formed of such material, is usually 
called probable. The degree of probability will vary, 
in judgments of this kind, from the barely probable 
to a strength of probability which amounts, practi- 
cally, to absolute certainty. 

Testimony. — The validity of probable judgments 
depends upon the evidence of testimony, and the 



100 A BASELESS DISTINCTION. 

degree of probability attached to these judgments is 
determined by the nature and amount of testimony. 
The most satisfactory evidence is the testimony of 
one's own senses or personal experience. We are, 
usually, firm in the belief of that which we have 
ourselves experienced or which we have learned 
through our own senses. 

A Baseless Distinction. — Strangely enough, a few 
writers appear to teach that things learned in this 
way constitute the only real knowledge we have ; 
that every thing else which we suppose we know is 
matter of belief, and not of actual knowledge. The 
distinction made by such persons is imaginary, and 
not real. All knowledge, except that expressed by 
self-evident propositions, is composed of beliefs. It 
all rests upon the evidence of testimony. The only 
difference is in the witnesses, and in the directness 
and reliability of the testimony. 

Illustrations. — I taste of some substance, and 
affirm that it is bitter. My affirmation is based upon 
the testimony of my own sense of taste. I affirm 
that T see objects, hear sounds, and touch rough or 
smooth surfaces. The affirmations, in each case, rest 
upon the testimony of some one of my senses. These 
may testify falsely, and deceive me ; they sometimes 
do fail to give me correct information ; yet, as a 
rule, they furnish truthful testimony, and I accept 
and believe their evidence without hesitation. 

Must Depend upon the Testimony of Others. — 
The range of personal observation is very limited, 
and, consequently, the testimony of experience and 



DIKECT EVIDENCE. 101 

of sense-perception can be employed in but few 
cases, either in practical affairs or in the study of 
science, history, literature, or art. We depend upon 
the testimony of other men and upon the evidence 
of circumstances, and believe, with more or less con- 
fidence, according to the character of the witnesses, 
and what we term the weight of evidence. The re- 
sulting beliefs constitute knowledge as real as any 
other. 

Direct Evidence. — Direct evidence is the testi- 
mony which men give in respect to what they have 
themselves seen, or heard, or have, in some way, 
known personally and immediately. The value of 
such testimony is estimated by laws of evidence, de- 
rived from laws of mind, and from observed facts 
in respect to human conduct. 

Assumptions. — In considering the weight of evi- 
dence, it is assumed that men generally will tell the 
truth unless they have, in a particular case, some 
especial reasons or motives for stating that which is 
false. If this were not so, no confidence could be 
placed in any statement of another person. Books 
and records of all kinds would be valueless. There 
could be no accumulation of knowledge, or of the 
materials of knowledge. 

It is also assumed that the influence of motives 
over human conduct and speech is uniform, and 
that the senses are to be trusted when in their nor- 
mal condition. 

Circumstantial Evidence. — Indirect or circum- 
stantial evidence is evidence derived from an accu- 



102 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 

mutation or a concurrence of conditions, circum- 
stances, events, or acts, no one of which alone would 
be sufficient to establish the truth of a proposition. 
Such evidence, when subjected to proper rules, is as 
reliable and trustworthy as direct testimony. In the 
nature of things, such evidence must be depended 
upon in many cases of murder and other great 
crimes, committed in darkness and secrecy. 

Rules in Respect to Circumstantial Evidence. — 
The following are some of the rules in respect to 
the reception and use of circumstantial evidence : 

(1.) The fact to be accounted for must be estab- 
lished by direct testimony. It must be proved directly 
that a murder, robbery, or theft has been perpetrated, 
before any person can be convicted and punished for 
such murder, or robbery, on the evidence of circum- 
stances. 

(2.) The existence of all the conditions, circum- 
stances, events, or acts, used in evidence, must be 
established by direct testimony. 

(3.) The circumstances, or the hypothesis based 
upon the circumstances, must fully account for the 
thing to be proved. There must be no " missing 
link " in the chain of circumstances. 

(4.) There must be no other circumstances, or 
hypotheses, by which the crime charged can possibly 
be accounted for. 

When these rules are observed, injustice can 
hardly be done to one accused of crime, the proof 
of which rests upon circumstantial evidence. 

Analogy. — In some cases, a species of reasoning 



ANALOGY. 103 

is employed called reasoning by analogy. The pro- 
cess of reasoning is not peculiar. The peculiarity 
lies in the source from which the premises are de- 
rived. The reasoning is based upon resemblances. 
It is assumed that, when several things resemble 
each other in a considerable number of points, they 
will probably resemble one another in still other 
points, concerning which we have no positive knowl- 
edge. Analogical reasoning is closely allied, in some 
directions, to inductive reasoning. In other direc- 
tions, it is closely related to reasoning from circum- 
stances and conditions. 

Examples. — From analogy, we infer that similar 
conditions will be followed by similar results ; that 
similar actions are intended to produce, and will 
produce, similar effects. The dog reasons by analogy 
when he runs upon perceiving that you are picking 
up a stone. He has observed that a previous similar 
act was followed by another act which caused him 
pain ; he infers that the second act will follow the 
first in the present case. 

We infer similarity of functions or uses from 
similarity of organs. The wings of the bird are used 
for flying ; we should infer, if we did not know, that 
the wings of the butterfly were employed for the 
same purpose. 

In all these cases, the resemblances from which 
we reason appear to be resemblances of relations. 

Progress of Development in Reasoning. — It is 
evident that the mental processes of comparing and 
judging are the same in all varieties of reasoning, 



104 DEVELOPMENT IN REASONING. 

and that these processes commence at an early period 
of the child's mental development. Sensations are 
compared and discriminated. Then percepts, and the 
objects which have occasioned them. Then concepts, 
and all other psychical products. Along with these 
comparisons, there must be acts of the judgment, 
deciding in respect to resemblances and differences 
and relations. A very little later, the incipient pro- 
cess of reasoning will begin by the comparison of 
judgments and the production of other judgments, 
in the form of inferences and conclusions. Early 
judgments and reasonings must necessarily be ex- 
ceedingly imperfect. The power of judging and 
reasoning correctly is of slow growth, and reaches 
maturity later than the powers of perception, repro- 
duction, and representation. In order that judg- 
ments may be trustworthy, considerable material 
must have been accumulated for examination and 
comparison. There must have been much personal 
observation, and enough experience to correct the 
natural tendency to make decisions as to resem- 
blances and differences, and to put objects together 
into classes without studying with care a sufficient 
number of individual cases. The proneness to draw 
hasty and unwarranted inferences from faulty pre- 
mises must be cured by the discovery of repeated 
and ludicrous blunders committed in previous pro- 
cesses of reasoning, and sometimes by suffering the 
ridicule and mortification to which one who persists 
in the perpetration of such blunders is necessarily 
exposed. 



DEFINITIONS. 105 



SUMMARY OF CHAPTER VIII. AND DEFINITIONS. 

1. Immediate and intuitive judgments. 

2. Judgments derived from other judgments. 

3. Provisional definition of reasoning. 

4. Examples of reasoning. 

5. Complete form of reasoning ; examples. 

6. Implicit and explicit reasoning. 

7. Inductive reasoning ; illustrations. 

8. Causes of hasty generalizations. 

9. Definition of induction. 

10. Deductive reasoning ; illustrations. 

11. The syllogism illustrated. 

12. Analysis of the judgments employed. 

13. Premises named and described. 

14. The terms ; where found. 

15. Basis of deductions. 

16. Illustrations by diagrams. 

17. Negative major premise. 

18. Fallacies. 

19. Proof and proving ; the process. 

20. Demonstrative and probable reasoning. 

21. Testimony, evidence, etc. 

22. Direct evidence ; assumptions upon which its value depends. 

23. Circumstantial evidence ; rules relating to its use. 

24. Reasoning from analogy ; illustrations. 

25. Reasoning of children ; the development of the power. 



Reasoning. — The process of comparing related judgments, and 
from these deriving new judgments. 

Induction. — The process of arriving at general truths, laws, etc., 
by the examination of a large number of individual cases. 

Deduction. — The process of applying general truths, laws, 
etc., to individual cases. 

A Syllogism. — A combination of three properly related judg- 
ments, two premises, and a conclusion. 



106 SUMMARY OF KNOWING ACTIVITIES. 



SUMMARY OF ELABORATIVE OR THINKING ACTIVITIES. 

__ , ... , . [ 1. Conception proper. 

Elaborative or thinking \ rt _ _ * * * 

, . mj . 4 2. Judgment. 

activities L ^ 

( 3. Reasoning. 



GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE KNOWING ACTIVITIES,— 

THE INTELLECT. 

T _, , . n ( 1. Consciousness. 

I. Perceptive and pre- \ n „ 

, ,. ,. .*. 12. Sense-perception, 

sentative activities. ) _ , .,. 

f 3. Intuition. 



II. Representative and 
reproductive activ- 
ities 



1. Real representation or simple 

conception. 

2. Ideal representation or imagina- 

tion. 

3. Memory. 



III. Elaborative or think- ( *' Conception proper. 

_ ._ •< 2. Judgment, 

ing activities . . . ) _ . 

( 3. Reasoning. 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE FEELINGS, GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS, 
AND CLASSES. 

Activities thus far Studied. — The activities of mind 
thus far studied are all concerned in some of the 
various knowing processes, and grouped together are 
called the intellectual powers, or simply the intellect. 

Associated States of Mind. — Associated with 
these mental processes of perceiving, conceiving, re- 
membering, and thinking, we are conscious of pecul- 
iar states of mind. We see a friend in deep afflic- 
tion ; we are conscious of that state of mind which 
we call sympathy. We see a person, or even an 
animal, suffering pain and distress ; we are conscious 
of that peculiar state of mind which we call pity. 
We see some one exposed to danger and harm ; we 
experience a state which we call anxiety. We see 
or hear of some great act of injustice, or of the 
perpetration of some monstrous crime, and we are, 
as we say, filled with a feeling of indignation. We 
think ourselves to have been greatly wronged and 
injured by the deliberate purpose of some one ; we 
have a state of mind which we call resentment, or 
perhaps by a stronger name, anger. We see or read 
or hear of great and noble deeds ; and we are filled 
with what we call admiration. 



108 ASSOCIATED STATES OF MIND. 

How Named. — These and other kindred states 
of soul are known by the general name of feelings. 
The susceptibility of the mind to feel is called sen- 
sibility, and the feelings themselves are frequently 
termed the sensibilities. 

Not Definable. — The feelings, being simple states 
of mind, can not, in the strict sense of the word, be 
defined. In respect to most of them a statement 
can be made of the circumstances under which they 
arise, of the causes which produce them, of the 
object toward which they are directed. Conse- 
quently we may learn how to arouse or excite them, 
and how they may be allayed or dispelled. 

Name Unfortunate. — The name " feelings" is an 
unfortunate one to apply to these states of mind, 
but no better or less objectionable word has yet been 
found by which to designate them. In using the 
name feelings there is constant danger of confound- 
ing states of mind with conditions of body. It is 
true also that the line which separates some of the 
lowest and simplest mental feelings from those 
which are purely physical is very indistinct, as we 
shall discover further on. 

How Some Feelings Appear to Come. — By observ- 
ing through consciousness the operations of our own 
minds, and still more by watching carefully the 
manifestations of feeling in children, we discover 
that some feelings appear to spring up spontaneously 
in the soul ; that is, they seem to come unbidden, 
of their own accord, as we say. They do not have 
their origin in any of the processes of thinking or 



RATIONAL AND MIXED FEELINGS. 109 

reasoning. Some of them are closely related to bod- 
ily conditions. 

Animals have Similar Ones. — We observe that 
some of the domestic animals appear to exhibit 
these same feelings, or very similar ones, in a 
greater or less degree. The human mother mani- 
fests a certain kind of feeling toward her young 
child. The animal mother, in many cases, exhibits 
a similar feeling. Young children manifest sportive 
and frolicsome feelings. The young of some of the 
domestic animals show the same feelings. Feelings 
which thus spring up spontaneously are called in- 
stinctive. 

Rational Feelings. — We are conscious ourselves, 
and we notice in others, feelings which come in 
consequence of knowledge which we have in some 
way obtained. Most of the examples previously 
given are of this kind, and others will readily sug- 
gest themselves. When reflecting upon our own 
conduct, upon our manner of life, we have a feeling 
of regret, or of satisfaction. Upon sight of a beau- 
tiful object a peculiar feeling arises in the soul ; a 
scene of sublimity excites another peculiar feeling ; 
a scene of terror, still another. Feelings which arise 
in consequence of reflection or other acts of knowing 
are named rational. 

Mixed Feelings. — In some cases feelings are 
clearly instinctive in their origin, but are modified 
and largely directed by rational considerations. The 
love of parents for their children is a feeling of this 
kind. The desire for society, for knowledge, for ac- 



110 THOUGHT AND FEELING HELPFUL. 

quisition, for superiority, seem to be of the same 
character. Such feelings may properly be termed 
mixed, being partly 'Distinctive and partly rational. 

Knowledge of the Feelings Important. — A knowl- 
edge of the various classes of feelings, of the cir- 
cumstances under which they naturally arise, of the 
modes by which they are manifested, and of the 
means by which they are excited and dissipated, is 
important to parents and teachers for several reasons. 
As stated in speaking of the laws of association, 
thinking and feeling are mutually helpful under cer- 
tain conditions and mutually obstructive under other 
circumstances. 

Thought and Feeling Helpful. — In study or read- 
ing the presence of a limited degree of feeling pro- 
duces that state of mind which is called " being in- 
terested." The interest is merely the proper amount 
of the appropriate feeling. The knowledge excites 
the emotion ; the emotion quickens the activity of 
thought ; the influence is reciprocal and, in every 
way, desirable and healthful. In this case the 
thought and feeling flow along in the same direc- 
tion and in the same channel. The two currents 
mingle together harmoniously, and acquisition be- 
comes pleasurable and rapid. The practical problem 
for the student and the teacher is to learn how to 
produce this natural and happy commingling of the 
two elements. 

When Opposed. — At times the thought and emo- 
tion take opposite or different directions. If the feel- 
ing has any relation to the immediate object of 



FEELINGS ARE THE ACTIVE POWERS. Ill 

study and thought, it is a relation of antagonism 
and opposition. The source of the feeling is foreign 
to the object of study. This condition ot mind finds 
illustration in the case of a child required to commit 
a lesson while his companions are engaged in some 
noisy and exciting sport within sight or hearing; 
or of an older person endeavoring to master some 
difficult problem in mathematics or some abstruse 
process of reasoning just after receiving news of 
some great good or bad fortune. 

The Mental State. — Thinking, under such cir- 
cumstances, is like rowing up stream against a 
strong opposing current. Progress is difficult, slow, 
painful, and sometimes quite impossible. The prob- 
lem now is to find how to change the direction of 
the current of feeling and to bring thought and 
emotion into concord. 

When Mutually Exclusive. — When thought upon 
any subject becomes so absorbing that a state of 
abstraction comes on, or when feeling becomes so 
intense as to overwhelm judgment and reason, and 
the soul is stirred up as by a tempest, then thought 
and feeling are "mutually exclusive." This con- 
dition is altogether unnatural and harmful. In re- 
spect to such states of mind the question is how 
to avoid them, or to control them, if they exist. A 
thorough knowledge of the laws of mind will enable 
one to do this in most cases. 

Feelings are the Active Powers — Motives. — The 
motive powers. A careful analysis of mental proc- 
esses and states shows that some feeling precedes 



112 A STUDY OF MOTIVES. 

every voluntary ' act, and obviously influences the 
determination of the mind. Action follows feeling, 
and is never performed until the impulsive power 
of feeling is exerted. For this reason the feelings 
have been called "the active powers" of the soul. 
They are to the machinery of thought what steam 
is to the mechanism of the engine, the force with- 
out which there is no movement. The feelings fur- 
nish the motives, and without these the human being 
has no inclination to act. 

A Study of Motives. — The study of the feelings 
is, therefore, a study of the motives which cause and 
control human conduct. This fact gives the study 
great practical value, especially to those concerned 
in the training and management of the young. 
Children can not be justly and wisely dealt with 
without considerable knowledge of the springs from 
which behavior originates, and which give volume 
and quality to the current of daily living. 

Relations of Feelings to Morals. — Moreover, mo- 
tives give moral character to human conduct, and 
make it praiseworthy or blameworthy. The study of 
the feelings, consequently, brings us to the study of 
morals, and sets us face to face with questions of 
right and wrong, of obligation and duty, and of re- 
wards and penalties. The subjects of motives and 
morals are merely mentioned here, as they will re- 
ceive separate consideration in another place. 

Classification Difficult. — Classification. A satis- 
factory classification of the feelings is a matter of 
much difficulty on account of their great number, 



EMOTIONS AND AFFECTIONS. 113 

great variety, and complex character. Almost every 
writer has a classification of his own growing out of 
his peculiar views, or adapted to the end for which 
he writes. The one here adopted is believed to be 
the best for our purpose. 

Pleasurable and Painful. — The general division 
of feelings into pleasurable and painful has no prac- 
tical value, since the same feeling gives pleasure at 
one time and pain at another ; and some feelings 
are so complex that it is impossible to say whether 
pleasure or pain predominates in them. Besides, 
there can be no doubt that the same feeling causes 
pleasure to one mind and pain to another. 

Emotions. — By an appeal to consciousness we 
discover that some feelings rise and fill the soul, to 
a greater or less degree, and then die away. They 
do not go out, so to speak, to fasten themselves 
upon any object, nor do they reach forth to grasp 
some object for self-gratification. They are simple 
states or excitements of mental pleasure or pain, of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction ; or they may be higher 
feelings of real joy or sorrow ; or feelings produced 
by the beautiful or the sublime. These feelings, 
which thus exist in the soul and are, so to speak, 
confined to it, are called emotions. 

Affections. — We are conscious of other feelings 
which seem to go forth and to fasten themselves 
upon objects and persons. Examples of these are 
the feelings which members of a family have for 
each other, or friends have toward friends. They in- 
clude, also, such feelings as anger, envy, and jealousy. 



114 ORGANIC AND VITAL FEELINGS. 

These feelings of good-will and ill-will toward ob- 
jects or persons are named affections. As employed 
in common speech, the affections denote only feel- 
ings of good-will. The term is here used with the 
wider and more technical meaning. 

Desire. — We are conscious, also, of another and 
different feeling, which appears to reach out to 
grasp objects for the purpose of obtaining satisfac- 
tion or gratification. It prompts to efforts to get 
possession of the objects upon which it has laid 
hold. This feeling is called desire. It is illustrated 
in the feeling which impels one to labor for the 
accumulation of property, or to obtain knowledge, 
or to gain possession of any thing which is termed 
an object of desire. 

States of Body, etc. — Certain states of body 
closely related to some of the mental feelings and 
having very similar characteristics, are usually 
classed with them, and studied in the same connec- 
tion. These will be noticed before considering fur- 
ther the different classes of psychical feelings. 

Organic and Vital Feelings. — In connection with 
the processes of digestion and assimilation there are, 
in a healthy condition of the physical organism, 
pleasurable feelings, and in a diseased condition, 
painful feelings. All normal activity of the bodily 
organs is attended with some degree of that feeling 
usually called comfort, a condition of quiet enjoy- 
ment such as the healthy and well-fed young 
animal seems to experience. All irregular and ob- 
structed activity of these organs is attended with a 



APPETITES. 115 

feeling of discomfort and irritation. A young child 
gives evidence of both these states of feeling. These 
conditions of body are worthy of notice chiefly on ac- 
count of their close connection with some psychical 
feelings to be presently examined. 

Appetites. — The bodily feelings best known are 
the appetites. If usage allowed, it would be better 
to speak of appetite as a single mode of feeling, 
excited by different objects, and hence, receiving 
various names. Our familiarity with these feelings 
renders any extended discussion of their nature and 
peculiarities unnecessary. They may be divided into 
natural and acquired, the natural being those origi- 
nally implanted in the physical organism, the ac- 
quired, those created or excited by habits. 

Natural Appetites. — Natural appetites are regu- 
larly recurring physical feelings, arising from some 
want in the organism, and causing more or less of 
discomfort and irritation. The feeling is allayed 
when the want is supplied. The frequency of the 
recurrence depends, to a large extent, upon habit, 
though in young children the needs of the body must 
be the controlling force in determining the times 
of recurrence. 

Some of the Appetites. — Hunger, the feeling 
occasioned by need of food, and thirst, the feeling 
produced by need of drink, are reckoned as appe- 
tites by all writers. Concerning some other physical 
feelings there are differences of opinion. The sexual 
feeling is peculiar to itself and can not be classed 
among the ordinary appetites. Those feelings which 



116 NATURAL AND ACQUIRED APPETITES. 

are spoken of as desires of rest, of activity, of sleep, 
and a few others of similar character, possess some 
characteristics of true appetites while they lack 
others. All these feelings are intimately associated 
with states of mind, and, for this reason, should 
be observed with care when these states of mind 
appear. 

Natural Appetites Necessary. —The natural appe- 
tites are necessary for the support of life and for 
the proper care of the body ; and their gratification, 
within proper limits, is clearly a demand of nature. 
Such gratification involves no question of morals. 

Acquired or Artificial Appetites. — Acquired appe- 
tites differ from natural ones in several particulars. 
As a rule they are more intense and exacting. They 
produce a greater degree of discomfort and irritation. 
Their recurrence is less regular and more frequent, 
and they are never fully satisfied. The craving be- 
comes almost constant. They usually grow stronger 
as age advances, whereas the natural become weaker 
and less imperative in their demands. 

The most Common. — The most common artificial 
appetites are those for intoxicating drinks, for to- 
bacco, and for some kinds of narcotics, especially 
for opium in its various forms. The creation and 
growth of such appetites are in conformity with the 
general law of habit, and they illustrate its wonder- 
ful power. 

Morals Involved. — The formation and gratifica- 
tion of these appetites involve moral considerations. 
No man has a right to debase and destroy his powers 



FEELINGS EXHIBITED BY ANIMALS. 117 

either of body or mind, or to waste upon filthy 
habits the means needed for higher and nobler pur- 
poses. 

Relation to Motives. — The appetites create desire, 
and thus find a place among the strongest forces 
which give direction to human conduct. The gratifi- 
cation of appetite constitutes one of the most power- 
ful motives with children and with large numbers of 
men and women of mature age. It should be kept 
constantly in mind that even natural appetites are 
blind, irrational forces, seeking only immediate grati- 
fication, and utterly regardless of ultimate conse- 
quences. They are, therefore, to be kept in subjec- 
tion to judgment and reason. 

Feelings Exhibited by Animals. — Young children 
show evidence of states of mind differing very little, 
if at all, from the feelings exhibited by the young 
of some animals. A kitten and a young lamb give 
evidence by sportive actions of what is called over- 
flowing animal spirits. The feeling has its origin 
in the condition of the body. The functions of the 
physical organs are properly performed, and the 
consequence is an instinctive and pleasurable emo- 
tion. 

Similar Feelings in Children. — A similar buoy- 
ancy of spirits is exhibited by children under like 
conditions. The feeling is partly physical and partly 
psychical, and the elements are so mingled that it is 
not easy to separate them by any acuteness of anal- 
ysis. The activity of a child under the influence of 
this feeling seems as aimless as that of the animal. 



118 FEELINGS IN CHILDKEN. 

No purpose can be discovered beyond the pleasure 
experienced in the activity itself. 

Law of Pleasurable Activity. — We find here one 
of the earliest illustrations of the law of " pleasur- 
able activity " ; that is, that action itself is pleasur- 
able when it exactly balances the amount of accu- 
mulated energy. 

Joyousness. — This state of mind in the child is 
probably the lowest form of mental feeling. It may 
be called the emotion of instinctive joyousness or 
pleasure. 

The Young Child. — The babe in arms exhibits a 
milder and less vigorous form of this feeling when 
its desire for its natural food is gratified, and it en- 
joys proper care and an agreeable temperature. 

Sadness. — Both the young animal and the child 
are subject to a feeling directly opposite to this, 
springing from opposite conditions of body. It may 
be called the instinctive emotion of sadness or de- 
pression. It is of the same mingled character as the 
joyous emotion. These feelings may be taken as 
types of a large class of instinctive emotions, exhib- 
ited most strongly and freely by children, but never 
entirely disappearing at any period of life. 

Irritability, etc. — Many of the manifestations of 
irritability, fretfulness, and so-called ill-temper in 
childhood are of this kind, as are, also, the manifes- 
tation of opposite states of mind and temper. These 
are not indications of character in the proper sense 
of the word, but rather of physical conditions. Chil- 
dren can not be justly treated unless this fact is 



RATIONAL EMOTIONS. 119 

taken into account. They are not to be harshly 
dealt with for purely instinctive behavior. At the 
same time it is of great importance to check, in all 
suitable ways, and at as early a period as the devel- 
opment of the child will allow, manifestations of ill- 
humor and irritability, and to insist upon self-control. 
Otherwise the law of habit will create a permanent 
tendency to such manifestations when there is no 
adequate cause for them. 

Rational Emotions. — Rational emotions, as pre- 
viously stated, are those feelings or states of excite- 
ment which arise and continue, for a time, in the 
mind in consequence of some activity of the know- 
ing powers. They may be excited by objects of 
sight, of hearing, and of other perceptive activ- 
ities ; and they may, also, be excited by recollec- 
tion, by reflection, and by other processes of think- 
ing. Those feelings which come into the mind in 
consequence of acts of memory have been called 
retrospective emotions ; those which are excited by 
present objects and thoughts, immediate emotions ; 
and those arising from anticipation and expectation, 
prospective emotions. In many cases a distinction 
of this kind can hardly be drawn, since objects im- 
mediately before us call up memories of the past, 
and, also, fill the mind with anticipations in respect 
to the future. The consequent emotions are of min- 
gled origin so far as time is concerned. 

Names. — The various emotions are named from 
the objects and ideas which excite them, or from 
some peculiarity in their mode of manifestation. 



120 JOY AND SORKOW. 

Joy and Sorrow. — Among the most common 
emotions are those of joy and its opposite, sorrow. 
These are experienced in every degree from the 
mild pleasure of instinctive joyousness to the high- 
est state of ecstasy, and from the gentle pain of 
instinctive sadness to the most profound anguish. 
These general terms include the greatest possible 
variety of agreeable and disagreeable feelings. 
Among these are the emotions indicated by such 
terms as satisfaction and dissatisfaction, gladness 
and depression, mirthfulness and melancholy, and 
others of kindred character. When the joy or sor- 
row springs from reflection upon one's own conduct, 
attainments, position, or state of mind and heart, a 
great number of egoistic feelings are experienced, 
all having some degree of the quality expressed by 
these general names. If the retrospect is satisfac- 
tory every pleasurable feeling, from that indicated 
by self -approval to those named self-esteem, vanity, 
self-conceit, and pride, may be enjoyed. If the ex- 
amination is unsatisfactory, painful emotions follow, 
from simple disapproval of self to mortification, self- 
condemnation, regret, and remorse. 

Emotions Occasioned by Wit, Humor, etc. — The 
emotions occasioned by wit, humor, and the ludi- 
crous are near of kin and are classed among the 
pleasurable feelings. It is difficult to state, in few 
words, the exact sources of these feelings, but they 
appear to arise chiefly from the sudden and un- 
expected discovery of some resemblances between 
things very unlike in all other respects, or from 



WIT AND HUMOR. 121 

some temporary relationship between things alto- 
gether incongruous. A dog in the church or in the 
school-room excites a laugh on account of the sup- 
posed incongruity between the animal and the place. 
An elegantly-dressed fop splashed with mud, or 
fishing for his hat in a puddle of dirty water, ex- 
cites the same expression. In these cases the feel- 
ing is produced by what is called the ludicrous. 
Wit and humor are entirely absent. 

Wit. — Wit is a single brilliant utterance, coming 
like a flash. Its essence may be found in a single 
word, or in a play upon words similar in sound but 
dissimilar in meaning. 

Humor. — Humor is wit which does not flask for 
an instant merely, but shines for a longer time with 
a sort of mellow and cheering light. Genuine 
humor is good-natured even in its sharpest attacks, 
while wit often bites and stings. "Wit laughs at 
things ; humor laughs with them. Wit is abrupt, 
darting, scornful, and tosses its analogies in your 
face ; humor is slow and shy, insinuating its fun 
into your heart." 

Downward Tendency of Wit and Humor. — Un- 
fortunately wit and humor, as commonly cultivated, 
have a tendency downward. Frequently vulgarity is 
mistaken for wit, and senseless drivel for humor. 
In such cases the genuine feeling of wit and humor 
is exchanged for contempt and disgust. 

Feeling Occasioned by the Beautiful. — We are 
not concerned here with theories as to the sources 
from which the idea of beauty is derived or as to 



122 OBJECTS OF SIGHT. 

what beauty really is. We know that some objects 
of sight occasion a peculiar and agreeable emotion in 
the mind. Some combinations of sounds produce the 
same feeling in a less degree. It is doubtful whether 
impressions through the other senses have any such 
influence. In cultivated minds certain ideas and 
combinations of ideas give rise to a similar emotion. 

Objects of Sight. — In objects of sight the ele- 
ments, of beauty appear to be color, form., and sym- 
metry of parts and arrangement. Motion, also, con- 
tributes to the same result. Isolated figures and 
bodies are more beautiful when bounded by curved 
or wavy lines and surfaces. In symmetrical combi- 
nations straight lines and plain surfaces are found 
to give equal pleasure. It is observable that the 
movements of single objects, either animate or in- 
animate, are more pleasing when in curved or wavy 
lines ; but when numbers of objects move together 
according to some definite plan, so that the move- 
ments become mingled and bear harmonious rela- 
tions to one another, the motions of individuals 
may be in straight lines, and still produce an effect 
equally agreeable. 

Music and Poetry. — The influence of music upon 
the feelings is due partly to the tones themselves 
and partly to the power of association. A simple air, 
associated with the scenes and friends of childhood, 
often seems more beautiful than the most artistic 
compositions of the great masters. In poetry, also, 
association is as potent a factor as the rhythm of the 
words or the beauty of the ideas. Association is not 



ESTHETICS AND TASTE. 123 

the source from which the notion of beauty is 
derived, but it greatly intensifies the effect of the 
beautiful, and sometimes produces essentially the 
same result. 

Language and Ideas. — Language and ideas are 
properly called beautiful when they so appeal to the 
representative power of imagination as to fill the mind 
with successive pictures and images which naturally 
excite and keep alive an emotion agreeable and 
pleasing, but not too intense or overpowering. The 
feeling produced by the beautiful, either in nature 
or art, in objects or ideas, is usually soothing and 
charming, but never overwhelming or highly ex- 
citing. 

^Esthetics and Taste. — That branch of science 
which treats of the beautiful and of beauty is called 
cesthetics. The primary idea of beauty is probably 
intuitive, like the idea of right. The power of mind 
by which the beautiful is perceived and enjoyed is 
taste. Good taste is the power to perceive the fit- 
ness of things and to arrange them according to fit- 
ness ; and, also, to perceive the fitness of conduct 
and to behave accordingly. Taste is a native en- 
dowment of the soul, capable of development and 
cultivation like all other endowments. 

Standards of Taste. — Whatever theories may be, 
practically the standard of taste can never be abso- 
lute ; but must vary with national and local pecul- 
iarities, with the age of persons, with education, and 
with degrees of culture and refinement. Q-ood taste 
and the love of the beautiful should be cultivated 



124 ELEMENTS OF SUBLIMITY. 

for many reasons. Although taste, however good, is 
not morality, yet there is a natural affinity between 
good taste and good morals. 

Feeling Occasioned by the Sublime, etc. — The 

sublime can no more be defined than the beautiful. 
The elements of sublimity include vastness, power, 
and strength. A very high, precipitous, and craggy 
mountain is called a sublime object. A mighty cat- 
aract, the ocean in violent commotion, a terrific 
thunder-storm, a roaring tornado, and other similar 
natural objects are sublime. The sublime in litera- 
ture, generally, consists of vivid descriptions of the 
sublime in nature, or of imaginary pictures involving 
the same elements. Ideas of grandeur, of immensity, 
of the boundless and unlimited in space, time, or 
power, are properly called sublime. Most sublime 
objects and ideas SLiggest something still greater, 
grander, and mightier beyond or above them, and 
thus involve, mystery and the incomprehensible. 

The Sublime Differs from the Beautiful. —The 
feeling awakened by the sublime differs, in many 
respects, from that excited by the beautiful. It is 
more intense and absorbing. It sometimes becomes 
painful ; occasionally it partakes of awe, and even of 
terror. It naturally touches and kindles feelings of 
reverence and adoration, and for this reason deserves 
to be cultivated, more particularly in the young. 

Moral Beauty and Sublimity. — The feelings of 
moral beauty and sublimity arise in view of quali- 
ties observed in the character and conduct of beings 
knowing right and wrong, and, consequently, worthy 



DEFINITIONS. 12 







of praise and blame. These emotions may be con- 
sidered further, in connection with the study of the 
moral powers and susceptibilities. 

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER IX. AND DEFINITIONS. 

1. Only knowing activities studied thus far. 

2. Other states of mind associated with these. 

3. Examples of these states. 

4. Sensibility and sensibilities defined. 

5. What only can be stated of the feelings. 

6. "Why the name is unfortunate. 

7. How some feelings appear to arise. 

8. Feelings of domestic animals. 

9. What feelings are called instinctive. 

10. What feelings are rational ; what are mixed feelings. 

11. Why knowledge of the feelings is important. 

12. Relation between thought and feeling. 

13. When thought and feeling are helpful, and when opposed 

to each other. 

14. When "mutually exclusive." 

15. Feelings are the motive powers of the soul. 

16. Relation of feelings to moral character. 

17. Why classification of feelings is difficult. 

18. Division into pleasurable and painful. 

19. The emotions described. 

20. The affections and desires described. 

21. Physical feelings, vital and organic. 

22. The appetites, — Natural, artificial. 

23. Some natural appetites. Their office. 

24. Some artificial appetites. Moral character. 

25. Relation of appetites to motives. 

26. Some mixed feelings exhibited by animals and by children. 

27. Law of "pleasurable activity." 

28. Joyousness, sadness, irritability, etc. 

29. Sources of the rational emotions. 

30. From what they are named. 

31. Joy, sorrow; emotions occasioned by wit, humor, etc. 



126 DEFINITIONS. 

32. Difference between wit and humor. 

33. Feeling occasioned by the beautiful. 

34. Taste ; the standard of taste. 

35. Feelings occasioned by the sublime. 

36. Difference between the beautiful and the sublime, 

37. Moral beauty and sublimity. 



Sensibility. — The susceptibility of the mind to feel. 
Sensibilities. — The various forms of mental feeling. 
Emotions. — Excited states of mind which merely exist in the 

soul without appearing to go out toward others, or after 

any object. 
Affections. — Feelings of good-will or ill-will appearing to go 

out toward persons or objects. 
Desire. — Craving of the mind for some real or supposed good. 
Natural Appetites. — Regularly recurring longings or cravings 

of body. 
Artificial Appetites. — Bodily longings or cravings produced 

by habits. 



CHAPTER X. 

THE FEELINGS. -(Continued.) 

Egoistic Feelings. — Those feelings which center 
exclusively upon one's self are sometimes called ego- 
istic. The soul is excited and aroused into a state 
of greater or less pleasure or pain. But self alone 
is concerned in the feeling. Most of the feelings 
of childhood are of this character. The emotions, 
studied in the last chapter, belong to this class. 

Altruistic Feelings. — Those feelings which center 
upon others, which seem to go out toward others, 
either for good or evil, are called altruistic. The 
word is sometimes limited to those feelings which 
prompt to acts of kindness and good-will to others. 

Affections Altruistic. — The affections are altru- 
istic feelings. They are directed toward persons, and, 
in some cases, toward other objects. Usage justifies 
us in speaking of affection for inanimate objects, and 
even for abstract ideas. Love of country, of human- 
ity, of truth, of goodness, and virtue are familiar 
forms of expression. Feeling toward inanimate ob- 
jects can not be precisely like that toward persons. 
The affections are social feelings, and make society 
a source of happiness. 

Classes. — The affections are variously classified. 
For our purpose we will divide them into three 



128 PARENTAL LOVE. 

classes, but no attempt will be made to enumerate 
all of them. 

(1.) The Beneficent Affections. — The beneficent 
affections are feelings of good-will, which have in 
view the good of the objects toward whom they are 
directed whenever it is possible to do good to them 
These include, first, — 

Domestic Affections. — (a.) The domestic affec- 
tions or love of kindred. These are partly instinct- 
ive and partly rational. They include the love of 
parents for their children, parental love ; the love 
of children for their parents, filial love ; and the 
love of children for one another, fraternal love. The 
term includes, also, the love of more remotely 
connected members of a common family for one 
another. 

Parental Love. — The love of a parent for a child 
is clearly instinctive in its origin, but is subject to 
the control and guidance of judgment and reason. 
It bears close resemblance to the feeling exhibited 
by many animals for their young, but differs in 
some important points. The affection of animals for 
their young is only temporary. It continues, so far 
as one can discover, only so long as the young have 
need of special care and protection. In some cases 
the animal mother abandons her young before such 
need ceases to exist. The fondness occasionally 
manifested by animals for grown-up offspring, and 
which the latter appear to reciprocate, seems not to 
differ in its character from that manifested at times 
by animals of the same species which have no rela- 



FILIAL AND FRATERNAL LOVE. 129 

tionship to each other. It is unnecessary to say that 
the affection of human parents has no such limita- 
tion. In most cases it increases in depth and 
strength with the passage of years. 

Filial Love. — Filial love must be the earliest 
affection of which a child is conscious. Most writers 
regard this feeling as instinctive. It is certainly 
mainly rational, springing up, at first, in conse- 
quence of care and kindness bestowed by the 
mother, and growing stronger as the relation be- 
tween parent and child becomes better understood. 
It is doubtful if the young of animals have any feel- 
ings which can with truth be called filial affection. 
This is not a matter of surprise when it is remem- 
bered that they probably have no conception of any 
such relationship as that between parents and off- 
spring. 

Children at School Age. — In the majority of 
children of school age filial love is sufficiently devel- 
oped to be one of the most active and efficient 
motives in the production of good conduct and in- 
dustry. The proper cultivation of this affection is 
essential to the formation of right character and 
good habits. Only in the most extreme cases should 
the confidence of a child in the wisdom and good- 
ness of his parents be weakened, or his regard for 
their commands or wishes be treated as of little 
consequence. 

Fraternal Love. — Fraternal affection is the love 
of children of the same family for one another, and 
the mutual regard of kindred more remotely con- 



130 FRIENDSHIP. 

nected. It is probably of instinctive origin, but, as 
developed and exercised, is mainly rational, spring- 
ing up in consequence of daily intercourse, of giving 
and receiving favors and kindnesses, and from a 
knowledge of common relationships, interests, obli- 
gations, and duties. It beautifies family life, and is 
a source of mutual enjoyment and protection. 
There is no satisfactory evidence of its existence in 
animals. The herding and flocking together result 
from an instinct of different character. 

Social Affections. — (b.) The social affections form 
the second group of the beneficent affections. 

Friendship. — Of these the first is friendship, or 
the mutual love between friends. This feeling may 
have its origin in the social instinct, but its growth 
and full development depend upon rational consider- 
ations. It often begins from the natural sympathy 
between individuals of similar tastes and disposi- 
tions, or between persons engaged in the same pur- 
suits, either of business, or study, or pleasure. It 
sometimes originates from the apparent accident of 
proximity of residence in early life. This feeling 
manifests itself in every possible degree of strength, 
from the kindly good nature existing between 
chance acquaintances and temporary associates, to 
the intensity of devotion occasionally exhibited for 
each other by individuals of the same sex. Pure 
friendship, entirely free from admixture of other 
feelings, does not often grow up between persons of 
opposite sexes. Friendship does much to adorn and 
beautify human life, and its healthy development 



THE MARRIAGE RELATION. 131 

should be helped in all suitable ways. Without this 
affection and the results which usually flow from it, 
the intercourse between men would be only such as 
self-interest and mutual advantages might seem to 
demand. They would unite to resist attacks of 
enemies, and to overcome obstacles too formidable 
to be removed by single individuals or by the mem- 
bers of one family or of a clan. But such unions 
would be scarcely higher and nobler in character 
than the herding together of cattle, or the flocking 
together of sheep or birds. They would be much 
like the occasional combinations of hungry beasts of 
prey to secure some common booty, or the crowding 
together of weak and timid animals for mutual pro- 
tection and safety. 

How Best Taught, — The most effective method 
of impressing upon the young the value, power, and 
beauty of genuine friendship is by examples and 
illustrations found in biographies, histories, and in 
the occurrences of every-day life. The stories of 
" Damon and Pythias" in secular history, and of 
" Jonathan and David" in sacred narrative, are full 
of interest to every child. 

The Marriage Relation. — The feelings which pre- 
cede and accompany the marriage relation may have 
their beginnings in simple friendship, but they are 
very complex in their character and not easily ana- 
lyzed. Desire enters largely into their composition, 
and other egoistic and altruistic feelings are present. 

Gratitude. — This feeling is called love of bene- 
factors, or of those from whom favors and kind- 



132 GRATITUDE AND INGRATITUDE. 

nesses have been received. It is, in a certain sense, 
a reflexive feeling, being directly called forth by 
some immediate external act. It enters into filial 
love and tends to render that deeper and more per- 
manent. In some cases it becomes an element in 
friendship. But if it enters largely into this, the 
purity of the friendship is destroyed from the fact 
that one of the parties is placed under obligations 
to the other, and the freedom which comes from 
the feeling of equality is necessarily lost. Under 
such circumstances some degree of restraint on 
one side is unavoidable. Friendship, in the high- 
est sense of the word, can not exist in connec- 
tion with a feeling of dependence. It becomes 
mingled, with gratitude, and thus loses its own 
peculiar character. . 

Origin. — Gratitude has its origin in a single 
consideration. Some good has been received and 
accepted. The relation is that of giver and recipient. 
Real gratitude may be felt and honestly expressed 
toward a person who can not be loved as a friend, 
or even esteemed as a worthy member of society. 
Gratitude makes no account of character or position, 
or of the opinions held by others of the benefactor. 
It looks only at the kindness done, and sees, for the 
time, nothing else. 

Ingratitude. — Ingratitude is universally and 
rightly regarded as the mark of a base and 
despicable nature. It has no excuse and finds no 
defenders. Benefactors may, and sometimes do, mar 
the beauty of noble deeds by expecting and demand- 



A RATIONAL FEELING. 133 

ing too large returns in way of acknowledgment 
and feelings of obligation. But even such demands, 
although they render the relation irksome, do not 
justify the withholding of that which is due. 

A Rational Feeling. — It must, however, be re- 
membered that gratitude is altogether a rational 
feeling, and can be but slightly felt by the young. 
It can take no strong hold upon the mind until the 
higher powers and the moral nature are consider- 
ably developed and matured. The young child is 
entirely dependent, is constantly receiving kind- 
nesses and favors, but it is unreasonable to expect 
from him any considerable feeling or expression of 
true gratitude. He does not yet comprehend rela- 
tions and obligations. 

As a Motive. — Appeals to gratitude as a motive 
to good conduct or to diligence in study can produce 
very little effect until early childhood is passed. 
Disappointment is often felt by parents and teachers 
at the apparent ingratitude of children, while they 
are really incapable of experiencing the feeling to 
the extent demanded. The grace of gratitude should 
be cultivated by all appropriate means. 

Patriotism. — The love for one's country is called 
patriotism. Patriotism properly means more than a 
mere feeling. It includes conduct in harmony with 
the feeling. It has always been regarded as praise- 
worthy to love one's own country and one's own 
countrymen above other countries and other peoples. 
Like most other noble impulses of the soul, this 
feeling is liable to be perverted and to be employed 



134 RATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS. 

as a motive for the accomplishment of the basest 
purposes. Great crimes have been committed against 
humanity in the name of patriotism and liberty. 

Patriotism Instinctive. — From an instinctive im- 
pulse of their nature men love and cherish their 
own families in preference to the families of others. 
They care more for their immediate neighbors than 
for people living at a distance. Ethical questions are 
not here under consideration ; the fact is as stated. 
The broadest benevolence and the highest and purest 
philanthropy can not be blind to this fact, nor can 
they condemn such natural patriotism. 

Rational Considerations. — The inhabitants of the 
same country are neighbors as compared with men 
dwelling upon opposite sides of the earth. They 
have common interests, common needs, and common 
purposes. They labor, suffer, and endure in common. 
They have a history, a language, institutions, and 
laws in which all are alike interested. All these bind 
them together, and create mutual regard, esteem, 
and affection. Real patriotism is a cardinal virtue, 
and the lack of it a crime. 

What Education Should Do. — The educational 
institutions of any people should aid most effectively 
in the development and cultivation in the young oj 
an intelligent and rational patriotism. In such a 
sentiment lies the real safety of any nation whose 
government and laws are fashioned by the will of 
the body of its citizens. The history of a country 
should be taught in its schools. The origin and 
progress of the nation, the nature and form of its 



HIGHER DEVELOPMENT. 135 

government, and the modes of its administration 
should be made familiar to every child. 

Philanthropy. — Beginning in the home and family, 
the feeling of good-will goes out through the neigh- 
borhood, over one's own country, and finally reaches 
"the ends of the earth." This affection toward men, 
simply because they belong to the human race, with- 
out reference to kindred, friends, or countrymen, is 
philanthropy in the proper sense of a much-abused 
word. 

Comes With Development. — There is, undoubt- 
edly, a feeble native susceptibility to this feeling in 
the undeveloped human soul, but its power is mani- 
fested very slowly. So far as tradition enables us to 
judge, it scarcely made itself felt in the childhood 
of the race. Men "loved," after a fashion, "their 
neighbors and hated their enemies," and all strangers 
and foreigners were counted as enemies. Philan- 
thropy was not possible until men recognized some- 
thing in common in all the race, at least a common 
nature, if not a common origin. It could not take 
its highest form until it was believed that "all 
nations were made of one blood." 

Higher Development. — With the progress of 
civilization, with the increase of intercourse be- 
tween nations and peoples, with the growing de- 
mands of commerce, the feeling of philanthropy has 
been more and more developed. The impulse of a 
restless love of adventure and discovery, and zeal 
for the propagation of religious faith, have greatly 
hastened this development. With still higher intel- 



136 PITY, SYMPATHY, COMPASSION, ETC. 

lectual and moral growth, with improved facilities 
for travel and the transportation and exchange of 
products, and with more intimate acquaintance, this 
feeling will have much greater power over the lives 
and conduct of men. It will not supersede patriot- 
ism, but will rather supplement it, as the love of 
friends supplements the love of kindred. 

Effect of Proper Teaching. — All true learning 
and teaching broaden the mind and open it to the 
reception of nobler ideas and purer and better feel- 
ings. Travel produces the same effect ; rightly di- 
rected study of geography and history enlarges the 
field of mental vision, and develops true philan- 
thropy. 

Pity, Sympathy, Compassion, etc. — The feelings 
indicated by the words pity, sympathy, compassion, 
and some others of similar character, belong under 
the general head of love to mankind. Since they 
all have certain common qualities, it is convenient 
to group them together. They are forms in which 
the feeling of good-will manifests itself under pecul- 
iar conditions. In origin they are partially instinct- 
ive, but do not appear in the early period of life 
with much strength. 

Pity. — Pity is a feeling which is excited by the 
sight of any one in suffering and distress. A very 
vivid representation of suffering produces the same 
feeling. So far as the feeling is instinctive, no ac- 
count is taken of the cause or occasion of the mis- 
ery. It is sufficient to know that a human being is 
in pain. The feeling is modified by the knowledge 



SYMPATHY AND COMPASSION. 137 

that the victim is reaping the natural fruit of his own 
sowing, or is suffering just punishment for crime, 
but even then it does not quite disappear. The 
judge may pity while he pronounces the severest 
penalty, and the officer of the law may pity while 
he inflicts it. 

Sympathy. — Sympathy is a fellow-feeling, a state 
of mind in which one enters into the feelings of 
another so fully that he literally suffers and enjoys 
with him. It is not confined to cases and conditions 
of joy and sorrow, but extends to all activities, em- 
ployments, and circumstances. The mother appre- 
ciates and sympathizes with her child, and the 
teacher with the pupil. We have sympathy with the 
purposes, aspirations, and efforts of our friends. 
Much that is called sympathy is only egoistic emo- 
tion. It expends itself altogether in the soul in 
which it rises. True sympathy prompts to appro- 
priate action, and expends itself upon others rather 
than upon one's self. 

Compassion. — Compassion is a deeper and ten- 
derer feeling than pity or sympathy. It usually mani- 
fests itself toward those who are weak and compara- 
tively helpless, and whose sufferings and miseries are 
exceedingly severe. It prompts to the breaking of 
fetters and the unbinding of chains. It pleads for the 
remission of even just punishment, when the remis- 
sion can be safely granted. It is not, however, that 
maudlin sentimentality which confounds crime with 
misfortune and the criminal with the unfortunate. 
It would gladly turn aside the descending stroke of 



138 THE DEFENSIVE AFFECTIONS. 

justice, but it does not palliate guilt, nor make 
heroes of the guilty. * 

Germs in the Soul. — The germs of these humane 
affections probably exist in the souls of all children, 
but, in many cases, their growth is extremely slow. 
They need fostering care and generous cultivation 
on the part of all concerned in the training of child- 
hood. The propensity of many boys to tease, vex, 
and sometimes to treat with positive cruelty weaker 
children and domestic animals, is well known. This 
disposition has its origin partly in thoughtlessness, 
partly in love of domination, partly in the native 
barbarism of the animal nature, and partly in bad 
examples and vicious training. The feeling of com- 
passion is yet too weak to exert any appreciable 
influence, and the moral nature is but slightly 
developed. 

(2.) The Defensive Affections. — The defensive 
affections are feelings which prompt to self-defense 
and to the protection of others. They are classed by 
many writers among the malevolent affections. It 
is admitted that they have a close relationship to 
these, and that, in some cases, it is difficult to draw 
a distinct and well-marked line between them. The 
same thing is true in respect to economy and par- 
simony, in respect to frugality and avarice, and in 
respect to generosity and prodigality. Things are 
not necessarily the same because they touch each 
other or approach so near as to be apparently 
mingled together. Many forms of evil are little else 
than good perverted and debased. 



RESENTMENT. 139 

Resentment. — Resentment is one of the defensive 
feelings. It springs up in the soul when we believe 
ourselves to have been insulted, injured, or wantonly 
wronged by deliberate intention, and when the in- 
jury or wrong may work serious harm to us in per- 
son, property, or reputation. It is an instinctive feel- 
ing, though modified by the action of judgment. It 
urges to measures of self-defense and protection. As 
the world now is, an affection of this sort seems 
necessary for the preservation of life, and for the 
retention of self-respect and the respect of others. 

Not Retaliation. — It does not, in its legitimate 
form, urge him who feels it to return injury for 
injury and wrong for wrong. It does not propose 
to harm him who has done the wrong, but to pre- 
vent the commission of further injury, and to secure 
proper reparation when this is possible. It is not 
inconsistent with the spirit of forgiveness and good- 
will even to enemies. It is true kindness to save a 
person from doing evil either to another or to him- 
self, provided the means employed are the mildest 
which will secure the result. This is all that resent- 
ment, as a purely defensive feeling, insists on having 
done. 

Easily Passes into Retaliation. — It can not be 
denied, however, that justifiable resentment easily 
gives place to a feeling of retaliation and revenge. 
Resentment is sure to be strong enough in all minds, 
and needs no nourishing, but rather restraining and 
curbing. It can not be suppressed, but it can be 
controlled. 



140 MALEVOLENT AFFECTIONS. 

Indignation. — Indignation is a feeling excited in 
view of injustice, injury, and wrong done to others, 
and prompts to their protection and defense, when 
circumstances permit us to render assistance. Like 
resentment, it looks primarily only to the prevention 
of wrong-doing, but does not disapprove when de- 
served punishment is inflicted upon deliberate per- 
petrators of injustice and crimes. It leads one to 
defend his friends and neighbors ; one state to aid 
in defending another unjustly attacked, and philan- 
thropists to seek to deliver men every-where from 
oppression and tyranny. The feeling is kindled when 
recitals are heard, or stories are read, of persecutions 
and sufferings endured by the weak and defenseless. 

Should be Properly Cultivated. — Indignation, like 
resentment, is instinctive, and usually acts with all 
necessary vigor, provided the defense of others does 
not impose burdens and self-denials too heavy for 
the natural indolence and selfishness of ordinary hu- 
manity. Injustice and wrong inflicted upon others, 
especially if distance separates them from us, touches 
us less keenly than similar acts inflicted upon our- 
selves. There is, consequently, need that the feeling 
of just indignation receive proper cultivation and 
direction in the minds of the young. 

(3.) Malevolent Affections. — The malevolent affec- 
tions are those feelings which are directed toward 
others with intent to do them harm, or work evil of 
some hind upon them,. These feelings are very nu- 
merous, and only a partial enumeration of them will 
be attempted. In many cases they pass, by almost 



PKEJUDICE. 141 

insensible gradations, into each other. Some writers 
believe the germs of all these evil feelings are found 
in resentment, and that they are merely perversions, 
modifications, and exaggerations of this feeling. It 
is hardly necessary to say that this view is not 
adopted in our classification. 

Do not Spring from Resentment. — That some of 
the so-called malevolent affections are near of kin to 
resentment is obvious, but this can not be affirmed 
of others. They all appear to be modifications of a 
general feeling of ill-will which does not prompt, 
like pure resentment and indignation, to defense 
and protection of self or others, with the infliction 
of only so much harm or pain as may be unavoid- 
able in securing these, but incites and urges to an- 
noy, vex, and injure others with or without refer- 
ence to wrong and evil received from them. This 
evil affection manifests itself in all possible degrees 
of intensity, and is named from the peculiar charac- 
ter of these manifestations. 

Prejudice. — One of the mildest forms of ill-will is 
prejudice. This is sometimes a passive rather than 
an active condition of mind, and exists almost 
unconsciously without seeking expression either in 
speech or action. Its influence, in such cases, is 
more negative than positive. It shuns its object 
and refrains from doing possible good instead of 
seeking to do positive evil. 

Origin of Prejudice. — It is often extremely diffi- 
cult to trace this feeling to its source. In some 
instances it seems instinctive. Usuallv it has its 



142 PREPOSSESSIONS AND ANGER,. 

origin in impressions made by personal appearance, 
by language, or by conduct. Sometimes it springs 
from family or party connection ; sometimes from 
religious faith and sectarian animosity. It may even 
extend to places of birth and education, to employ- 
ments and professions. The inquiry, " Can any good 
thing come out of Nazareth ? " illustrates the power 
of prejudice, perhaps mingled with contempt, over 
even a good man. 

When very Strong. — In its strongest form preju- 
dice amounts to a pre-judgment and a predetermi- 
nation in respect to a person or a case. When it 
reaches this degree of intensity, it renders one un- 
able to give proper weight to evidence, unfits him to 
act as judge or juror, and prompts to acts of wrong 
and injustice. Prejudice is a subtle feeling, often 
existing and working unsuspected and unobserved. 
For this reason there is need to guard against its 
influence both in one's self and in others. 

Prepossessions. — Prepossession is a species of prej- 
udice in favor of persons or things. This inclines one 
to give undue weight to testimony and arguments 
upon one side, and thus works injustice to the other. 
In circumstances where there are no opposing inter- 
ests or parties, prepossessions are generally harmless 
and sometimes of real service. 

Anger. — Anger bears close resemblance to resent- 
ment in its origin, but has no reference to personal 
safety or the protection of others. It is ill-will with 
no definite aim or purpose. In a mild and well-con- 
trolled form it is scarcely malevolent or blameworthy. 



RESEMBLES INSANITY. 143 

Its Tendency. — But its tendency is to pass at 
once beyond proper control, and to become a danger- 
ous and violent passion. It then changes to wrath, 
and finally to rage. 

Effects upon the Appearance. — It produces most 
marked effects upon the whole physical organism. 
" Under moderate anger the action of the heart is 
a little increased, the color is heightened, and the 
eyes become bright. The respiration is likewise a 
little hurried, the mouth is commonly compressed, 
and there is almost always a frown on the brow." 
When the feeling becomes rage, "the countenance 
reddens, the eyes flash indignant fire, and the aspect 
speaks horror ; muscular strength is abundantly in- 
creased, and powers of exertion are acquired un- 
known to cooler moments." 

Resembles Insanity. — The condition is very near 
that of temporary and violent insanity. In such cir- 
cumstances a person is dangerous to himself and to 
all about him. Outbreaks of anger may sometimes 
find palliations and mitigating conditions, but very 
seldom any sufficient excuses. The plea of "quick 
temper " may be accepted from a child, but not 
from a man. Manhood implies self-control and self- 
restraint ; childhood is obliged to learn these by the 
teachings of hard experiences. The young child can 
understand the necessity of putting checks upon his 
passions only when he comes into collision with 
others, and discovers the painful effects in his own 
person of provoking strong opposing forces and pas- 
sions. Regard for one's own personal comfort and 



144 ENVY. 

safety is a potent motive for the subjection of pas- 
sions to the control of reason, and in some cases the 
only effective one. 

How to Deal with Children. — In the management 
of children it is of the utmost importance to avoid 
vexing and irritating them needlessly. They should 
be helped to form the habit of self-control at the 
earliest possible time. It scarcely needs to be said 
that example is here the most efficient teacher. An 
irritable, ill-tempered, easily angered person is alto- 
gether unfit to deal with young children either in 
the home or the school. 

Envy. — Envy is the feeling of ill-will excited by 
the good fortune and success of others. By such suc- 
cess and good fortune they have become our supe- 
riors in some respects, and envy prompts to efforts 
to reduce them to our own level or to put them 
below us. The immediate result may be modes of 
speech intended to belittle their attainments, posses- 
sions, and characters. Sneers, innuendoes, and derog- 
atory insinuations are freely employed. But's and 
if's are liberally used whenever they are subjects of 
conversation. In these and other kindred ways envy 
manifests its presence in the soul. When it becomes 
dominant, as it sometimes does, in the mind, it is 
one of the basest of all the passions. It then de- 
grades and destroys all real nobility of character. 

Envy may Enter into Emulation. — Envy frequently 
accompanies and enters into the state of mind called 
emulation. This is likely to occur when emulation 
in unduly stimulated by artificial and unwholesome 



JEALOUSY. 145 

means. Too great care can not be taken to guard 
the young against this most pernicious feeling. No 
incentives to study or to any other desired activity, 
which have a tendency to create or foster this ma- 
lignant passion, should be tolerated in any institu- 
tion for the education and training of children. 
True manhood and moral uprightness are of too 
much value to be sacrificed for the attainment of 
some temporary advantage, however great it may 
appear. 

Jealousy. — Jealousy is the feeling which arises 
in the mind of one individual when another pos- 
sesses or seems likely to obtain possession of some 
object which he strongly desires, and to which he 
thinks or imagines he has a just claim. To the feel- 
ing of envy, jealousy adds the idea of real or sup- 
posed personal injury or affront. Another has come 
between us and some object of affection, has carried 
off some prize for which we have contested, has 
gained a position which we have coveted, or has 
thwarted our plans in some direction. 

Examples. — The lower animals appear suscep- 
tible of this feeling. The pet dog is offended if 
another dog receives too much attention. It appears 
in the young child when some other child is caressed 
and fondled by the mother or nurse. It is apt to 
manifest itself wherever there is strong competition 
of any kind. It arises among children in school and 
among men in business. It finds especial room for 
exhibition in the relations between the sexes, and is 
often most intense and bitter between those who 



146 MALICE, HATEED, AND REVENGE. 

have previously been strongly attached to each 
other. When it takes full possession of the soul, it 
becomes the most terrible of the passions, and im- 
pels to the perpetration of the most fearful and re- 
volting cruelties and crimes. 

Malice. — Malice is one of the most malignant 
forms of ill-will. It is a feeling which finds delight 
in the misfortunes of those toward whom it is 
directed, and seeks to do them harm in all possible 
ways, and by all possible means, without reference 
to their character or deserts. 

Hatred. — Hatred is deep-seated and permanent 
ill-will. Anger flashes up, burns intensely, and dies 
out, while hatred makes for itself a dwelling-place 
in the soul. It has no one specific mode of mani- 
festation, but enters into envy, jealousy, malice, and 
every other evil affection. 

Revenge. — Revenge is one of those lurking pas- 
sions which burrow in the human soul. It works in 
darkness and secrecy as much as possible, and takes 
advantage of times and circumstances. It waits and 
watches, like a wild beast, for its prey, and pounces 
upon its victim when least expected. It seeks to in- 
flict pain and harm under the pretense of paying 
back what has been received, of "giving as good as 
has been sent," of returning to one the coin which 
he has paid out. It is a demoniacal passion when it 
ripens into full maturity. And it is the more dan- 
gerous from the fact that it often attaches itself to 
the milder feeling of legitimate resentment, and 
pretends to be what it is not. 



DEFINITIONS. 147 

Proper Punishment not Revenge. — The inflic- 
tion of deserved punishment upon convicted crimi- 
nals by officers of justice is not revenge, even though 
the punishment should be death. 

When society has reached a civilized condition 
and has become regularly organized, the state, which 
is nothing more than the people considered as a col- 
lective body, assumes the right to make all necessary 
laws for regulating the conduct of its citizens, and 
also assumes the duty of defending and protecting 
their persons, property, and rights. Having enacted 
laws, it appoints, by some established method, officers 
to administer and execute these laws. Such officers 
are merely the servants and agents of the state, that 
is, of the people. 

In all ordinary cases neither the judge, the jury, 
nor the executive officers are influenced by feelings 
of a personal nature. They bear no hatred, no mal- 
ice, no personal ill-will of any kind against persons 
charged with violating law. The members of a jury 
may pity while they are forced by "the law and the 
evidence " to convict ; the judge may be moved by 
pity and compassion while he pronounces the sever- 
est penalty which the law provides ; and the sheriff 
may feel intensest pity while he commits the crimi- 
nal to prison or conducts him to the scaffold. 

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER X. AND DEFINITIONS. 

1. Egoistic and altruistic feelings distinguished. 

2. The affections altruistic. Classes various. 

3. The beneficent affections defined. 



148 DEFINITIONS. 

4. The domestic ; divisions of these. 

5. The social, (a.) Friendship ; its nature, value, (b.) Grati- 

tude ; source, etc. Ingratitude, (c.) Patriotism ; origin, 
etc. Influence of education. 

6. Philanthropy ; comes with development ; effect of proper 

instruction. 

7. Pity. Sympathy. Compassion. 

8. Only germs of these in the soul ; need of culture, etc. 

9. The defensive affections, (a.) Resentment; not retaliation, 

etc. (b.) Indignation ; need of instruction. 

10. Malevolent affections ; general nature ; do not spring from 

resentment. 

11. Some of these affections, (a.) Prejudice, origin, effects when 

strong, (b.) Prepossession, not necessarily evil, (c.) An- 
ger, its tendency ; effect upon the physical appearance ; 
approaches temporary insanity ; dealing with children. 
(d.) Envy ; enters into emulation, etc. (e.) Jealousy ; 
how it differs from envy. (/.) Malice, (g.) Hatred. 
(h.) Revenge. 

12. Punishment not revenge. 



Egoistic Feelings. — Those which refer to self alone. 

Altruistic Feelings. — Those which refer mainly to others. 

The Affections. — Feelings which are directed toward persons 
or other objects. 

Beneficent Affections. — Feelings which prompt to acts of 
good- will to others. 

Defensive Affections. — Feelings which prompt to self-defense 
and to the protection of others. 

Malevolent Affections. — Feelings which prompt to acts of ill- 
will and harm to others. 



CHAPTER XI. 

THE FEELINGS — (Continued.) 

Desire Defined. — Desire is the craving of the 
mind for real or supposed good. It may be called 
the appetite of the soul. 

The Term Good. — The term good, as here em- 
ployed, has no reference to any moral quality or 
character in the object of desire. The good means 
any thing from the possession of which it is believed 
that pleasure, enjoyment, satisfaction, or happiness 
may be derived. The good of one person will not 
be the good of another. The good of the child will 
not be the good of the man. The supposed good 
may not be a real good, and may not contribute to 
enjoyment if obtained. 

Aversion. — Aversion is universally the opposite 
of desire. Every desire must have its natural oppo- 
site aversion. 

Desire a Single Feeling. — Desire is a single feel- 
ing, but takes different names from the different 
objects which excite it and toward which it is 
directed. We, consequently, speak of a desire for 
knowledge, a desire for esteem, power, wealth, and 
so on indefinitely, as if there were so many distinct 
desires. 

Instinctive Desire. — Some forms of desire are 



150 RATIONAL AND MIXED DESIRES. 

instinctive. Among these are the desires for the 
means of supporting life, for food, drink, protection, 
self-defense, and many others. 

Rational Desire. — Some forms of desire are 
purely rational, being excited by the discovery of 
advantages of some sort to be derived from the 
possession of particular objects. The desires to enter 
upon certain courses of life, to prepare for specific 
employments and professions are of this kind. 

Mixed Desire. — Some desires are instinctive in 
origin, but are rational in their complete develop- 
ment, and in the course along which they impel 
effort for their gratification. Such are desires for 
knowledge, for approbation, and for society. 

A Want Implied. — Desire always implies that its 
object is not in one's possession, or, if now in posses- 
sion, is liable to be removed or lost. In the latter 
case the desire is for continued possession and enjoy- 
ment. The presence of a friend, now with me, 
affords me pleasure, and I desire that he remain. I 
am surrounded by circumstances which contribute 
greatly to my happiness, and I desire that these 
conditions may become permanent. 

Excited by Perception. — Desire may be excited 
by objects immediately before me or within the 
range of my senses.. In this case perception fur- 
nishes the knowledge through which the feeling is 
aroused. Even here, however, previous experience 
must have proved that these objects have power to 
give gratification or enjoyment. There is, conse- 
quently, an act of memory in reviving some past 



THE UN IV Eli SAL MOTIVE. 151 

impressions and their associated feelings. A subor- 
dinate representative element is present in the mind, 
and mingled with perception. 

Excited by Representation. — In many cases the 
exciting cause of the activity of desire is a repre- 
sentation alone. This is the fact when we desire 
approbation, wealth, power, or higher knowledge. 
We picture, or represent mentally, the advantages 
and pleasures which the possession of these will 
afford us. Such representations may be real or ideal. 

More Permanent than Other Feelings. — Desire 
is a more permanent state of mind than either emo- 
tions or affections. Emotions rise and subside like 
gusts of wind, or like clouds flitting along in the 
sky. Affections have usually more permanence than 
emotions, but they are, by their very nature, varia- 
ble and inconstant. When they reach the intensity 
of passions they speedily burn themselves out and 
expire. Desires, on the other hand, have an element 
of permanence in them. They come near to being 
dispositions or tendencies of mind, acting constantly 
and uniformly. The same desire continues for 
months and years, or even for a life-time, approach- 
ing, in some cases, to the nature of a " ruling pas- 
sion." 

The Universal Motive. — The great importance of 
desire lies in the fact that it is the one universal 
motive to all voluntary human activity. Its peculiar 
relation to the will is more fully considered in con- 
nection with the study of that activity of mind. It 
is the one feeling which moves the will. The other 



152 SELF-LOVE AND SELFISHNESS. 

feelings are motives only as they excite desire and 
intensify its energy and impulsive force. External 
objects are motives simply because they appeal to 
some form of desire. Voluntary activity does not 
begin until desire is kindled ; it ceases when desire 
dies or is satisfied. 

Self-Love and Selfishness. — Self-love, so-called, is 
desire looking in the direction of self, and seeking 
those things which self particularly needs. Among 
these are the preservation of life, personal safety, all 
legitimate freedom of action, opportunity of acquir- 
ing property and knowledge, means of self-develop- 
ment and improvement, and of doing good to others. 
These are all proper objects of desire, and are con- 
sistent with the great law, " Thou shalt love thy 
neighbor as thyself." Self-love, thus understood, is 
not selfishness, the essence of which is supreme 
regard for self, and disregard for others if their 
rights and interests conflict with one's own. 

No Specific Desire for Happiness. — All desires 
have in view some good, — using the word with the 
widest possible signification, — to self. This good may 
be the simplest form of personal gratification and 
enjoyment ; it may be the pleasure which arises 
from witnessing and ministering to the enjoyment 
of others ; it may be the satisfaction which comes 
into the soul from the consciousness of doing one's 
duty, of meeting one's obligations, of making the 
best of one's powers and opportunities, and of living 
in harmony with one's self, with one's neighbors, 
with all mankind, and with the Divine Being. 



TRUE HAPPINESS. 15o 

True Happiness. — Such satisfaction of soul is the 
substance of true happiness, which is the end sought 
by the highest rational desires. According to this 
view there is no single specific desire for happiness. 
Indeed, happiness can not be made a distinct object 
of pursuit, since it consists in a state of soul conse- 
quent upon the highest and best activity of all the 
powers both of body and mind. This touches the 
moral aspect of the desires and their proper use as 
motives, and belongs with the study of the moral 
powers. 

The Term Love Used for Desire. — The feelings 
called love of knowledge, love of power, love of 
money, and others of similar nature, are found, upon 
careful analysis, to be forms of desire. We have no 
affection for these objects ; the soul does not go out 
in good-will toward them ; we do not wish good to 
them in any sense. We value them because we be- 
lieve they will contribute to our own enjoyment, 
pleasure, or happiness. We labor for them and 
strive to get possession of them for this reason 
alone. It may be said, and in some cases truthfully, 
that we seek them in order to use them for the 
good of others. But this very mode of use contrib- 
utes to our highest and purest enjoyment. There 
is no more profound pleasure than the feeling which 
arises in a soul conscious of earnest and unselfish 
effort for the good of sentient beings. All these feel- 
ings are, therefore, to be classed among desires. 

Forms of Desire Very Numerous. — It would be 
impossible to enumerate all the different forms in 



154 DESIRE OF SOCIETY. 

which desire manifests itself. A few only will be 
named here, some of which have already been men- 
tioned. 

Some Instinctive Desires. — Among the instinctive 
are the desires for the gratification of appetite, for 
the preservation of life, for personal safety and pro- 
tection, for self-defense when attacked, and for the 
good and protection of those for whom we have 
special affection. This last is mingled with the social 
instinct. 

Origin of the Higher Forms of Desire. — Most of 
the higher forms of desire have their origin in some 
native tendency or appetency of the mind, but take 
their direction and much of their strength from ex- 
pectations of advantage and pleasure of some kind 
discovered by the knowing activities of the soul. 
Such manifestations of desire may be called rational. 
A few forms may be purely rational. 

Desire of Society. — The desire for society exhibits 
itself very early, and in its first manifestations is 
altogether instinctive. It is evident that it does not 
originate in the natural tendency of the young to 
imitate the older, nor in considerations of safety and 
other advantages. Later in life it, undoubtedly, 
takes direction from the conclusions of judgment 
and reason in respect to personal interests, and real 
or supposed utility. 

Desire of Knowledge. — The desire for knowledge 
appears first as native curiosity ; in maturer years 
the feeling is rational. The young child seeks to 
find out things from an almost irresistible impulse, 



DESIRE OF APPROBATION AND ESTEEM. 155 

just as he seeks to use his limbs and his vocal 
organs. This is one of the strongest motives for 
the activity of childhood, both physical and mental. 
The resulting enjoyment appears to spring from the 
law of pleasurable activity, and not from the pleas- 
ure of acquisition, nor from regard for the use or 
value of knowledge. 

Change with Age. — With increasing years the 
power of curiosity, properly so-called, diminishes, and 
a rational love of knowledge takes its place. The 
pleasure resulting from the acquisition of knowledge 
is of a mingled character. There is pleasure in the 
mere exercise of the knowing activities, in perceiv- 
ing, reproducing, imagining, judging, and reasoning. 
There is pleasure in the mere consciousness of hav- 
ing mastered difficulties, and in the simple fact of 
possession. Regard for the value and use of knowl- 
edge, in many cases, increases the pleasure. 

Desire of Approbation and Esteem. — Desire for 
approbation and esteem exhibits itself at a very 
early period of a child's life, and constitutes one of 
the motives of childhood. In riper years it still re- 
mains a motive, good or bad according to the direc- 
tion which is given to its power. A reasonable re- 
gard for the good opinion of others is certainly a 
proper feeling, and seems necessary to the attain- 
ment of the highest excellence of character. When 
such regard becomes undue and excessive, it tends 
to destroy integrity and manliness. The practical 
problem is to determine how much influence this 
desire may be allowed to exert at particular times 



156 EMULATION. 

and under particular circumstances, and how much 
appeal should be made to it as a motive in dealing 
with the young. 

Desire of Superiority. — The desire of superiority 
assumes almost an infinite variety of aspects. It 
closely resembles, in some manifestations, the love 
of authority and power ; in other directions it differs 
widely from that feeling. It does not look to the 
exercise of dominion over others. It urges to efforts 
to attain superior excellence, superior knowledge, su- 
perior rank and position, but not for the purpose of 
rendering others inferior or subservient. The desire 
may only seek to make the most and best of one's 
own abilities, resources, and opportunities, to reach 
the highest possible personal excellence. 

Emulation. — In schools this desire often takes the 
form of emulation, and leads to endeavors to surpass 
others for the sake of obtaining some rank, position, 
prize, or other mark of honor and distinction. As a 
motive emulation has great power, and may be em- 
ployed under sufficient safeguards and limitations. 
But it needs no artificial stimulus, and should be ap- 
pealed to very seldom in the management of children. 

General Influence. — In the world at large this 
feeling of emulation exerts a very powerful influence. 
The progress of humanity has been, in many direc- 
tions, accelerated by it. It has caused improvements 
in neighborhoods, villages, and cities. It has helped 
to give us better steam-ships, better railway coaches, 
better school-houses, and many other better facilities 
and conveniences. 



DESIRE OF ACQUISITION. 157 

Desire of Acquisition. — The desire to acquire and 
possess material things makes itself felt as soon as 
a child becomes acquainted with external objects, 
and has sufficient strength to grasp them. At first 
the pleasure seems to be that of possession alone, 
with no reference to use or value. In a few singu- 
larly constituted minds this form of pleasure appears 
to continue into mature years. The miser hoards 
money for the mere enjoyment of hoarding and 
holding. In his earliest efforts at acquisition the 
child recognizes no right of ownership in others. 
The world is all his own. The notion of mutual 
rights and obligations is slowly acquired in the pro- 
cess of mental and moral development. 

Right to Hold Property. — The right of every in- 
dividual to acquire and hold property as his own 
personal and private possession, appears to be recog- 
nized by all men and in every state of society and 
under all forms of social and political organization. 
The idea of such right may be intuitive, or it may 
originate in the teachings of experience and obser- 
vation in respect to the advantages of private own- 
ership both to individuals and to society. That the 
right of private and personal acquisition and reten- 
tion of some kinds of property may need to be re- 
stricted and limited for the general good, must be 
admitted. It is, however, a matter of very great 
practical difficulty to determine the nature and ex- 
tent of such restrictions and limitations. 

Desire of Power and Authority. — The desire for 
power and authority shows itself even in young 



158 AMBITION. 

children. It seems to find gratification in control- 
ling inanimate objects, and in exercising dominion 
over animals. By an easy transition the child finds 
pleasure in mastership over other children. The boy 
prefers to be "driver" rather than u horse" on the 
playground, and to be an officer instead of a private 
when he acts the part of a mimic soldier. 

In Later Years. — With advancing years the de- 
sire seeks higher modes of gratification, and min- 
gles itself with various other feelings. The desire 
for knowledge as a motive to study is re-enforced 
by the pleasure which comes from intellectual mas- 
tership. The line can not always be clearly marked 
between the love of power and the love of excel- 
lence. This desire has its own appropriate field of 
activity, and within that field is a most useful and 
effectual spur to legitimate exertion. Control over 
the forces of nature and over the animal creation is 
necessary to the progress of civilization, and to the 
highest development of the human race. The desire 
in man for dominion over his fellows may be pro- 
ductive of good, but is usually a source of great and 
terrible evils. It gives birth to tyranny and despotism. 

Ambition. — Ambition is a term of ambiguous 
meaning, but it is generally employed to denote an 
inordinate desire for honor, place, and power. It is 
sometimes used as a name for any strong desire, and 
thus it comes to have a good as well as bad signifi- 
cation. We speak of individuals as being ambitious 
to become excellent, to become learned, to be useful, 
to do good, and to make others happy. 



SOME COMPLEX FEELINGS. 159 

Some Complex Feelings. — A few complex feel- 
ings in which desire or its opposite aversion is an 
important element must be briefly noticed. 

Hope. — Hope is desire and expectation. We hope 
only for those things which we believe to be desira- 
ble and attainable. Hope, in any particular case, is 
strong or weak according to the strength of expecta- 
tion. When all ground for expectation crumbles 
away hope expires. Desire moves to action only 
when it is presupposed that the object of desire is 
attainable by efforts which we are capable of mak- 
ing, and by means which we can control. Tentative 
efforts may be and often are put forth to ascertain 
the possibility of attainment, but these are merely 
preliminary to any deliberate and settled course of 
action. 

Despair. — Despair is the opposite of hope. There 
may be intense desire, but no expectation, rather a 
full conviction that the object desired is unattain- 
able. The depth of the despair is often in propor- 
tion to the intensity of the desire. Despair, also, 
arises from the anticipation of some great evil from 
which we can discover no way of escape. In this 
case there is desire of escape and safety, but no ex- 
pectation of averting the coming doom. 

Discouragement. — Discouragement is an incipient 
form of despair resulting from a discovery of unex- 
pected obstacles and from weariness produced by 
protracted and fruitless efforts. Encouragement is 
the opposite feeling, and follows unexpected success, 
or unlooked-for help or relief. Discouragement par- 



160 APPREHENSION, ALARM, FEAR, ETC. 

alyzes one's powers, as encouragement redoubles their 
energy and activity. 

Apprehension, Alarm, Fear, etc. — Apprehension, 
alarm, fear, dread, and terror are terms denoting 
different degrees of the same feeling. There is an- 
ticipation of evil or danger, either near at hand or 
approaching, accompanied by doubt as to one's power 
to escape from it or to avert it. When the evil is 
indefinite, and is supposed to be remote, the feeling 
is merely apprehension. The mind is uneasy but 
not seriously disturbed, and the external appearance 
is not much affected. 

Alarm. — When the evil is believed to be close at 
hand, and its greatness is magnified, the feeling be- 
comes alarm. The appearance and conduct of a per- 
son, under the influence of this feeling, exhibit evi- 
dence of great perturbation of mind, and frequently 
of the absence of judgment and reason. 

Fear. — Fear is a general name to denote any 
moderate degree of the feeling which accompanies 
serious anticipation of evil, danger, pain, or suffering, 
either near or remote. 

Dread and Terror. — Dread is a deeper and more 
permanent feeling, while terror is an exceedingly in- 
tense and violent form of fear. It produces usually 
great agitation both of body and mind, and renders 
sound judgment impossible. Like every other form 
of excessive feeling, it can continue but a short 
time. These are only a few of the feelings in which 
desire or aversion appear in greater or less degrees 
of strength. 



DEFINITIONS. 161 



SUMMARY OF CHAPTER XI. AND DEFINITIONS. 

1. Desire defined. 

2. Use of the term good. 

3. Relation of aversion to desire. 

4. Desire a single feeling. 

5. Instinctive, rational, and mixed desires. 

6. Desire implies a want. 

7. How desire is excited. 

8. Desire more permanent than other feelings, 

9. Desire the universal motive. 

10. Self-love and selfishness. 

11. No specific desire for happiness. 

12. The substance of true happiness. 

13. The term love used for desire. 

14. Forms of desire very numerous. 

15. Some instinctive desires. 

16. Origin of the higher forms of desire. 

17. Desire of society. 

18. Of knowledge. 

19. Of approbation and esteem. 

20. Of superiority, emulation. 

21. Of acquisition. 

22. Right to possess and hold property. 

23. Desire of power and authority. Ambition. 

24. Some complex feelings, (a.) Hope, (&.) Despair, (c.) Discour- 

agement, (d.) Apprehension, (e.) Alarm, (/.) Fear, (g.) 
Dread and Terror. 



Desire. — Craving of the mind for real or supposed good. 

Good. — That which, when rightly used, contributes to real 
and proper pleasure, enjoyment, satisfaction, and ad- 
vantage. 

Highest Good. — That which contributes to the highest advan- 
tage and happiness. The highest happiness of man re- 
sults from the right employment of all his powers and 
capacities. 



162 



SUMMARY OF THE FEELINGS 



GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE FEELINGS. 
1. Instinct. 



1. Origin of the 
Feelings. 



2. Classes. 



2. Rational considerations. 
i 
1^3. Instinct and reason. 



1. Physical. 



2. Emotions. 



1. Organic and vital. 

rt . f 1. Natural. 

2. Appetites. 1 _ . . 

12. Acquired. 

1. Instinctive. 

2. Mixed. 

3. Rational. 



fl. Beneficent. 
3. Affections. -j 2. Defensive. 
I 3. Malevolent. 



4. Desire and 
Aversion. 



Forms various. 



5. Complex feelings, in which desire and 
aversion appear. 



CHAPTER XII. 

TH E WILL. 

Automatic Movements. — Certain movements of 
the physical organism necessary to the continuance 
of life go on, as we say, of themselves. Among these 
are the beating of the heart, respiration, the proc- 
esses of digestion, and some others. Such move- 
ments are called automatic. Those named are auto- 
matic from the beginning of life. 

Force of Habit. — Some other movements of parts 
of the body become nearly automatic by force of 
habit. It is only necessary to start these movements 
by an act of the will. When once begun, they con- 
tinue without conscious attention until the organs 
become fatigued, or the purpose has been accom- 
plished. Walking is one of these forms of activity. 
At first, to the child the process is full of difficulty 
and labor, and requires a strong and constant effort 
of will. Gradually it becomes less and less difficult, 
until finally it is performed almost automatically. 
The same is true of the movements of the hands 
and fingers in playing the piano and other musical 
instruments, of the movements made in writing, and 
of the movements made by all artisans in their work. 

Articulate Sounds. — The complicated movements 
of the muscles concerned in the production of artic- 



164 INSTINCTIVE AND KEFLEX MOVEMENTS. 

ulate sounds, either in speaking or singing, are still 
more wonderful in their character. After sufficient 
practice, the singer or speaker has only to think of 
the desired sound, or combination of sounds, and 
the muscles instantly make all the required move- 
ments. In these cases, not only single movements, 
but whole series of movements, seem to become 
almost if not quite automatic. 

Random Movements. — Many of the movements 
of the body and limbs made by the young child are 
apparently random and entirely aimless. Automatic 
activities have a purpose, while these have none. 
They can not, therefore, be properly called auto- 
matic. 

Instinctive and Reflex Movements. — Some other 
bodily movements, automatic so far as any act of 
the will is concerned, are of a peculiar character, 
and are called, sometimes instinctive, and sometimes 
reflex. They are executed by " an impulse acting 
prior to experience or instruction," and for this rea- 
son may be named instinctive. They are made in 
response to some external provocation, excitant, or 
stimulus, without the intervention of the will, and 
for this reason may be called reflex. 

Examples. — Among these are the movements of 
a young child in sucking when the finger is placed 
between the lips, in swallowing when any thing is 
placed upon the tongue, and in closing the fingers 
when the palm of the hand is touched. The acts of 
winking when something is brought suddenly near 
the eye, of dodging to avoid a blow, and of ducking 



THE WILL. 165 

the head at the whistling sound of a bullet, are of 
this kind. 

Voluntary Movements. — Before most other move- 
ments of the body, and before the exercise of most 
of the knowing activities of the mind, we are con- 
scious of an antecedent psychical activity by which 
we choose, decide, or determine to do the act. Before 
turning the head, raising the hand, or stretching out 
the arm, we choose and determine to do these acts. 
All such movements are called voluntary, and the 
mental activity by which we choose and determine 
to do them is called the will. 

The Will. — The will is the executive power of 
the mind, the power by which all other voluntary 
activities are controlled. The nature of this power 
can be best learned by analyzing its complex action 
in some particular case. 

Illustration. — Two objects are placed before me, 
and I am told that I can have one of them and 
may take my choice. Something is here presented 
to be done, and an alternative is offered. I am 
allowed freedom in selecting. Without such freedom 
there could be no such thing as choice. If only one 
object were before me, there would still be oppor- 
tunity for choice, provided I am permitted to accept 
or reject it. 

Examination and Deliberation. — I proceed now 
to examine the objects, to compare their values, to 
consider and deliberate ; I use judgment and reason. 
There can be no choice, in the proper sense of the 
term, without time for deliberation and careful com- 



166 VOLITION. 

parison. In some cases much time may be required 
from the fact that many things have to be consid- 
ered. 

Preference, Choice, and Desire. — After examining 
and comparing the objects, estimating the advantages 
to be derived from the possession of each one, or the 
enjoyment and pleasure they are expected to give, 
either immediately or in the future, I come to have 
a feeling of preference for one object over the other. 
The feeling of preference excites the feeling of de- 
sire. In consequence of this feeling I make choice 
of that object. 

Volition. — Following this mental act of choosing 
I decide, or determine, to make the object my own 
by such physical action as may be necessary. This 
final psychical act is called volition. It is the last 
of a series of consecutive activities of mind, the 
crowning executive act of the will. Whether, in 
any particular case, immediate external activity fol- 
lows this final psychical act, depends upon conditions 
and circumstances. The mental activity of willing 
is complete even if such outward action should 
never take place. 

Steps in the Process of Willing. — The successive 
steps of this complex process can be easily traced. 
(1.) Some object or objects of perception or of thought 
must be presented. The object may be external and 
real, or it may be a mental concept or picture. 

(2.) There must be time and opportunity to know 
the object or objects. Examination, comparison, and 
deliberation must be had. 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 167 

(3.) This examination must reveal qualities or 
characteristics in the object which, when known, 
will affect the sensibilities ; that is, will excite some 
feeling in the mind. The feeling may be an emotion 
or an affection, but the final result must be either 
desire or aversion, so that the object is pronounced 
desirable or undesirable. 

(4.) Following this examination and the feeling 
excited, the mental act of choice takes place. If the 
final feeling is desire, we choose to have the object ; 
if it is aversion, we refuse the object, or choose not 
to have it. There must be perfect freedom of choice. 

(5.) The psychical act of volition is put forth, and 
the series of mental activities is completed. 

Desire Precedes every Act of Volition. — Our 
analysis reveals the fact that final acts of willing 
are preceded, in all cases, by desire ; and that desire 
is excited by the discovery of some real or supposed 
good which may be possessed, or which we believe 
may be possessed. The real motive therefore, in the 
soul, is some form of desire ; but, in common modes 
of speech, those things which appeal to the mind 
in such a way as to excite desire, are also called 
motives. 

Freedom of the Will. — With the vexatious con- 
troversies concerning the power of motives and the 
freedom of the will we have no occasion to concern 
ourselves. It is sufficient to say that the mental 
activities called willing are performed, like all other 
psychical acts, in accordance with the general laws 
of mind. The will is as free as perception, or judg- 



168 FEELING OF RESPONSIBILITY. 

ment, or imagination, when it is permitted to act 
without compulsion or restraint imposed by any ex- 
ternal power or authority. 

Testimony of Consciousness. — We are conscious of 
no irresistible compulsion in our acts of volition, more 
than we are in acts of judging. We feel that we could 
have chosen differently, and could have adopted a 
different course of conduct. So far as we can learn, 
all other men have the same feeling of freedom. 

Feeling of Responsibility. — In consequence of this 
sense of freedom we feel responsible for our determi- 
nations and our conduct. We are subject to feelings 
of self-condemnation and remorse, to which we could 
not be subject if not free in respect to volitions and 
behavior. 

These Feelings Universal. — So far as our knowl- 
edge extends our associates and all men share in 
these feelings. All rules and laws for the regulation 
of human conduct in the family, in the school, in 
general society, and in the State, are based upon the 
conviction that men generally can do or can refrain 
from doing according to their own pleasure. Tn the 
administration of justice and in the infliction of pun- 
ishments, regard should be had, in individual cases, 
for the influence of heredity, environment, and edu- 
cation. This does not invalidate the universal law 
of human responsibility. 

The Strongest Motive. — It is frequently affirmed 
by those who deny the freedom of volition that we 
always act, and must act, in the direction of what 
is called the " strongest motive " ; that the " prepon- 



ESSENCE OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 169 

derance of motives" in all cases determines our 
actions. This may be admitted without hesitation, 
since, in substance, it is only another way of saying 
that the motive which prevails is, for the moment, 
the strongest, the fact of preponderance being the 
sole criterion by which its relative strength is de- 
termined. The inference is that since the will is 
thus influenced by the strongest motive it can not 
be free in its choice ; in other words, it can not 
choose otherwise than it does choose. 

Essence of Freedom of the Will. — The fallacy 
here is in the tacit assumption that the will has no 
power in determining the " strongest motive " or the 
u predominance of motives." The essence of the free- 
dom of the ivill consists in its power to give "pre- 
dominance to motives" or to make any selected mo- 
tive the strongest for the time. It is a familiar fact 
that the action of motives upon us is not uniform. 
A motive which is very strong at one time, at an- 
other moment is almost powerless. Dr. Carpenter 
says, " Reflection on our own mental experiences 
will satisfy us, that these variations in the relative 
strength of motives mainly arise from the degree 
of attention that we give to each respectively. An 
excited feeling which would soon die out if left to 
itself, will retain its potency, or even gain augmented 
force, if we allow ourselves to brood over it." If we 
turn from it, and refuse to harbor it, it has very 
little power over us, and presently disappears. The 
will, consequently, " determines the preponderance of 
motives " by giving direction to attention. 



170 REGULAR ORDER OF ACTIVITIES. 

The Will Feeble in Young Children. —The power 
of the will in the young child is very feeble, and the 
development of this power is very slow. One of the 
most important objects of education is to give the will 
supreme control over the whole being so that every 
voluntary activity, both of body and mind, shall yield 
perfect obedience to its commands. It is only then 
that man is master of himself. 

Regular Order of Activities. — Relation between 
knowing, feeling, and willing. The relation between 
knowing, feeling, and willing has been already indi- 
cated, but the importance of this relation will justify 
a little repetition. In a series of psychical acts, in- 
volving all these modes of activity, a regular order 
of succession is easily discovered by an appeal to 
consciousness, and even by observation. We do not 
determine to do, or not to do, until we feel the 
impulsive force of desire. Desire is not excited 
until we have some knowledge concerning any pro- 
posed course of conduct, or about any object brought 
before us. We do not will until we feel ; we do 
not feel until we know. The necessary order, there- 
fore, is, first, knowing ; second, feeling ; and last, 
willing. 

Movements Rapid. — The movements of the mind 
are so rapid that often the three modes of activity 
seem to take place simultaneously. No appreciable 
space of time passes between the reception of knowl- 
edge and the act of volition. For example, we are 
informed that a neighboring house is on fire and 
a friend is in great danger. The knowledge is in- 



REFLEX INFLUENCE. 171 

stantly comprehended, the feeling of love and sym- 
pathy - is excited, the desire to render assistance is 
aroused, and we start for the scene of danger. We 
set out before the story has been fully told. But 
even here there can be no doubt as to the order in 
which the mental acts have occurred. 

Reflex Influence. — This view of the relation is, 
however, only a partial one. There is a reflex action 
of feeling upon knowing, and of knowing upon feel- 
ing, which is of the highest practical importance. 
Such mutual reaction increases very largely the pro- 
ductive power of the mind. 

Illustration. — A child commences to read or study 
a book. The information given in the first pages 
creates an interest ; that is, excites a certain feeling 
in his mind. This feeling spurs him to read or study 
more eagerly. The added knowledge increases the 
feeling of interest. The desire to know more be- 
comes intensified and acts more vigorously upon the 
will. The will commands the attention and holds all 
the necessary activities of mind and body steadily 
to the work of mastering the contents of the book. 
Acquisition is thus rendered easy, rapid, and agree- 
able. In this and in all similar cases feeling greatly 
accelerates the process of learning. As previously 
stated, when the feeling becomes too intense or 
takes a wrong direction, it hinders the knowing 
activity or entirely paralyzes it. Naturally the vari- 
ous powers of the mind work in harmony, and the 
effort of the student and teacher should be to create 
and preserve an equilibrium between their activities. 



172 



DEFINITION 



SUMMARY OF CHAPTER XII. AND DEFINITION. 

{ 1. Automatic. 
j 2. Random. 
1. Movements or activities. \ 3. Instinctive. 

4. Reflex. 

5. Voluntary. 

1. Objects, etc., presented to the 
mind. 

2. Examination and delibera- 
tion. 

3. Feeling excited. 

4. Choice. 

5. Volition, executive act. 

1. Consciousness. 

2. Observation. 

3. Feeling of responsibility. 

4. Universal belief. 



2. Steps in the process of 
willing 



3. Evidences of freedom in 
willing 



" 1. Knowing. 

4. Relation and order of men- J 2. Feeling. 

tal activities .... 1 3. Willing. 

[_ 4. Reflex influence. 



The Will. — The mental activity of choosing and determining, 
or the executive power of the mind. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

THE MORAL NATURE. 

Not another Nature. — The moral nature is not 
another and different nature from that which we 
have been studying. We have here the same intel- 
lect, the same sensibilities, and the same will. 

The Moral Nature Defined. — The moral nature 
is the mind knoioing, feeling, and willing upon and 
concerning matters of right and wrong, of worthiness 
and unworthiness, of obligation and duty. It is the 
mind inquiring as to the reasons for bestowing praise 
and blame, for speaking of merit and demerit, for 
believing in such distinctions as good and bad in 
character and conduct. 

The same Processes. — We perceive, think, and 
reason concerning these and similar questions just 
as we do of all other matters. Some apparently 
different forms of psychical activity and different 
modes of feeling necessarily appear, when moral 
questions are considered, on account of the peculiar 
nature of such inquiries. The activity of conscience 
can be exercised only when the mind is debating 
about right and wrong ; the feeling that we ought 
or ought not can be excited only when obligations 
and duties are presented and urged. 

Intelligence and Freedom Necessary. — In order 



17-4 IDEA OF RIGHT AND WRONG. 

that a being may have a moral nature and be justly 
held responsible for his conduct, he must be intelli- 
gent enough to distinguish right from- wrong, and 
free enough to be able to choose and to pursue one 
of these in preference to the other. These two con- 
ditions appear to exist in all men. 

Idea of Right and Wrong. — We find ourselves 
in possession of an idea of right and wrong. We 
can not recall a time in our lives when we did 
not have this idea with some degree of distinctness. 
We are unable to determine whence or how we 
first obtained it, or from what source it came. We 
observe that all our friends and neighbors have the 
same idea, and all the people with whom we have 
ever associated. All the tribes and races of men 
of whom we have heard or read appear to possess 
this notion with varying measures of clearness. It 
is said that in all languages, ancient and modern, 
terms are found to express a radical moral dis- 
tinction between right and wrong. This distinc- 
tion exists every-where to-day, and has existed as 
far back in the past ages as history or tradition 
can be traced. It is universal. 

An Important Distinction. — This general notion 
of a right and a wrong must, however, be carefully 
distinguished from the belief that certain specific 
characters and actions are right and certain others 
are wrong. Concerning the particular things re- 
garded as right or wrong, differences of opinion will 
be discovered even in the same community. The 
reasons for such differences will be discussed in an- 



MORAL INTUITION AND PERCEPTION. 175 

other place. It is only affirmed here that all men 
recognize the idea of moral goodness and moral bad- 
ness, and that they all consider some things morally 
right and others morally wrong. 

Source of this Idea. — Moral intuition. How came 
men in all ages and every-where to have this idea? 
From what source did it come, and in what way did 
it originate? Different answers are made to these 
questions. It may not matter practically whether 
we suppose it has been inherited or has been given 
us by an original power of the mind. I believe it to 
be one of the intuitive ideas, or intuitions, of the 
human soul, a product of intuition or the intuitive 
activity of the mind. This is the same psychical 
power which gives us all other intuitive ideas. But 
on account of the peculiar nature of this idea, the 
power may be called moral intuition, if it is kept 
in mind that the term moral is employed simply 
for convenience to designate the particular direction 
in which the activity is here exerted. 

Moral Perception. — In addition to this primary 
notion of right and wrong, which seems to be a 
common possession of all mankind, history teaches 
that men in all ages have been in essential agree- 
ment concerning the moral nature of some actions 
whose characteristics are strongly marked and read- 
ily discovered. We find men still in this state of 
practical agreement. 

Things Considered Wrong. — Murder, robbery, un- 
provoked personal violence, stealing, lying, and some 
other similar deeds, have always been, and are now, 



176 MORAL PERCEPTION. 

condemned as wrong without argument or prolonged 
consideration. They have never been approved or 
defended except under peculiar circumstances and 
for obvious reasons. 

Inferences from Peculiar Conditions of no Value. — 
Inferences drawn from what may be said and done 
in a state of war, or in a condition of mutual hatred 
into which men can, without doubt, be educated, 
have here no relevancy. At such times the ordinary 
laws of judgment and behavior are evidently over- 
borne and held in abeyance by excited passions and 
brute violence. 

Things Considered Right. — On the other hand 
it has, in all periods, been regarded right and praise- 
worthy to protect and defend the weak, to provide 
for the needy, to relieve those in distress and trouble, 
to deal honestly in business, to observe the require- 
ments of justice and mercy, to speak the truth, to 
be faithful to promises, and to live a life of purity 
and self-restraint. 

Moral Perception. — Something in all human souls, 
whatever the external conduct may be, appears to 
discover in these and kindred acts an element of 
moral right, as in deeds of an opposite character it 
discovers the quality of moral wrong. This some- 
thing may be called moral perception, that is, the 
ability of the mind to perceive, with little or no in- 
struction and guidance, the moral qualities of many 
of the most simple and most easily comprehended 
human actions. Its power is not sufficient to grasp 
and resolve complex problems of conduct. This ac- 



MORAL JUDGMENT. 17 7 

tivity may be considered as only the incipient and 
slowly developing moral judgment ; but it seems 
best, on the whole, to speak of it as a distinct and 
separate activity of mind. 

Moral Judgment. — In respect to all complicated 
questions of right and wrong, of obligation and duty, 
we proceed to make inquiries and to seek information 
just as we do in relation to all other matters. We 
do not expect to receive unerring direction from some 
inward monitor without the use of our ordinary men- 
tal powers. We seek to learn what ought and what 
ought not to be said or done in precisely the same 
way in which we set about learning other things. 
If a certain course of conduct, or a particular manner 
of life is urged upon us, we inquire concerning the 
influence which will be exerted by it and the conse- 
quences which will probably follow its adoption. If 
in doubt, we ask the opinions and advice of those 
who are, as we believe, better qualified than our- 
selves to decide wisely and correctly as to the right 
or wrong of the proposed conduct or manner of life. 
Having thus sought and obtained all possible infor- 
mation, we come to conclusions and make decisions 
as to right and duty by employing the same powers 
and exercising the same activities of mind which 
we employ in reaching conclusions and making de- 
cisions about matters of business, or about questions 
in history, or literature, or in science, or art, where 
no moral considerations are involved. 

Nature of the Process. — The process is one of 
examination, comparison, and conclusion. These are 



178 CONSCIENCE. 

functions of the judgment. The activity is here, as 
in the case of intuition, exerted in a special direc- 
tion, and, for this reason, the power may ~be called 
the moral judgment. The term moral merely indi- 
cates the peculiar province in which the action takes 
place, and not any peculiarity of the activity itself. 

Limitations of the Judgment. — In this field, and 
when deciding ethical questions, the judgment is 
limited by the same conditions and is obedient to 
the same laws as in any other field, or when ex- 
amining problems of any other nature. It decides 
according to the knowledge possessed, and according 
to the accepted moral standard. It is no more in- 
fallible here than elsewhere, and frequently makes 
faulty decisions. 

Conscience. — Whenever a decision of the judg- 
ment has been rendered we are conscious of some 
activity or impulse of mind which insists that this 
decision shall be respected and obeyed. This inner 
power demands that, in all cases and under all cir- 
cumstances, we shall do tohat the moral judgment 
declares to be right, and shall refrain from doing 
what it pronounces wrong. It forbids all evasion, or 
compromise, and is satisfied with nothing short of 
direct and unqualified submission to its require- 
ments. This power is conscience. 

Nature of Conscience. — Conscience is the supreme 
and only peculiar psychical activity of the so-called 
moral nature. It is, according to this analysis, an 
executive and not a judicial activity of mind. It 
leaves the judgment to decide all questions of right, 



USE OF THE TERM CONSCIENCE. 179 

obligation, and duty, and only concerns itself to 
have these decisions recognized and carried into 
full effect. As thus defined, conscience itself can 
make no mistakes, and is always to be obeyed. 
This is only another way of saying that a man 
should at all times and under all conditions do 
that which he believes, after the most patient, 
thorough, and honest examination, to be right ; and 
should abstain from doing that which he believes 
to be wrong, or concerning which he has any seri- 
ous doubts. 

Use of the Term Conscience. — The term con- 
science is frequently used to designate the entire 
moral nature, and more frequently to denote the 
moral judgment and the moral executive power of 
the mind. While such usage can plead good author- 
ity, it, nevertheless, causes much unnecessary per- 
plexity and confusion in the minds of the young. 
Referring to such perplexity and confusion, a very 
acute writer says : "It seems to me easy enough to 
solve this difficulty. The judgment pronounced by 
the conscience in each particular case is, in reality, 
composed of two judgments: (1) Such an action is 
your duty; (2) Perform this action because it is 
your duty. Now, in the first of these judgments 
the conscience may be mistaken ; for it may happen 
that a certain action which I believe to be my duty 
is not my duty. But it is not mistaken in the sec- 
ond ; for, if it is certain that any given action is my 
duty, I ought to perform it. If, then, it be agreed 
that the name of conscience shall be applied only to 



180 SATISFACTION AND DISSATISFACTION. 

the second of these judgments, to the act by which 
I declare that, a certain action being my duty, I 
ought to perform it, it is clear that such a judg- 
ment is never erroneous.' 1 There can be no doubt 
of the advantage of thus limiting the use of the 
term conscience. 

Moral Feelings. — The moral nature embraces 
feelings as well as positive activities. These feel- 
ings are numerous, complex in many cases, and not 
easily grouped into classes. They are, however, es- 
sentially the same as those already described in the 
study of the sensibilities, with some modifications 
caused by the influence of ideas of right, obligation, 
duty, and so forth. 

Feelings of Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction. — The 
earliest feelings of the child, related in any way to 
conduct and to moral activities, appear to be those 
of simple satisfaction and dissatisfaction. These, at 
first, are probably closely connected with mere phys- 
ical feelings and with the emotions of joyousness 
and sadness which are largely instinctive. They are 
more readily observed in the young, but are not 
confined to any period of life. 

When They Arise. — They usually arise in connec- 
tion with states of mind or with external conduct 
concerning the propriety and goodness of which the 
moral perception and judgment have grave doubts. 
If these doubts are dispelled, and the state or act 
appears manifestly right, a feeling of satisfaction 
fills the soul ; but if the doubts continue, even 
though the act or state may not be vigorously con- 



MOTIVES DISAPPROVED, ETC. 181 

demned, a feeling of dissatisfaction and discomfort is 
sure to be experienced. 

Feelings of Approbation and Disapprobation. — 

These simple and almost instinctive feelings of sat- 
isfaction and dissatisfaction naturally and easily 
change, as the mind matures, into the stronger and 
more definite feelings of approbation and disappro- 
bation. These feelings are directed both toward 
one's self and toward others. In the young child 
they are mingled with the emotions of satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction which are experienced when he 
receives the approval or disapproval of the mother 
or other attendants, and have very little reference 
to moral considerations. Gradually these feelings 
become more closely related to states of mind and 
to conduct, and the child begins consciously to ap- 
prove or disapprove himself. Later the feelings 
become clearly defined ; and the pursuit of a course 
of conduct which the ■ judgment fully approves is 
attended and followed by an agreeable feeling, more 
or less intense and lasting according to the measure 
of self-denial involved, or the amount of resolution 
and effort required. This is a feeling of approbation. 
Motives Disapproved, etc. — A careful analysis of 
one's own states of mind will make it evident that 
this feeling is directed rather toward the motives 
by which actions are supposed to be prompted than 
toward the acts themselves. The soul refuses to 
approve itself or others for deeds, however good in 
themselves, which are performed for impure or self- 
ish reasons. 



182 OBLIGATION AND DUTY. 

Need of Control. — The feeling of self -approbation, 
although natural and proper, needs to be limited 
and restrained. Otherwise it passes, by almost in- 
sensible gradations, into too intense self-gratulation, 
self-confidence, and even into self-conceit and offen- 
sive pride. 

Effect of Disobedience to Conscience. — When we 
refuse to abide by the decisions of the moral- judg- 
ment and to obey the commands of conscience, we 
are speedily conscious of a feeling of disapprobation. 
The intensity of the feeling depends upon the degree 
of violence done to our convictions of right and 
duty. Its sharpness is, without doubt, gradually less- 
ened by persistent and long-continued disregard of 
the conclusions of judgment and the demands of 
conscience, and by yielding to the solicitations of 
appetites and passions. Unless the soul does thus 
become debased and hardened, if wrong-doing con- 
tinues, disapprobation changes into self-reproach, self- 
condemnation, and finally into remorse. This feeling 
of disapprobation and condemnation goes out toward 
others whose character and conduct our judgment 
condemns. 

Feelings of Obligation and Duty. — All mature 
and sane minds are conscious of feeling that some 
things ought to be done and some other things 
ought not to be done. That which we ought to do 
uje call duty, and the feeling that we ought to do 
this we call the feeling of obligation or duty. 

This Feeling in the Child. — How early a child 
begins to experience this state of mind it is impos- 



AFFECTIONS AND DESIRE. 183 

sible to determine with absolute certainty. At first 
the feeling is very feeble and not clearly defined, It 
must be preceded by a knowledge of relations and 
consequent obligations. The strength of the feeling 
increases slowly, but with greatly varying degrees of 
rapidity. Its development and growth are much 
helped or hindered by early education and by sur- 
rounding conditions. 

Affections and Desire. — All those feelings which 
have been already described as affections and de- 
sires belong also to the moral nature. They spring 
either from a good or a bad state of mind. They 
constitute that which we call the heart as distin- 
guished from the intellect. They are the impelling 
forces which produce right or wrong in human char- 
acter and conduct. Affection kindles desire ; desire 
moves the will ; and the will stirs up the internal 
activities of the soul and the external activities of 
the body. It puts the whole man to doing good or 
evil. It is the center of human character. 

Feelings of Moral Beauty and Sublimity. — We 
discover in the characters and lives of some individ- 
uals with whom we are personally acquainted, or of 
whom we hear or read, certain qualities which we call 
morally beautiful. We perceive the same qualities 
in many actions considered apart from the actors. 
We find ourselves drawn by a natural attraction 
toward such individuals and such actions, as we 
are drawn toward a beautiful landscape, a beautiful 
picture, or any beautiful work of art. An emotion 
is excited called the feeling of moral beauty. 



184 MORALLY BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME. 

Characters and Acts Morally Beautiful. — The 

characters which cause this feeling are usually 
marked by quiet, unaffected, unostentatious, and 
apparently unconscious goodness. The acts are ex- 
pressive of love, pity, kindness, tenderness, and sym- 
pathy. There is no exhibition of peculiar power or 
strength. 

Characters and Acts Morally Sublime. — There 
are other characters and acts which excite within 
us a feeling called that of moral sublimity. These 
characters and acts show goodness combined with 
great might and energy. We see in them courage 
and heroism united with tenderness and devotion to 
right and duty. 

Illustrative Examples. — Examples of such char- 
acters and deeds are abundant in biographies and 
histories, and they are not infrequent in the records 
of common, daily life. The familiar story of " The 
Good Samaritan" appeals to the feeling of moral 
beauty. So also do the words and conduct of Sir 
Philip Sidney when wounded and dying on the bat- 
tle-field. " Being thirsty with excess of bleeding, he 
called for drink, which was presently brought him ; 
but as he was putting it to his mouth, he saw a 
poor soldier carried along, mortally wounded, casting 
his eyes at the vessel of water ; which Sir Philip 
perceiving, he took the water from his own lips, 
before tasting, and gave it to the poor man, with 
these words : — ' Thy necessity is greater than mine.' " 

The sight or description of a strong, determined 
man holding steadily on in the pursuit of some 



DEFINITIONS. 



185 



grand purpose, or of some imperative duty, never 
hesitating, never faltering, though surrounded by 
dangers and, at times, baffled and forced backward 
by obstacles and disasters, risking the loss of all 
things, even of life itself, excites the emotion of 
moral sublimity. 

Related to Love of Truth, etc. — The emotion of 
moral beauty is closely related to the love of truth, 
goodness, purity, and all excellence, and tends to 
kindle such love in the soul. The emotion of moral 
sublimity has a natural kinship to the feelings of 
respect and reverence for age, for order, for just 
laws, and for all legitimate authority. For these 
and other reasons the susceptibility to the emotions 
of moral beauty and sublimity should be cultivated 
in the minds of the young. 

SYNOPSIS OF THE MORAL NATURE AND DEFINITIONS. 



The Moral 
Nature. 



f 1. Intuition. 

r l. Powers, or J 2. Perception. 

Activities. ] 3. Judgment. 

I 4. Conscience. 



2. Feelings. 



1. Satisfaction and dissatisfac- 

tion. 

2. Approbation and disapproba- 

tion. 

3. Obligation and duty. 

4. Affections and desire. 

5. Beauty and sublimity. 



1. The Moral Nature includes all the activities and feelings 
of mind concerned about right and duty. 



186 DEFINITIONS. 

2. Intuition is that activity of mind which gives us the sim- 

ple, primary idea of right and wrong. 

3. Perception is the activity of mind which enables us to dis- 

cover immediately the moral qualities of many simple 
states of mind and external acts. 

4. Judgment is the activity of mind which examines, com- 

pares, and decides all questions and matters of right 
and wrong. 

5. Conscience is the activity of mind which insists that the 

decisions of judgment shall, in all cases, be respected 
and obeyed ; that we shall always do what we believe 
to be right and duty, and refrain from doing what we 
believe to be wrong. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

ORIGIN AND NATURE OF MORAL LAW. 

Obstacles and Difficulties. — Insuperable obstacles 
have been discovered or imagined in the way of giv- 
ing instruction in public schools in respect to morals. 
It has been supposed impossible to separate such in- 
struction from questions of a religious or semi-relig- 
ious nature. The existence of difficulties is freely 
admitted, but the demand for such instruction is be- 
coming imperative. The obstacles must be removed, 
or a path must be found which shuns them. Some 
familiar illustrations and comparisons may lead 
toward the discovery of a practical road. 

The Judge Decides by the Law. — In a court of 
justice the judge is guided to his decisions by the 
provisions of law made by some legitimate authority. 
He merely explains and applies the law to the cases 
brought before him. If a case concerns human con- 
duct, he compares the acts alleged to have been 
done with the provisions of the law applicable to 
such a case. If the conduct agrees in form and 
nature with the conduct prescribed by the law he 
pronounces it right ; if it disagrees he declares it 
wrong. 

What Right is. — To be right is to be in harmony 
with the requirements of the law ; to be wrong is to 



188 KEGULATED ACTIVITY. 

be out of harmony with these requirements. Bight, 
therefore, as the term is here used, is conformity to 
law. The conduct of a citizen is right when it is in 
accord with the laws of the State. The conduct of a 
member of any organization is right, so far as his 
relations to that organization are concerned, when it 
conforms to the rules made for the government of 
that body. In these cases the term right has no ref- 
erence to moral character or qualities, but merely 
to the question of obedience to the law prescribing 
the conduct proper in such relations. 

Right Applied to Acts of Inanimate Things. — 
The term right is applied to the actions of animals 
and of inanimate things with a similar meaning. A 
clock is said to be right when it indicates correctly 
the time of day ; that is, when it answers the pur- 
pose for which it was made. The action of any 
piece of machinery is pronounced right when the 
machine does with accuracy the particular work for 
which it was contrived. The mechanism conforms to 
law in all its movements. 

Regulated Activity Refers to an End. — All regu- 
lated activity, whether of men, of animals, or of ma- 
chines, has reference to the accomplishment of some 
desired purpose or end. The law of right action is 
simply adaptability. The law relating to conduct or 
to action is merely a formal statement of the kind 
of conduct or action necessary to accomplish the 
purpose or to secure the end. The laws of a State 
for the government of its citizens prescribe the con- 
duct necessary on their part to secure the ends for 



WHAT THE JUDGMENT DOES. 189 

which the State exists. The rules of any organized 
body are of the same character. The laws and 
rules forbid and declare conduct wrong when not 
so adapted. In the court the judge or the jury 
examine and compare the conduct of an alleged 
criminal with reference to this adaptability. 

What the Judgment Does. — It was stated in the 
preceding chapter that the human judgment, when 
exercised upon moral questions, decides what is 
right and what is wrong. If the question relates to 
our conduct, it decides what we ought or ought not 
to do. After such decision, conscience insists upon 
absolute and unconditional obedience to it. No ex- 
cuse or subterfuge is accepted or tolerated. Feelings 
of self -approval and of pleasure follow obedience ; 
feelings of self-condemnation and of pain follow dis- 
obedience. 

The Judgment Guided by Some Law. Moral 
Law. — In rendering its decisions the judgment 
must be guided by the provisions of some law made 
by some competent authority for the direction and 
control of human conduct This law must be the 
standard of right conduct in cases where questions 
of right and wrong are involved, just as the laws of 
the State constitute a standard of right conduct for 
its citizens, and the rules of a debating club consti- 
tute a standard for the behavior of its members in 
their conduct while in the society. The moral judg- 
ment performs the same duties in the court of con- 
science as the civil judge does in the court of a 
State. It ascertains and applies the law " for such 



190 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE. 

cases made and provided." It does not make the law 
any more than a judicial officer makes the law 
which he administers. It finds a law already " made 
and provided." This law is usually called "the moral 
law"; and it is the generally accepted standard by 
which human conduct is to be regulated, and accord- 
ing to which such conduct is judged. By this law 
the judgment is guided in all its determinations. 

Illustrative Example. — When, therefore, my judg- 
ment declares some act of mine to be morally right 
or morally wrong, the decision must be based upon 
the result of a comparison of this act with the pro- 
visions of the moral law prescribing what sort of an 
act I ought to have done under the given conditions. 
The conduct has been laid alongside the law, and 
has been measured and estimated by the require- 
ments of the law. If it satisfies these requisitions it 
is pronounced right ; if it fails to satisfy them it is 
affirmed to be wrong. An appeal to consciousness 
will enable us to determine whether such processes 
of comparison and determination go on within our 
own minds. 

Thoughts, Feelings, etc., Right or Wrong. — Upon 
careful examination of the activities and states of 
our minds we discover that we approve and dis- 
approve, pronounce right or wrong, not only our 
conduct, but also our thoughts, feelings, purposes, and 
intentions. We perceive an intimate connection be- 
tween external acts and internal thoughts and feel- 
ings. The one seems to be the natural product of 
the other. We observe even that we often approve 



ACTION OF LEGAL TRIBUNALS. 191 

or condemn an action on account of the character 
of the thought or feeling which appears to have 
given birth to it. The act is declared good or bad 
according to the nature of the end for the accom- 
plishment of which it was performed. 

Action of Legal Tribunals. — Upon inquiry we 
learn that even legal tribunals, in seeking to reach 
conclusions as to the innocence or guilt of persons 
charged with criminal conduct, go beyond the acts 
themselves and take into consideration the real or 
probable intentions with which the acts were com- 
mitted. If it can be satisfactorily shown that, in a 
given case, good was intended, though harm was 
really done, the legal character of the act is very 
essentially modified in the eyes of the administra- 
tors of the law. In such a case the moral charac- 
ter of the act may be entirely changed, although, 
in a purely legal aspect, it still remains a violation 
of the letter of the law, and renders the doer liable 
to a legal penalty. 

Dealing with Children. — We observe further that 
parents, teachers, and others in charge of children, 
are influenced by the same considerations in judging 
of the conduct of those under their care. They allow 
the apparent and probable intentions of a child to 
have much weight in determining the merit or 
demerit of particular acts as well as of general 
courses of behavior. 

Character and Scope of Moral Law. — These illus- 
trations and examples help us to discover the gen- 
eral character and scope of so-called moral law. 



192 EVIDENCE OF AUTHORITY ASKED. 

Like all other laws, it has reference to ends to he 
attained. Civil law aims to make good citizens and 
thus to secure the highest good of the State. Moral 
law aims to make men and women morally good, 
and thus to secure the highest good of mankind. It 
requires such external conduct and such a state of 
mind as will result in the highest good to the indi- 
vidual, and consequently in the highest good to the 
race as a whole. 

Moral Law Every-where Recognized. — It seems 
abundantly evident by our references to conscious- 
ness, to legal tribunals, and to the conduct of men 
generally, that moral law is every-where recognized, 
and is every-ivhere regarded as of binding force. 
Reference will be made in another place to the rea- 
sons for minor differences of interpretation and ap- 
plication of the law, while there is substantial agree- 
ment as to its essential character and its important 
requirements. 

Evidence of Authority Asked. — When required by 
some person, who professes to be clothed with au- 
thority, to do or not to do certain things, to conduct 
ourselves in a particular way and not to conduct 
ourselves in another way, we are naturally impelled 
to require evidence that his authority is legitimate. 
We ask for the source of his authority, the origin 
of his claim of a right to demand obedience of us. 
We do this in civil affairs, and the officers of gov- 
ernment are bound to answer our demands. They 
refer us to the law under which they are acting, 
and point out the special provisions which justify 



ANOTHER DEMAND. — FIRST REPLY. 193 

their requisitions. Their appeal is to statute or mu- 
nicipal enactments. 

Authority for Making Laws Demanded. — We may 
go a step further now in our inquiries and demands. 
We may ask by what authority and by what right 
such specific laws have been enacted. We may deny 
the validity and the binding force of the laws. This 
is often done. In this case we are answered by refer- 
ence to what are called the fundamental laws of the 
State or country, the constitution so-called. It is 
shown that these authorize the enactment of the 
particular regulations in question. 

Still Another Demand. — It is possible for us to 
go still further, and inquire for the origin of these 
fundamental principles of government. If told that 
they were " ordained and established" by the people, 
we may demand to know by what authority the 
people so ordained, and whence they derived this 
authority. This in substance is an inquiry as to the 
origin of government itself. To this final inquiry 
different answers will be made ; but they will all 
affirm, with equal posit iveness, the validity, the 
rightfulness, of human government. 

First Reply — Necessity. — We shall be told by 
some that the experience of mankind through all the 
past ages has proved, beyond the possibility of ques- 
tion, the absolute necessity of some form of govern- 
ment ; that society can not exist without govern- 
ment ; that without it life would be intolerable, and 
the condition of men little above, or better than, that 
of wild animals. This answer justifies the existence 



194 SECOND AND THIRD REPLIES. 

of government upon the ground of necessity, and 
from such necessity there is no appeal. The aver- 
ments of this reply are true, whether this basis of 
government be accepted or not. 

Second Reply — Intuitions of the Mind. — We 
shall be told by others that the idea of government 
is one of the intuitions of the human soul, like the 
idea of time and space and cause and effect; that 
the human mind is so constituted that whenever a 
considerable number of human beings are, by any 
cause, congregated, they immediately organize some 
sort of a government ; and that this is done without 
reference to the teachings of experience or to the 
plea of necessity. This answer makes the ultimate 
basis of government the native intuitions of the 
mind. To many this reply is entirely satisfactory. 

Third Reply — Divine Authority. — We shall be 
told by others that humam government has its basis 
in the will and authority of the Supreme Ruler of 
all things ; that government is ordained of God and 
established by His direction ; that He has made a 
revelation of His will in this respect to the human 
race ; that this revelation is contained in His Word, 
and is also made known through the intuitions of 
the soul. This reply may be said to include all that 
is essential in the second, but the second alone does 
not necessarily involve the acceptance of the doctrine 
or belief in the existence of a personal Supreme 
Ruler. This last reply will be accepted by most of 
those who believe in a Divine revelation. 

Illustrative Diagram. — The origin and develop- 



RELATIONS 



195 



ment of civil government and of specific laws may 
be illustrated by the following diagram. 




Relations. — Fundamental and constitutional prin- 
ciples have their basis in the revealed or intuitive 
idea of government. Out of these fundamental prin- 
ciples grow all special laws. Civil law may right- 
fully claim obedience from me. In yielding myself 
to its demands, I am obeying the authority of neces- 
sity, of the intuitions of our common humanity, and 
of the Supreme Ruler of all things. 



196 INQUIRIES AS TO MORAL LAW. 

Inquiries as to Moral Law. — The same inquiries 
may be made in respect to moral law and its de- 
mands. A child is directed to do certain things 
because it is right that he should do them ; he is 
forbidden to do certain other things because it is 
wrong for him to do them. He is required to tell 
the truth, to be honest, to obey his parents, because 
these things are right ; he is told not to lie, not to 
steal, not to cheat his companions, not to disobey his 
parents, because such acts are wrong. The child 
may ask why it is right to do some of these acts, and 
wrong to do others; why he ought to do these and 
ought not to do those. The answer may be that it is 
the wish and will of his parents, of his teachers, and 
of others who are older and wiser than he, or that 
it is the command of God. The child is perhaps 
satisfied, for the time, and presses his inquiries no 
further. At this period of his mental and moral de- 
velopment he knows no authority higher than that 
of the mother or father or teacher. He has no 
thought of the possibility of appealing to any power 
beyond, or of asking by what authority they impose 
these commands and these limitations upon his con- 
duct. 

Further Inquiries. —The child, grown older, pro- 
ceeds to put further questions. He asks for reasons 
other than the mere assertions of the person who 
utters the command or the restriction. He demands 
to know why it is wrong to lie, to steal, to deal dis- 
honestly ; and why it is right to tell the truth, to 
act justly and honorably in the various relations of 



A FINAL INQUIRY. 197 

social and business life. He inquires for the origin 
of the distinction between right and wrong so-called; 
and for the basis upon which these rules, commands, 
and prohibitions, in respect to conduct rest. In other 
words, he asks for the source from which the de- 
tailed requirements and provisions of the moral law 
are derived, and what gives force to these provisions 
and makes them binding upon him. This question 
is of the same nature as that asked in respect to the 
authority of statute and municipal enactments, and 
essentially the same reply must be made. 

Derivation of Special Rules. — The special provis- 
ions, the specific requirements, of. the moral law are 
derived from what may properly be called funda- 
mental and constitutional principles of justice and 
righteousness, the underlying principles out of which 
all rules for human conduct are drawn, just as stat- 
ute laws are derived from the constitution of the 
State. Specific regulations for conduct are binding 
only as they are in accord with these foundation 
principles. They are to be tested by these as the 
enactments of the legislature are tested by an appeal 
to the constitution. 

A Final Inquiry. — Assuming the existence of such 
fundamental moral principles, we proceed to inquire 
concerning their origin, and their general nature. 
The question is really as to the existence of moral 
government, its source, and its character. Various 
answers have been made to the substance of these 
questions, but no reply will be accepted as satisfac- 
tory by all inquirers. 



198 FIRST REPLY. 

First Reply. — We are told, in substance, by some 
philosophers that these so-called fundamental prin- 
ciples are formulated conclusions, definite statements, 
derived from the teachings of the experience of the 
human race during the ages of the past. The phys- 
ical and mental constitutions, the instincts, wants, 
and tendencies of men show that they were designed 
to live together. They are capable of sustaining 
various relations to each other, some of these very 
intimate and productive of much happiness or of 
great misery according to the conduct of the par- 
ties to the relations. It appears evident that the 
intercourse between men is intended to be productive 
of good both to individuals and to the whole body. 
Experience has proved that this result can be secured 
only when the conduct, the manner of living and be- 
having, is of a certain kind. It has been discovered 
that some things must be done and others must not 
be done in order that life may be even tolerable, and 
that domestic and social relations may be maintained. 
It has been found absolutely necessary that people 
should tell the truth, should be honest and upright 
in business and other transactions, should respect 
the property, the persons, the reputations, and the 
interests of others ; that they should not commit 
theft, robbery, murder, nor do violence nor injus- 
tice to any one. It has been discovered that it is 
of the highest importance in the domestic relations 
that parents care properly for their children, feed- 
ing, clothing, protecting, and educating them ; and 
that in turn children be obedient and respectful 



A SECOND REPLY. 199 

to their parents and to other older persons. These 
and many other things of similar nature having 
been found by Jong experience and much obser- 
vation to be essential to the good order, the comfort, 
convenience, and happiness of mankind, came to be 
considered and called right, and things of an oppo- 
site character came to be regarded and called wrong. 
Statements were finally formulated, embodying these 
ideas and conclusions, and were called general or 
fundamental principles of moral law and of right 
conduct. Gradually these came to be accepted as 
axiomatic truths, and to be considered as impera- 
tively binding upon all men. Deductions and infer- 
ences from these constitute the specific rules for the 
regulation of conduct in all the various and compli- 
cated relations of life. 

A Second Reply. — Another reply to our inquiry 
is that these general and fundamental principles of 
morals are expressions of the will of God, revealed 
in His Word, and perhaps by other means, to man- 
kind ; that they are true because they are His com- 
mands, and are to be received and obeyed for the 
same reason. This statement of the origin of moral 
law is accepted by many as the briefest and most 
satisfactory that can be given. Like the preceding 
one, it is open to very serious objections unless ac- 
companied by careful and full explanations. 

Another Answer — Idea of Right. — Another an- 
swer is, in substance, that the idea of moral right 
and wrong is one of the intuitions of the mind. Like 
the idea of civil government, it springs up in the 



200 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. 

soul when it is needed, and serves as a basis upon 
which the principles of morals and duty may rest. 
It is the deep foundation upon which the whole su- 
perstructure of theoretical and practical morals is 
built. The idea exists in the mind long before ex- 
perience and observation have taught the necessity 
of moral law for the good and protection of society, 
and before the doctrine of a revelation from a moral 
Governor can be comprehended. It manifests itself 
at an early period in the life of the child, and is 
found among people of all degrees of development 
and culture. Every man is conscious of the presence 
of this idea in his own mind. 

Fundamental Principles. — In addition to this in- 
tuitive idea of a distinction between right and wrong, 
there are certain fundamental truths, or principles 
of justice, righteousness, beneficence, and mercy, so 
nearly intuitive and axiomatic that they commend 
themselves at once to the judgment, and are accepted 
as practically beyond doubt or question. The mind 
rests upon them as upon an immovable foundation. 
They occupy the same position in the system of 
moral government that the constitution occupies in 
our system of civil government. From them are 
deduced and inferred all needed specific rules for 
human conduct. 

Nature of these Principles. — These principles are 
universal, unchangeable, eternal truths, commend- 
ing themselves to the " general consciousness " of the 
race. The existence of such principles is generally 
admitted, though different views are entertained as 



THE BELIEVER IN REVELATION. 201 

to their origin. Those who believe in a Supreme 
Moral Ruler find them embodied in His character, 
and speak of Him as personified righteousness and 
justice. They find an expression of these principles 
in His revelation of Himself and His will, both in His 
Word and in the intuitions of the soul. 

The Believer in Revelation. — The intelligent 
believer in God and in revelation does not believe 
these principles to be truths simply because they 
are revealed. He believes they are revealed because 
they are truths. He accepts them as truths, not 
simply because he believes God has spoken them ; 
but he believes God has spoken them because they 
are true. They are true, as mathematical and other 
axioms are true, because the contrary is inconceiv- 
able as the mind and the moral nature are consti- 
tuted. 

Not Easy to Express these Truths in Words. — 
It is not easy to embody these principles fully in 
words. They are better conceived than expressed. 
Like other intuitive truths, they are known in their 
completeness only in consciousness. " The Declara- 
tion of Independence " makes an effort to express 
some fragments of them when it affirms : " We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are cre- 
ated equal ; that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain inalienable rights ; that among these 
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The 
existence of self-evident truths, relating to the rights 
and duties of men, is here recognized and affirmed. 
The primary truth here expressed is that of justice ; 



202 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. 

that to every man should be given that which is his 
due. The Roman declared it to be " the unchanging, 
everlasting will to give each man his right." This 
is undoubtedly the first of the intuitive, fundamental 
moral principles. It is accepted without hesitation 
by all men, even though they may daily do violence 
to its teachings, 

Words of the Great Teacher. — A Greater than 
the author of the Declaration expressed the sub- 
stance of the law of justice more simply and more 
beautifully when He said, "All things whatsoever 
ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so 
to them." The same Great Teacher epitomized the 
whole moral law in the declaration, " Thou shalt* 
love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with 
all thy mind, and thou shalt love thy neighbor as 
thyself." 

Fundamental Principles. — The fundamental prin- 
ciples of morality include (1) the law of justice, to 
render to every man his right, or that which he can 
justly claim ; (2) the law of beneficence, to do good 
to all men, especially to those in need, as we are 
able and have opportunity ; and (3) the law of 
mercy and forgiveness, to do to the erring and those 
who have wronged us as we would that they, under 
like circumstances, should do unto us. It is difficult 
to conceive of any objections which can be urged 
against these principles. They are taught by revela- 
tion ; they are approved by the judgment of all 
men ; and they are in harmony with the teachings 
of experience. Those who reject revelation must 



DIFFERENCES OF OPINION, ETC. 203 

accept them on the ground of utility, if for no 
higher reason. 

Harmony between Revelation and Utility. — There 
can be no doubt that the teachings of revelation and 
of real utility harmonize when both are rightly 
understood and correctly interpreted; and they will 
also agree with the native intuitions of the mind. 
We have in these accepted principles a sound and 
safe basis for all needed moral instruction and train- 
ing in the schools. 

Practical Rules Deduced. — From these principles 
practical rules may readily be deduced for the regu- 
lation of the conduct of children in the home, in 
the school, and in all other places ; for the conduct 
of parents toward their children ; of all members of 
a family toward each other ; for the conduct of 
friends and neighbors ; for conduct in matters of 
business and pleasure ; for the conduct of employers 
and those employed ; of citizens, of public officers, 
and finally, of men in all possible conditions and 
relations. 

Differences of Opinion, etc. — Some differences of 
opinion and of practice are found even among good 
men in respect to the interpretation and application 
of laws of conduct. Things are approved by some 
which are condemned by others ; things are regarded 
as morally indifferent by some which are considered 
morally wrong by others. It will be discovered on 
examination that such differences relate to matters 
of minor importance , and usually to things supposed 
to be enjoined or forbidden by obligations of a relig- 



204 INFLUENCE OF EARLY EDUCATION. 

ions character which have been assumed. The dif- 
ferences affect none of the essentials of private or 
public morality. In respect to these there is entire 
agreement, and these only should be included in the 
instruction given in the schools. 

Influence of Early Education. — The influence of 
early education is observable in the opinions of men 
upon all matters of every-day life, and especially 
upon the moral character of many customs and 
habits of society, such as forms of recreation and 
amusement. These, in many cases apparently mor- 
ally indifferent in themselves, must be approved or 
disapproved according to their general effects upon 
character and conduct, and their natural association 
with other things positively and obviously good or 
bad. Things, -like men, are estimated by "the com- 
pany they keep," and the direction in which they 
lead. 

Instruction can be Given. — Avoiding unessential 
matters concerning which differences exist, and tak- 
ing into account the influence of early education 
and environment, the instructor will encounter no 
serious obstacles in teaching and enforcing the fun- 
damental laws of morals in all their important ap- 
plications. He may safely insist upon obedience to 
rightful authority in the family, in the school, and 
in the State. Such obedience may be enforced by 
the sanctions of revelation, of the " common sense " 
of mankind, and of utility in the best sense of the 
word. 

The duties of truthfulness, honesty, integrity, and 



USES OF TERM "RIGHT." 205 

purity of thought, of feeling, and of speech may be 
enforced by the same sanctions. 

Regard for the rights of others in respect to lib- 
erty, reputation, property, and " the pursuit of hap- 
piness" can also be taught. All these are included 
in the great law of justice. 

Duties imposed by the laws of beneficence and of 
mercy and forgiveness can be illustrated and insisted 
on without danger of giving just cause of offense to 
even the most sensitive natures. Benevolence, char- 
ity, kindness, pity, compassion, and other modes of 
manifesting good- will are approved by revelation and 
by the judgment of all men. 

These examples indicate with sufficient clearness 
the general character and scope which instruction in 
morals should have in the schools. The detail of 
methods does not fall within the limits of our pres- 
ent purpose. Such details will readily suggest them- 
selves to an intelligent teacher. 

An Explanation — Uses of Term " Right." — A sin- 
gle point may require a word of explanation to pre- 
vent confusion of ideas, and consequent confusion in 
instruction. Right has been defined as conformity to 
law and rule. Another use of "right" and " rights" 
must be distinguished from this. Bights are claims 
made in accordance with laws of nature, of society, 
or of the State to possession, use, and enjoyment of 
things. So we speak of natural rights, social rights, 
civil and political rights. In this sense it is said 
men have a right to life and liberty. Whatever 
things another may justly claim from me are his 



206 DUTY. 

by right ; his claim is made in harmony with some 
law. Some rights are determined by the law of 
justice ; others by the law of beneficence, and still 
others by the laws of mercy and forgiveness. 

Duty. — Duty is that ivhich we ought to do; that 
which we owe under the demands of some law. 
Generally rights and duties are correlative ; so far 
as the law of justice extends they are completely 
correlative. Under the laws of beneficence and 
mercy, duties go very far beyond rights. Whatever 
another has a right to claim of me it is my duty to 
grant him ; whatever I can rightfully claim of him 
it is his duty to give me. So much evidently falls 
under the law of justice. 

Illustration. — For example, I owe a sum of money 
to another ; under the law of justice he can claim 
the payment of the sum in full, with proper compen- 
sation for its use. I meet the demands of duty, so 
far as simple justice is concerned, when I make such 
payment. He can claim nothing more. But suppose 
this man is in sore and pressing need of something 
which I have and which I can spare without serious 
detriment, or that his family is suffering for things 
which I can easily furnish, it is without doubt my 
duty, under the laws of beneficence and mercy, to 
give him these things, even though he may have no 
right to claim or demand them of me by the law of 
justice. It is important that the distinction between 
rights and duties under the law of justice and under 
what may be called the higher laws be made clear 
in giving instruction to the young. In one case= the 



DIAGRAM. 



207 



rights and duties are legal as well as moral ; in the 
other, they are moral only. 

Diagram. — The diagram previously used will illus- 
trate the origin and development of moral law, and 
the relation of rules of conduct to general principles 
and to the intuitive idea of right. 




SUMMARY OF CHAPTER XIV. AND DEFINITIONS. 

1. Obstacles in the way of moral instruction in the schools. 

2. Illustration of the office of judgment by reference to the 

judge in a court. 

3. What right is in the general use of the term, 



208 DEFINITIONS. 

4. Term right applied to the action of inanimate things. 

5. All regulated activity has reference to an end. 

6. The office of judgment. Guided by law. 

7. Decision in a case involving conduct. 

8. Appeal to consciousness shows that judgment goes beyond 

the outward act. 

9. Legal tribunals and parents do the same. 

10. General character and scope of moral law. 

11. Such law recognized every- where. 

12. Inquiries made when obedience is demanded. 

13. The three successive inquiries. 

14. The three replies, and conclusions. 

15. Relations shown by the diagram. 

16. Inquiry as to right, etc., by a child. 

17. Further inquiries by a child matured. 

18. Final inquiry as to origin of moral law. 

19. Replies in their order. 

20. Idea of right. Fundamental principles. 

21. Can be accepted by all. 

22. Difficulty of expressing these principles. 

23. Declaration of Independence. The Great Teacher. 

24. Substance of these principles. Justice, beneficence, mercy, 

and forgiveness. 

25. Revelation and utility in accord. 

26. Rules of conduct from general principles. 

27. Differences of view as to minor matters. 

28. Caused by differences in early education. 

29. No serious hindrances to instruction. 

30. Some topics for instruction. 

31. Explanation of terms right and rights. 

32. Duty. Its relation to rights. Illustration. 

33. Illustrative diagram. 



Right. — Conformity to law. Adaptability. 

Rights. — Claims to whatever one may justly have, enjoy, etc. 
Moral Law. — Rules for the conduct of moral beings. 
Duty. — What one ought to do. That which is owed. 



CHAPTER XV. 

SOME CONDITIONS OF EFFECTIVE MENTAL WORK. 

Body and Mind Closely Connected. —The inti- 
mate connection between the body and the mind has 
already been described. This connection is such that 
the condition of the body determines, to a very great 
extent, the character of the mental activity at any 
given time. If the body is full of vigor and energy, 
the mind is usually vigorous also. If the body is 
sluggish, the mind is generally in the same state. 
An acute attack of any serious disease makes mental 
labor impossible. Chronic disorders, such as dyspep- 
sia, affect the general tone of the mind, and fre- 
quently give a peculiar coloring to all mental pro- 
ductions. 

Influence of the Condition of the Nervous Sys- 
tem. — The state of the nervous system has a very 
marked influence upon mental action. If this system 
is in a peculiarly excited and irritable condition, the 
mind is likely to exhibit a large degree of excite- 
ment and irritability, which renders productive men- 
tal effort exceedingly difficult, and tests severely 
the power of self-control. Study, under these condi- 
tions, involves a large expenditure of both physical 
and psychical energy and yields only very meager 
returns. The cost is altogether too much for the 



210 NO NEED TO DESPAIR. 

profit. It is the part of wisdom to " put into port for 
repairs" rather than to attempt to sail with disabled 
machinery. 

No Need to Despair. — Yet no genuine student 
will sit down in despair on account of temporary dis- 
ability of body, or even of a considerable degree of 
chronic or constitutional weakness. Many men have 
accomplished much mental labor, and have achieved 
great literary and scientific successes, with w^eak phys- 
ical powers, and while laboring under severe bodily 
suffering. Such men have possessed great strength 
of will and an unlimited supply of patience and per- 
severance. 

Effect of Attending to Pains and Discomforts. — 
By an easily understood law of mind, pain and dis- 
comfort become more troublesome and apparently 
more intense if attention is constantly directed to 
them or to their real or supposed causes. If one an- 
ticipates discomfort from indigestion after dinner, 
and waits and watches for it, he will be pretty cer- 
tain to find it. Many a man makes his life wretched, 
and unfits himself for any effective work, either phys- 
ical or mental, by the habit of expecting the ap- 
pearance of his ailments and bestowing all his time 
and attention upon them. Like some other unwel- 
come visitants, they are best got rid of by ignoring 
their presence. Treated with wholesome neglect, they 
cease to force themselves upon us. No effective 
study can be done if the student is thinking of some 
pain which he is suffering or expects to suffer pres- 
ently. 



SLEEP, EXERCISE, REPOSE. 211 

Conditions of Bodily Health. — The conditions of 
bodily health are generally well understood. A proper 
amount of wholesome and nutritious food must be 
taken at regular times. The food should be well 
cooked, and served and eaten in a civilized way. 
Violent physical exercise should not immediately fol- 
low a hearty meal, nor should any severe mental 
labor be entered upon at that time. The nervous 
energy is needed for the processes of digestion. 

Sleep, Exercise, Repose. — Provision must be 
made for a sufficient amount of sleep and for appro- 
priate exercise. The student can secure no real and 
permanent advantage by shortening the hours of 
sleep and lengthening the hours of study. The ap- 
parent temporary gain will be more than offset by 
the ultimate and real loss of mental energy and 
effectiveness. Nor will he find profit by attempting 
to steal for study time which belongs to physical 
exercise and to out-of-door recreations and sports? 
Mental labor must be relieved by periods of repose 
and relaxation in order to be most productive. 

Division of Time. — Mental productiveness will be 
increased also by making a systematic division of 
time. A student should determine as accurately as 
possible the proportion of time to be given to each 
subject of study and to every other employment, 
and should hold himself to this arrangement with a 
good degree of persistency. More work can be done 
by such regularity, and the expenditure of strength 
is less than it is when labor is performed in a ran- 
dom manner and by spasmodic efforts. 



212 A DEFINITE PURPOSE. 

A Definite Purpose. — An essential condition of 
fruitful labor is a clearly defined purpose kept stead- 
ily in view. Much energy is wasted because it is 
undirected, or directed now this way and now that, 
expending itself uselessly, making, it may be, a pro- 
digious noise, but leaving no permanent results. A 
scholar may study a little of this branch, and a 
little of another, and something of still others, and 
accomplish nothing worthy of record simply because 
there has been no concentration of effort. A wide 
extent of surface has been skimmed over, but the 
soil has not been stirred deeply enough to yield even 
a scanty harvest. While the mind needs and craves 
variety, it is important to guard against mental dis- 
sipation, and against the present tendency to include 
too many subjects in a course of instruction limited 
in time. 

Subjection to the Will. — Another condition is the 
complete subjection of all the energies and activities 
of the mind to the control of the will. Until this has 
been accomplished the man is not master of himself 
nor of his own powers. The will is designed to be 
the regal power, the dominant energy, of the soul. 
One prominent purpose in education is to enthrone 
this natural king and to bring all the other activities 
to work harmoniously, cheerfully, and readily under 
his direction. Then action becomes altogether vol- 
untary, and the whole energy of the mind may be 
concentrated at pleasure, and held steadily upon any 
selected form or object of labor. The difficulty of 
controlling the mental activity is a matter of expe- 



DEFINITION. 213 

rience with most young pupils, and occasionally with 
students engaged in advanced studies. They attempt 
and abandon in turn half a dozen lessons, or a half 
score topics for an essay, in consequence of the dis- 
orderly state of mind produced by the revolt of 
the perceptive, the representative, or the thinking- 
powers against the authority of the will. The soul 
is in a condition of anarchy, and no productive effort 
can be put forth. This naturally brings us to the 
fundamental condition of effective mental activity, 
attention. Its importance is such as to justify an 
attempt to understand its nature, and something of 
the means by which one becomes able to command 
or to give it. 

Definition. — Attention is that state of mind in 
which its energy and activity are concentrated upon 
a particular object of observation or of thought. This 
concentration may be either voluntary or non-volun- 
tary. To command the attention of another is to 
cause his mind to be brought into this condition. 
To give attention is to bring one's own mind into 
this condition. 

Not a Distinct Power. — Attention is not a dis- 
tinct power of the mind, nor a specific mode of 
mental action, like perception, or representation, or 
imagination. Any activity of the mind intensified 
and concentrated upon some object involves that 
condition which we call attention. 

The Word Itself. — The word attention itself in- 
dicates that the mind, to borrow a term applied to 
objects of sense, is in a state of tension, of more or 



214 EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL ATTENTION. 

less excitement, and is stretching itself toward some- 
thing with eager interest. 

External Attention. — The attention may be di- 
rected to external objects. In this case the percep- 
tive activity is in an excited state, and exerts itself 
through some one or more of the organs of sense. 
We may be intent in watching or examining an 
object of sight ; we may listen intently to catch 
some sound ; we may seek eagerly to detect the pe- 
culiar character of some odor or flavor. The appear- 
ance and posture of the body frequently indicate the 
greater or less degree of concentration of mind upon 
objects of sense-perception. The whole body may be 
bent forward ; the head may be turned and inclined ; 
the neck may be stretched to its full length ; the 
eyes may be wide open and fixed, and even the 
*mouth may be unconsciously opened. The entire 
nervous and muscular systems are highly excited. 

Internal Attention. — The attention may be di- 
rected inward. In this case the mind is absorbed 
and occupied by processes of thought, or in the 
examination and analysis of these processes. When 
internal attention becomes exceedingly intense, so 
that ordinary impressions upon the senses are un- 
noticed, a person is said to be absent-minded or in 
a state of abstraction. The eyes may be opened 
without seeing and the ears without hearing, and 
even the sense of feeling seems to be lost for the 
time. Amusing examples are given of such com- 
plete absorption in study or meditation. Newton 
sometimes forgot the hour and the need of his 



EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL STIMULI. 215 

dinner, and it is said that men have forgotten to 
attend their own weddings. 

Attention Produced by Stimuli, etc. — This direc- 
tion and concentration of mental activity, called at- 
tention, is produced by allurements, incitements, or 
stimuli of some kind acting upon the mind. The 
attention is said to be caught, to be arrested, to be 
fastened, to be commanded. The meaning is that 
some enticement or stimulus has presented itself or 
has been presented to the mind. It may have ap- 
peared by accident, or by the purpose and design 
of some individual, or the mind may have intention- 
ally and voluntarily sought for it and yielded itself 
to its power. 

External Stimuli. — These enticements are either 
external or internal. The external are the charac- 
teristics and qualities of objects and acts which 
strongly impress and excite the senses. A very 
bright light, a brilliant color, some strange peculiar- 
ity of form or movemejit, an unusual stir of any sort, 
lay hold, so to speak, upon the sense of sight and 
compel attention. A loud noise, a peculiar combina- 
tion of sounds, an unexpected burst of song or of 
musical instruments, a clap of thunder, strike upon 
the ear and arrest attention. Among the external 
stimuli are all the various devices of parents, teach- 
ers, and others, employed to attract, hold, divert, and 
occupy the attention of young children. 

Internal Stimuli. — Internal stimuli include all 
things which appeal to the representative and 
thinking powers, and those which excite the feel- 



216 NATURAL STIMULI. 

ings through these powers. The mental representa- 
tions of the pleasures and advantages resulting from 
the acquisition of knowledge stimulate the student 
and fix attention upon the subjects of study. The 
real or imagined enjoyment supposed to follow the 
possession of wealth, or power, or influence of any 
nature, constitutes a strong allurement to many 
minds, and concentrates attention upon the means 
necessary to attain these. The pleasure springing 
out of the mere exercise of any form of mental ac- 
tivity, when the exercise is proper in degree and 
amount, is a constant stimulus to attention. Affec- 
tion for parents, love of friends, desire of approval 
are so many internal stimuli to the young pupil. 
The most effective internal, as well as external, 
stimuli vary with age, with habits, and with degrees 
of development and culture. Attention is most 
especially allured by what is called interest. This 
is only a degree of emotion, either pleasurable or 
painful, not so intense as to interfere with the reg- 
ular action of the knowing activities or, in case of 
maUire minds, with the directive power of the will. 
Usually an agreeable emotion is meant when we 
speak of being interested. 

Natural Stimuli. — Stimuli to attention, like stim- 
uli to appetite, or to physical or mental exertion of 
any sort, may he natural, agreeable, and wholesome, 
or they may be unnatural, disagreeable, and un- 
wholesome in their ultimate effect. Natural stimuli 
allure and entice the attention, lay hold upon it 
with a gentle grasp and produce no sudden and 



UNNATURAL STIMULI. 217 

violent movements. The mind is not forced and 
dragged along like an unwilling and struggling ani- 
mal, or like a resisting child. The activity excited 
is steady and grows in intensity. The interest and 
the attention reach their highest pitch by gradual 
increments and not by a single unnatural and pain- 
ful effort. Among such stimuli are the forms, feat- 
ures, qualities, and characteristics of external objects 
properly presented, and also customary acts, move- 
ments, modes of address and management. Of this 
kind are the pleasurable feelings of the soul, the 
emotions, affections, and desires when not unduly 
excited ; and, indeed, all forms of mental activity 
within proper limits. 

Unnatural Stimuli. — Among the unnatural and 
usually harmful stimuli are all harsh and violent 
incitements ; strange and frightful objects suddenly 
presented, strange sights, sounds, and actions ; so also 
are the uncouth, senseless, and almost barbarous de- 
vices sometimes resorted to by unskillful teachers 
and sensational orators. 

Effect of Violent Stimuli. — Such violent stimuli 
compel attention for the moment. They produce, for 
a short time, an intense but painful and exhausting 
concentration and activity of mind, followed of ne- 
cessity by weariness, weakness, and disgust. The 
frequent use of stimuli of this character renders the 
mind insensible to the influence of milder and more 
healthful incitements, just as artificial stimulants 
and highly seasoned food destroy the relish for plain 
diet and wholesome cooking. The natural appetite 



218 TWO KINDS OF ATTENTION. 

is destroyed in both cases. Children accustomed to 
the government of objurgations and blows soon be- 
come deaf to requirements expressed in quiet tones 
and mild words. So pupils whose attention is de- 
manded by loud and angry talking, by violent gestic- 
ulations, by rappings with a ferule, and stampings 
of the foot, become blind and deaf to all natural and 
proper stimuli. 

Two Kinds of Attention. — Two varieties of atten- 
tion should be distinguished, the reflex or non-volun- 
tary and the voluntary or volitional, Hamilton, 
with his usual acuteness of analysis, makes three 
varieties. 

Hamilton. — He says : " I am persuaded that we 
are frequently determined to an act of attention, as 
to many other acts, independently of our free and 
deliberate volition. Attention is of three degrees 
or kinds. The first is a mere vital and irresistible 
act ; the second, an act determined by desire, which, 
though involuntary, may be resisted by our will ; the 
third, an act determined by a deliberate volition." 

Sully. — Mr. Sully remarks: "When the mind is 
acted upon by the mere force of the object presented, 
the act of attention is said to be non-voluntary. It 
may also be called reflex (or automatic) because it 
has a striking analogy to reflex movement, that is 
to say, movement following sensory stimulation with- 
out the intervention of a conscious purpose. On the 
other hand, when we attend to a thing under the 
impulse of a desire, such as curiosity or a wish to 
know about a thing, we are said to do so by an act 



PHYSICAL CONDITION. 219 

of will or voluntarily. These two modes of attention 
are very properly distinguished. In early life non- 
voluntary attention is predominant ; in later life, 
voluntary attention." 

Carpenter. — Dr. Carpenter says: " Attention may 
be either volitional or automatic ; that is, it may be 
either intentionally induced by an act of the will, or 
it may be produced unintentionally by the powerful 
attraction which the object, whether external or in- 
ternal, has for the eye." 

Importance of the Distinction. — In the training 
of childhood, and in personal efforts to bring the 
mental activities under the control of the will, it is 
of much importance to keep in mind the essential 
difference between non-voluntary and voluntary at- 
tention. Non-voluntary or reflex attention is the 
only kind of which the very young child is capable. 
Even at the age of entering school the attention is 
mostly of this sort. Injustice will be done if that is 
demanded of which the pupil is incapable, and dis- 
couraging failure will result from efforts to secure 
that which, for the time, is unattainable. The prog- 
ress from the state of reflex to that of voluntary 
attention is very gradual. Judicious training and 
reasonable demands will hasten the progress, while 
unwise treatment and unreasonable demands will 
retard it. 

Physical Condition. — In demands upon attention, 
more particularly in case of children, regard must be 
had for the physical condition. Intense concentration 
of mental activity taxes directly and severely the 



220 MENTAL CONDITION. 

energy of the nervous system and, to some extent, 
the muscular system also. If the body has become 
greatly fatigued, continuous attention can be given 
only in answer to the excitement produced by vio- 
lent stimuli, or in forced and painful obedience to 
the imperative demands of the will ; the effort to 
give attention is irritating and exhausting, and to 
require it is hardly less than cruelty. 

Mental Condition. — Great mental fatigue and ex- 
haustion render effective attention absolutely impos- 
sible. Under such conditions the student can not 
afford to make heavy requisitions upon himself, nor 
can a teacher afford to make them upon pupils. The 
expenditure of vital and psychical force is too great 
for the meager returns secured. Work which calls 
for much concentration of mental activity and for 
close and protracted attention, should be undertaken 
at that period in the day when both body and mind 
are most fresh and vigorous. 

Influence of Surroundings. — The power to secure 
attention of others or to give attention one's self is 
very greatly affected by the immediate surroundings. 
While this is especially observable in the case of 
children, even scholars of considerable maturity and 
culture are conscious of the influence of environment 
in this respect. Any thing unusual in the room or 
about the house distracts the attention. Familiarity 
with the place, with the furniture and its arrange- 
ment, with the tables, books, papers, and other arti- 
cles used in the preparation of lessons, or in the 
prosecution of any form of literary or scientific labor, 



INFLUENCE OF ASSOCIATION. 221 

contributes to increase the power of attention. An 
approach is made here to the domain of habit. 

Influence of Association. — The ordinary influence 
of environment is greatly increased by the power of 
association in giving direction to mental activity. If 
the associations are in harmony with the objects of 
observation or thought to which the attention is 
solicited, they are valuable and effective aids in pro- 
ducing perfect concentration of mental energy. A 
room set apart for study, pleasantly associated with 
books, lessons, teachers, and instruction ; with quiet- 
ness, good order, agreeable companions, and industry 
in literary pursuits, makes attention easy. On the 
other hand, a building or room associated with entic- 
ing games and sports, with exciting representations 
of any kind, with musical or theatrical entertain- 
ments, or with any thing peculiarly attractive and out 
of harmony with books, study, and school work gen- 
erally, renders it difficult to fix attention upon les- 
sons, or any kind of mental labor. The surroundings, 
the associations, and the occupation must be in 
accord in order that attention may be had without 
painful effort, and that mental activity may be most 
fruitful. 

Limitation of Time. — Very vigorous activity of 
either body or mind can be kept up for only a limited 
time. The more intense and absorbing the action, 
the shorter its duration. Consequently attention, be- 
ing merely some form of mental activity concen- 
trated and highly intensified, is subject to the same 
general law. The attention of a young child should 



222 ILLUSTRATION OF A MICROSCOPE. 

be demanded for only a very brief period. Let it be 
made as complete as possible while it is held, and let 
it be followed by a period of relaxation and repose. 

As age increases, and habit begins to exert its 
power and lend its assistance, the periods of tension 
may be gradually lengthened, and those of rest may 
become shorter and less frequent. The child should 
be taught and trained to study with the utmost 
possible vigor during the times of study. Great care 
must be taken to save pupils from falling into the 
habit of " dawdling" over books and lessons. Noth- 
ing is more fatal, to real scholarship or to effective 
work, than this habit, into which children are some- 
times driven by unreasonable demands, and by un- 
wise methods of training. 

Illustration of a Microscope. — A microscope with 
an object glass of high power so concentrates the 
light as to bring out with great distinctness even the 
most minute features of that part of the object 
within the field of view. But the field is very lim- 
ited. The work done is most thorough and effective, 
but it is confined to a narrow space. A glass of less 
power allows the eye to traverse a wider field, but 
the resulting knowledge lacks in definiteness and 
completeness. 

Effects of Concentration. — Attention is the micro- 
scope of the mental eye. Its power may be high or 
low ; its field of view narrow or broad. When high 
power is used attention is confined within very 
circumscribed limits, but its action is exceedingly 
intense and absorbing. It sees but few things, but 



CONDITION OF MEMORY. 223 

those few are observed " through and through " and 
thoroughly learned. The resulting knowledge is per- 
fectly clear, sharply defined, and available for use. 
Mental energy and activity, whether of perception or 
of thought, thus concentrated, act like the sun's rays 
concentrated by the burning glass. The object is 
illumined, heated, set on fire. Impressions are so 
deep that they can never be effaced. Attention of 
this sort is the prime condition of the most effective 
and most productive mental labor. 

Condition of Memory. — Attention is also the most 
essential subjective condition of retention and re- 
production. Attention and memory are inseparably 
connected. Things are forgotten because no real 
attention was bestowed upon the process of learning. 
Mechanical repetition is often relied on to supply 
the place of genuine concentration of mental activity. 
Repetition is necessary, especially for young students, 
and is of great value in many cases, but it can never 
be made a substitute for attention. The one merely 
penetrates through the surface, the other pierces to 
the heart of things. 

Can Attention be Given to More than One 
Thing at the Same Time ? — This is an old ques- 
tion, and has been much and eagerly discussed. It 
is a subject of theoretical interest, and is worthy 
of thought and investigation, but it is not of great 
practical importance. This is certain : We com- 
pare objects. We' place them side by side before 
the senses, or by the power of representation we 
place them thus in the mind. We say this is like 



224 POSSIBLE EXPLANATION. 

or unlike that. It is difficult to understand how a 
comparison can be made unless the two objects or 
the mental representations of the objects are before 
the mind's eye at the same moment. 

Possible Explanation. — It is possible that this 
old problem has its solution in the well-known fact 
of the persistence or continuance of impressions 
upon the senses and upon the mind. Sensations 
produced by impressions upon the nerves of sight, 
hearing, or taste, persist for an appreciable length of 
time after the exciting causes have ceased to act. 
Why may not this be true of the products of other 
forms of mental activity? For example, I am com- 
paring two objects placed before me. I am unable 
to look intently upon both objects at the same in- 
stant. The attention is directed in turn to one and 
then to the other. The change from one to the 
other may be said to be instantaneous ; nevertheless 
it occupies an appreciable portion of time. Is it not 
altogether beyond doubt that the percept of the one 
object persists on the retina and in the mind until 
the percept of the other is formed ? In this case the 
second percept is superimposed, so to speak, upon 
the first, and the two are thus brought into the most 
favorable position for comparison. The same may 
be true of the mental products, the images, of two 
successive acts of representation. It may also be 
true when one of the mental products is an image 
or a concept and the other a percept. 

Importance of Attention. — A writer says: "The 
difference between an ordinary mind and the mind 



DEFINITIONS. 225 

of a Newton, consists principally in this, that the 
one is capable of the application of a more continu- 
ous attention than the other." 

Newton himself said, "if he had made any dis- 
coveries, it was owing more to patient attention 
than to any other talent." Q-enius has been called 
" a continued attention," and also " a protracted 
patience." Chesterfield affirmed that "the power of 
applying an attention, steady and undissipated, to a 
single object, is the sure mark of a superior genius." 

While differences in native mental power count 
for much in efforts for intellectual mastery, it is still 
true that any student, with industry and a fixed 
habit of genuine attention, can command success in 
almost any department of study. Without continu- 
ous attention the greatest genius is doomed to cer- 
tain and ignominious failure. 

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER XV. AND DEFINITIONS. 

1. Intimate connection of body and mind. 

2. Relation of the nervous system to mind. 

3. Force of will can overcome the obstacles of bodily weak- 

ness, etc. 

4. Effect of giving much attention to pains and discomforts. 

5. Some conditions of bodily health and vigor, food, sleep, 

relaxation, rest. 

6. Mental productiveness helped by systematic division of 

time. 

7. Effect of a definite purpose. 

8. Importance of the power and controlling influence of the 

will. 

9. Definition of attention ; not a separate power of the mind ; 

the word. 



226 DEFINITIONS. 

10. External and internal attention. 

11. Attention produced by stimuli ; external, internal, natural, 

unnatural. 

12. Effects of the unnatural. 

13. Two kinds of attention: reflex or non-voluntary, voluntary. 

14. Views of Hamilton, Sully, and Carpenter. 

15. Importance of the distinction in dealing with children. 

16. Influence of physical conditions, — of mental conditions. 

17. Influence of environment, — of association. 

18. Illustration of the microscope. 

19. Effects of concentration illustrated. 

20. Influence of attention on memory. 

21. Can attention be given to more than one thing at the same 

time, — possible explanation. 

22. G-eneral importance of attention. Newton's testimony. 



Attention. — State of mind in which its energy and activity 

are concentrated upon a particular object of observation 

or of thought. 
Reflex or Non- voluntary Attention. — Attention produced 

without the intervention of the will. 
Voluntary Attention. — Attention produced directly by an act 

of the will. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

AUTOMATIC, IMPULSIVE, REFLEX, AND 
INSTINCTIVE ACTIVITIES. 

Forces Known by Movements. — The mind is 
known only by its manifestations of activity. These 
manifestations, when within, appear to conscious- 
ness. Outward manifestations are discovered through 
movements of the body. All movements of the body, 
however, are not indicative of mental action. Some 
are produced by forces which, so far as can be as- 
certained, have no psychical character. At any rate, 
they do not result from any conscious mental ac- 
tivity. 

Forces which are Slightly Mental. — Some other 
movements appear to be connected with very slight 
manifestations of psychical action. They are appar- 
ently started by a mental impulse and direction, and 
then go on for a considerable or an indefinite period 
without further attention or propulsion. 

Force of Will. — Others still are altogether volun- 
tary, depending for their inception upon a conscious 
and positive act of the will, and ceasing whenever 
the impelling force of will is withheld. 

Force Learned from the Movement. — The na- 
ture of the originating force may often be deter- 
mined, or at least conjectured with a good degree of 



228 STUDY OF FORCES NECESSARY. 

certainty, from the character of the movement. On 
the other hand, the character of the movement can 
be pretty accurately anticipated and described from 
a knowledge of the peculiar nature of the producing 
force. The cause manifests itself in the effect ; and 
the effect reveals the cause. 

Study of Forces Necessary. — The processes of 
development in the child, the successive steps by 
which the human being becomes master of himself, 
and his various forms of physical and mental activity 
become so adjusted and correlated in their move- 
ments that the whole complex mechanism of body 
and mind acts in perfect harmony and in ready 
obedience to the authority of the will, can not be 
comprehended without some study of these forces. 
Although they have been incidentally alluded to, and 
some of them partially described already, they re- 
quire a more specific enumeration and a more com- 
plete explanation. 

Automatic or Impulsive Action. — The action of 
some of the ~bodily organs is purely automatic. Such 
is the beating of the heart. The movements are 
produced and controlled entirely by impulsive force 
or stimulus generated in certain nerve centers, and 
acting altogether independently of the will. Strong 
emotion tends to increase the rapidity and the energy 
of the beating of the heart, and the feeling of fear 
and terror sometimes renders it slower and weaker ; 
but the will has no control over it. 

Respiration. — The action of the respiratory organs 
is of the same nature. Respiration may be regulated, 



IMPULSIVE MOVEMENTS. 229 

to a certain extent, by the will, for the convenience 
of speaking and singing. We can "hold the breath" 
for a short time while listening very intently or for 
any purpose, but the effort soon becomes too painful 
to be endured. Practically, respiration is automatic 
like the action of the heart. 

Action of Vital Organs. — The movements of all 
the organs whose regular and uninterrupted action is 
necessary to the support of life, are essentially of the 
same impulsive and automatic character, being so 
far and so completely removed from the control of 
volition as to be subject to no danger from caprice 
or forgeffulness. 

Impulsive Movements. — The earliest observable 
movements of a child appear to be altogether spon- 
taneous and random. They are almost, if not quite, 
as automatic as the action of the vital organs just de- 
scribed. They are called by Preyer purely impulsive 
movements, distinguished, from instinctive movements 
by having no aim, being altogether purposeless : and 
from reflex movements by the fact that they are not 
made in response to any excitation or irritating stimu- 
lus. They are entirely unconscious, having no relation 
to desire or will. They result from the spontaneous 
overflow or excitation of the nervous centers. This 
impulsive force expends itself in producing action 
through the motor nerves. The jerking movements 
of the arms and legs by young children are caused 
by this force. So are also the movements of the 
muscles of the face, which are frequently supposed 
to indicate feeling. 



230 FEELING MINGLED. 

Feeling Mingled. — Many of the movements of 
children up to three and four years of age are 
largely of this impulsive and automatic character. 
Probably, however, the agreeable feeling arising from 
the exercise of the various parts of the body, under 
the law of u pleasurable activity," tends to excite 
the feeling of desire, and to mingle an element of 
volition with the impulsive force. The origin of such 
activities is to be taken into account in judging of 
the character of the conduct of children, and in the 
demands made upon them in respect to behavior. 
Their movements are of essentially the same nature 
as the gambols of young lambs and the sportive 
frolics of kittens. While such activity is aimless and 
purposeless, it subserves the important end of secur- 
ing for the child, as for the animal, necessary physical 
exercise. Beyond the period of childhood these im- 
pulsive movements seldom appear. The movements 
of the arms, limbs, and of the whole body in sound 
sleep, may possibly be of this character ; but they 
are more probably reflex in their origin, being caused 
by irritations of some of the sensory nerves resulting 
in consequent irritations of the motor nerves. 

Reflex Movements. — The next movements observ- 
able in the child are those called reflex. These are 
movements answering to other movements, or to ex- 
citations and stimuli of some kind. In case of the 
impulsive movement there is but a single current of 
irritation or excitement. The • current is from the 
overflowing nerve center outward. To produce the 
reflex action two currents are necessary ; first, one 



ILLUSTRATION OF THE MOVEMENTS. 231 

from the excited or impressed extremity of some 
sensory nerve inward to a nerve center, and then 
one outward from this center along a motor nerve 
to cause muscular movement. The current inward 
does not extend so far as to reach the great center 
of nervous power and of conscious mental activity, 
the brain. It is intercepted and stops at some local 
and subordinate center. Purely reflex movements 
are not attended by consciousness. The person act- 
ing has no immediate knowledge of such acts. They 
are known, if known at all, by their consequences. 
In this respect they differ from instinctive move- 
ments which are evidently accompanied by full con- 
sciousness, and also from imitative and volitional 
movements. 

Illustration of the Impulsive Movement. — The 
diagram will represent to the eye, in a crude way, 
the supposed origin of the impulsive and of the 
reflex movements. Suppose A to be the great center 
of nervous matter and the center of intellection ; B, 
C, D, E, F, G are subordinate local centers in the 
spinal cord or at other points in the body; H, I, K 
are points upon the surface of the body, upon the 
hands, feet, or elsewhere. An impulsive movement, 
such as the jerking of the arm in the young child, 
is caused at the point H by the overflow or excita- 
tion of nervous force from the center at B, or E, 
passing along the moter nerve to the surface at H, 
where it produces a muscular contraction or expan- 
sion. There is only a single current, and that is out- 
ward from a local center. 



232 ILLUSTEATION OF THE MOVEMENTS. 

Illustration of the Reflex Movement. — A reflex 
movement at K, for example, which may be sup- 
posed to be a point upon the sole of the foot of a 
sleeping child, is caused by some irritation upon a, 
sensory nerve at that point, by the finger or by some 
other means, producing a current of excitement along 




that nerve to the point G, or D, where it is intercepted 
and produces an immediate return current from D, 
or G, to K, which results in a muscular movement 
withdrawing or changing the position of the foot. 
Since the sensory current does not go on to the cen- 
ter, A, there has been no conscious knowledge of the 
movement. If the movement should be very violent, 
or the limb should strike some obstacle so as to 



EAKLY REFLEX ACTS. 233 

cause a severe shock to the body, the child might 
be awakened and thus learn of what had hap- 
pened. 

Early Reflex Acts. — Among the earliest reflex 
acts of the child are those of swallowing, closing the 
fingers when the palm of the hand is touched, blink- 
ing when an object is thrust toward the eye, sneez- 
ing, and yawning. Sobbing and sighing are probably 
purely reflexive with a young child. Hiccough is of 
the same nature. Sneezing, yawning, and hiccough 
are among the few purely reflex movements which 
remain to the adult. Coughing is generally reflex 
when it is not altogether imitative, as yawning some- 
times is. The act of sucking in the young animal, 
as in the child, has something of the reflex charac- 
ter, but is, in its origin, instinctive. Ducking the 
head at the whistling of a bullet, shutting the eyes 
when sneezing, raising the arm to ward off a blow, 
and many other familiar movements are mostly, if 
not entirely, reflex. 

Reflex Mental Acts. — The movements referred to 
thus far are all bodily. A few mental acts seem to 
partake, to a considerable extent, of the same char- 
acter. Resentment, although regarded as instinctive, 
has something of this nature. It is a mental move- 
ment answering instantly to a mental irritation. In- 
dignation is closely related to the reflex character, 
as is also anger. All these can be repressed by an 
act of the will, provided the movement of the will 
is prompt enough. Some reflex acts of the body can 
be repressed in the same way, but, unless there is a 



234 MOVEMENTS IN SCHOOL. 

warning beforehand, the act of willing is usually too 
late to intercept the reflex movement. 

Nature of Reflex Attention. — The nature of reflex 
or non-voluntary attention is noiv clearly seen. It is 
merely an answering back of the child to some stim- 
ulus or irritant by which some one of the sensory 
nerves is affected. Some object strikes the eye, some 
sound the ear, some odor the smell, or some surface 
the touch, and a response is made. If the irritant is 
sufficient to challenge the curiosity, then the mind 
itself turns toward the object, and the attention 
changes partially from the reflex to the voluntary 
form. 

Movements in School. — Many of the uneasy 
movements of children in the school-room are more 
reflex than purposed, and should be treated as such. 
The sensory nerves become irritated by enforced 
restraint, by uncomfortable seats, by unnatural posi- 
tions, and positive force of will would be necessary 
to prevent movement of some sort. In the case of 
young children, movements in the school are often 
more impulsive than reflex, being liteTally compelled 
by the overflow of accumulated and pent-up nervous 
energy. Under such conditions the child should not 
be held to a severe accountability for his conduct. 
The proper remedy is to afford opportunity for the 
legitimate discharge of superabundant energy by ap- 
propriate exercise. 

Instinct, Mysterious, etc. — Of the forces impelling 
to action, that which is called instinct is among the 
most mysterious, the most difficult to comprehend, 



ANIMALS MOVED BY INSTINCT. 235 

and the hardest to define satisfactorily. It is scarcely 
possible to draw a line of separation between instinct 
and thinking and reasoning. 

Men Said to Think, etc. — When men perform 
acts perfectly adapted to accomplish results, when 
they select and use means exactly fitted to bring 
about desired ends, they are said to think, to judge, 
to reason, and to act intelligently. It is found that 
men require instruction and experience in order to 
become skillful in the adaptation of means to ends, 
and in order to do the best work of which they are 
capable. They improve by practice ; long practice 
results in habit ; habit renders difficult actions easy 
and makes those which at first demanded consider- 
able time and much pains-taking care, almost instan- 
taneous and automatic. 

Animals Moved by Instinct. — When " animals 
perform acts perfectly adapted to accomplish results 
without previous experience and without instruction" 
they are said to be moved by instinct, and the acts 
are called instinctive. Such are the acts of bees in 
constructing honey-comb, and of birds in building 
nests ; of beavers in erecting dams, and of spiders in 
weaving their webs. The young bee constructs a 
perfect comb at the first effort ; the young bird, 
with some possible but trivial exceptions, builds as 
good a nest on the first trial as the parents build 
after the practice of several seasons ; the first dam 
of the beaver and the first web of the spider are 
perfect of their kind. 

Experience - not Necessary to Pure Instinct. — 



236 OFFICES OF INSTINCT. 

Neither experience nor observation seems necessary 
to pure instinct. It acts with marvelous precision 
and accuracy under conditions where these are not 
possible. The chicken, when the proper hour arrives, 
pecks its way out of the shell. Chickens hatched in 
an incubator, where no imitation of the acts of the 
hen can be possible, at once seize and swallow insects 
and peck at other objects. They also recognize the 
clucking of a hen when heard for the first time, and 
run toward the spot from which the sound appears 
to come. 

Offices of Instinct. — "The apparent work of in- 
stinct, or the operation of the instinctive principles 
of action, is to fit the animal to the world ; to enable 
him to battle for existence, to hold his place in spite 
of opposing forces and enemies, — in fact, to make 
the forces and products of nature his servants so far 
as they are needful for his perfection. It secures 
this by putting him at once, by a spontaneous mani- 
festation of impulse, knowledge, and skill, into the 
needful relations to those objects in nature that are 
necessary for his individual welfare or that of the 
species. It does this in many cases with almost the 
certainty of the operations of the laws of inorganic 
nature." The province of instinct is to provide for 
the life and safety of the individual and for the pres- 
ervation and perpetuation of the species or the race, 
under conditions in which the teachings of expe- 
rience, of observation, and of intelligence, as the term 
is usually understood, can afford no guidance or can 
not be had. Intelligence is here employed simply to 



ILLUSTRATIONS OF LIMITATIONS, ETC. 237 



denote the power to comprehend clearly an object or 
an end, and to select and use means adapted to se- 
cure the object or to reach the end. 

Instinct Subject to Limitations, etc. — In order to 
accomplish the purposes for which it has been im- 
planted, the instinctive impulse is itself subject to 
limitations and restrictions. If it is, as some affirm, 
a "blind impulse" or a "blind feeling," its times and 
modes of activity are such as to compel the conclu- 
sion that there is behind it some regulating power. 
This power probably inheres in the appetites, the 
feelings, and other constitutional and functional pe- 
culiarities of the beings impelled to act by instinct. 
The conditions of domestication undoubtedly inter- 
fere with the natural workings of this power in the 
case of fowls and other domesticated animals. 

Illustrations of Limitations, etc. — Birds are im- 
pelled to mate, to. build nests, to lay eggs, to rear 
the young at the right season of the year. The 
salmon goes from the ocean to the river to spawn. 
Migratory birds feel the impulse to migrate at the 
proper time. The squirrel gathers and stores his 
nuts ; the hibernating animals retire to their holes 
and dens, impelled when the impulsion is needed. 
Other animals show evidence of the same subjection 
of the impulse of instinct to periodic direction. The 
impulse to care for the young continues only so long 
as care is needed. The animal mother, who yester- 
day watched and guarded her young and fought 
fiercely to defend them from harm, to-day drives 
them angrily and violently from her. This change 



238 INSTINCT AND THE SENSES. 

of conduct is seen in the hen, in the cat, and in 
other domestic animals, and is without doubt pro- 
duced by a change of some sort in bodily functions. 
In one condition of body the instinctive force impels 
the animal to one sort of behavior ; in a different 
bodily condition, to an opposite kind. 

Instinct and the Senses. — Many instinctive acts 
have a very close relation to impressions made upon 
the senses. Such acts follow and are guided by 
knowledge received through the senses. This fact 
explains most cases in which instinct is said to be 
deceived, and animals are said to be cheated. The 
fallibility of instinct in such cases is really the falli- 
bility of the senses, and the animal is cheated by 
deceiving his senses. The hen gives the note of 
alarm and the chickens hide for safety when the boy 
imitates the cry of the hawk. The sense of hearing 
gives a false report, but instinct acts truly. The 
sight of the duck, not her instinct, is cheated by the 
" decoy " of the sportsman. The dog eats poisoned 
meat because neither smell nor taste warns him of 
the danger. Instinct does not correct the errors of 
the senses and, through their mistakes, leads one 
animal to fly from imaginary danger, and another to 
certain death. 

Instinct and Exercise. — Modifications of Instinct. 
— Instinct is subject, Wee other powers, to the law 
of exercise. Forms of instinct constantly used are 
strengthened, and apparently rendered more acute 
and serviceable ; forms disused become weaker, and 
probably after a long time entirely disappear. The 



INSTINCT DIFFERS FROM IMPULSE. 239 

instincts of animals in the state of domestication are 
greatly modified. Peculiar manifestations of instinct, 
at first apparently accidental, may be rendered per- 
manent and cultivated to a high degree of perfec- 
tion. All dogs probably had a common origin and a 
common manifestation of instinct. By selection and 
care in breeding, varieties have been made with 
permanently differing characteristics of form, color, 
size, and also of instinctive impulses. If new in- 
stincts have not been produced, a common one has 
been most wonderfully modified, and the modifica- 
tions have been transmitted by the general law of 
heredity, as the peculiarities of hand, ear, hair, limb, 
and color have been. The spaniel instinctively takes 
to the water ; the shepherd-dog to the care of sheep ; 
and young " pointers" and " retrievers" do their pe- 
culiar work, when first taken out by the sportsman, 
as perfectly as after long practice. No one of these 
varieties shows any disposition or aptitude for the 
work of another variety. 

Instinct Differs from Impulse to Random Acts. — 
Instinct differs from the impulsive force previously 
described in being chiefly psychical while that is 
altogether physical ; and still more in that the activi- 
ties which it puts in motion are directed toward 
definite ends, which, in some cases, must be repre- 
sented in the consciousness of the actors. It is im- 
possible to suppose the bird proceeding to build a 
nest without some notion beforehand of the object 
she is building, or of the bee constructing honeycomb 
with no idea of the form or character of the comb. 



240 Definitions vakious. 

To say that such notions may be derived from obser- 
vation does not fully relieve the difficulty, since, in 
many cases of instinctive acts, there can be no op- 
portunities for observation. 

Instinct Differs from the Reflex Activity. — In- 
stinctive differ from reflex acts in not being directly 
correlated to exciting stimuli which can be observed 
and described. The reflex act is an answer to some 
challenge, provocation, or irritation. The instinctive 
activity, though it may be awakened by the stimu- 
lation of organic feelings or by other causes, is not 
in the nature of a reply to these. Appetite is an or- 
ganic and not an instinctive feeling. The cravings 
of appetite, however, arouse the instinctive activity 
necessary for obtaining food both in the animal and 
in the young child. Probably some organic feeling 
awakens the nest-building instinct in the bird, and 
the dam-building instinct in the beaver, and the 
hibernating instinct in the bear, but the acts follow- 
ing have no reciprocal relation to the feelings. 

Definitions Various. — The purposes for which 
instinct has been given to animals and many of the 
acts resulting from its impulses are obvious. Con- 
cerning these there is general agreement, but defini- 
tions of instinct are various, and contradictory in 
some cases. Paley's is familiar, "Instinct is a pro- 
pensity prior to experience and independent of in- 
struction." This does not distinguish instinct from 
random and undirected impulse. 

Whately says : " Instinct is a blind tendency to 
some mode of action, independent of any considera- 



INSTINCT IN MAN. 241 

tion on the part of the agent, of the end to which 
the action leads." This can not be accepted by one 
who believes the animal to have some notion of the 
object to be accomplished by his instinctive activity. 

Another writer says : " The instinct of the pres- 
ent generations is the product of accumulated expe- 
riences of past generations. Instinct is inherited 
memory." This can be accepted as true of many 
special forms of instinctive activity, but it fails to 
account for the original instinctive impulse. 

On the whole, the following by Dr. Chadbourne is 
most nearly satisfactory: "An instinct is simply an 
impulse to a particular kind of voluntary action 
which the being needs to perform as an individual 
or representative of a species, but which he could 
not possibly learn to perform before he needs to act." 
Under the general term instinct he includes " all the 
original impulses, — excepting the appetites, — and 
that knowledge and skill, with which animals are 
endowed, which experience may call into exercise, 
but which it does not give." 

Definition. — For brevity we adopt the following: 
Instinct is an impulse to activity, directed to definite 
ends, and to the performance of acts necessary before 
experience or instruction is possible. 

Instinct in Man. — The instinctive activities are 
much less important and less numerous in man than 
in many of the lower animals. In human actions, in 
many cases, the instinctive and the rational impulses 
become mingled so that it is scarcely possible to 
determine which predominate. The affection of the 



2tL2 INSTINCTIVE EXPRESSIVE ACTS. 

human mother for her child, is both instinctive and 
rational ; that of the father for his family is of the 
same character, so is also that of the patriot for his 
country and his countrymen. 

Instinct in the Child. — In the young child the 
acts necessary to the preservation of life, such as 
sucking, swallowing, which is partially reflex, biting, 
and some others, are evidently instinctive. The act 
of creeping is of the same nature. The movements 
necessary to standing, jumping, running, and walk- 
ing are also instinctive, although the forces of imita- 
tion and instruction are here mingled with the 
impulses of instinct. 

Instinctive Expressive Acts. — Many acts express- 
ive of emotion and of other feelings are clearly 
instinctive, as they are performed before the possi- 
bility of imitation or instruction. Such are crying 
and screaming from pain or vexation ; and sounds 
indicative of comfort and satisfaction, and the earliest 
movements of the muscles of the face in smiling. 
Movements of the head to denote assent and refusal, 
turning away the head and hiding the face through 
fear, holding out the hands to receive, and pushing 
with the hands to indicate aversion, have the appear- 
ance of instinctive actions. It does not change their 
character to call them inherited habits. 

Instinctive Fear. — The child exhibits fear of dan- 
ger before he can have learned from experience or in- 
struction what danger is. He clings to the mother at 
sight of strangers, trembles at the approach of some 
animals, is terrified at strange and unexpected sounds. 



INSTINCT AND INTUITION. 243 

Knowledge of Instincts Necessary in Dealing 
with Children. — No one can deal wisely, or even 
justly, with young children without a knowledge 
of instinct as manifested in childhood, and without 
making account of its power over the conduct dur- 
ing that period. Punishments are sometimes inflicted 
for acts purely or mainly instinctive. The fear ex- 
hibited by some children in the " dark " is without 
doubt instinctive through heredity, although in a 
majority of cases it is produced by unwise treatment. 

Instinct and Intuition. — Instinct in man should 
not be confounded with intuition. While in some 
points closely related they are quite distinct in their 
leading characteristics. Intuition has to do with 
primary ideas, truths, and beliefs. Instinct has to do 
with acts and feelings. The truths which we accept 
without evidence and call self-evident are intuitive. 
The acts which we perform by an inward impulse 
without instruction or practice are instinctive. 

Feelings Instinctive. — Many feelings are instinct- 
ive. These were treated at sufficient length in their 
proper place and need only be referred to here. 
Among these are the simple emotions, many of the 
affections, and most , of the desires. Among the in- 
stinctive desires are the love of life, the generic de- 
sire for happiness, the desire of approbation, esteem, 
knowledge, property, power, and many others. The 
love of society, the affections which lead to the 
conjugal relation, all the domestic affections, the 
feelings of pity, compassion, and sympathy are in- 
stinctive in origin, but are modified and controlled 



244 STUPIDITY OF INSTINCT. 

in their manifestations by judgment and reason. 
The desire to be remembered and the desire for con- 
tinued existence are also instinctive. The feelings of 
awe and reverence in the presence of exhibitions of 
great wisdom, power, and might appear to be instinct- 
ive. Near akin to these and of similar origin are 
the feelings which impel to acts of adoration and 
worship. 

Instincts Should be Studied. — No man can "know 
himself" or understand other men who neglects to 
study the instinctive elements in his nature. The 
instinctive impulses, in the realm of feeling, afford a 
basis for much valuable instruction and practical 
training in respect to character and conduct. Proper 
appeals to children and to men find an answering 
response in these feelings, which may be made of 
great service in the department of "morals and 
manners." 

Stupidity of Instinct. — Examples of cases in which 
instinct seems to approach very nearly to that rea- 
soning intelligence which consciously and purposely 
adapts means to ends, are frequently related. The 
stupidity of instinct is not so often referred to. Sir 
John Lubbock gives some remarkable illustrations of 
such stupidity in the conduct of bees. A. small part 
of the covering of a cell, which a bee was closing 
up after filling it with honey and depositing within 
it an egg, was broken away. This damage the bee 
immediately repaired, as she also did some breaks in 
the walls of half-finished cells. When, however, a 
hole was made in a cell below the part where the 



DEFINITIONS. 245 

bee was working, and through which the honey at 
once began to exude, the bee worked on as if noth- 
ing had happened, though the honey ran out as fast 
as it was poured in. This experiment was repeated 
over and over again, and always with the same result. 
As it was thought possible the bee might not 
have noticed these small holes, a larger hole was 
made in the bottom of a cell which contained only 
a little honey. The bee soon returned with more 
honey, seemed surprised to find the hole in the cell, 
examined it carefully, and even pushed her antennae 
through it. She did not, however, as might have been 
expected, stop up the hole, but went on calmly to 
pour into the cell load after load of honey, which ran 
out at the bottom as fast as she poured it in at the 
top. When she had brought the usual quantity of 
honey, she laid her egg and sealed up the empty cell. 

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER XVI. AND DEFINITIONS. 

1. Forces known by the movements produced. 

2. Study of forces producing human actions necessary. 

3. Automatic or impulsive actions, beating of the heart, respi- 

ration, action of vital organs. 

4. Impulsive movements and force. 

5. Feeling mingled in these movements. 

6. Actions of young children. 

7. Reflex movements, general character. 

8. Diagram and explanations. 

9. Early reflex acts of the child. 

10. Reflex mental acts. Reflex attention. 

11. Movements of children in school. 

12. Instinct mysterious. Acts of men adapted to produce re- 

sults, etc. 



246 DEFINITIONS. 

13. Acts of animals called instinctive. 

14. Experience and instruction not necessary to pure instinct. 

15. Offices of instinct in animals. 

16. Instinct subject to limitations of time, etc. 

17. Illustrations of such limitations. 

18. Relation of instinct and the senses. 

19. Instinct requires exercise. Modifications of instinct. 

20. How instinct differs from random impulse. How from re- 

flex activity. 

21. Definitions. Paley, Whately, and others. 

22. Definition here adopted. 

23. Instinct in man ; in the child. 

24. Instinctive expressive acts ; fear. 

25. Knowledge of instinct necessary, etc. 

26. Instinct and intuition. 

27. Instinctive feelings, emotions, affections, desires. 

28. Reasons for studying instinct, etc. 

29. Stupidity of instinct. 



Automatic Activities — In man many of the activities inde- 
pendent of the will. 

Simple Impulsive Force. — The force which causes the ran- 
dom and spontaneous bodily movements of children. 

Reflex Action. — Action answering to other action, or action 
in direct response to stimuli. 

Instinct. — An impulse to activity directed to definite ends, and 
to the performance of acts necessary before experience 
or instruction is possible. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

IMITATION AND HABIT. 

Connection Between Imitation, Habit, and In- 
stinct. — An intimate and exceedingly interesting rela- 
tionship exists between imitation, habit, and instinct. 
Imitation of acts and processes, continued for some 
time by an individual, results in personal habit; 
habit, persisted in for an indefinite period by a 
family or a species, results in an instinct. In such 
a case instinct is in truth a transmitted and inher- 
ited habit, and the child merely continues uncon- 
sciously to imitate the parent. 

Order of Progress. — Imitation. When a child, 
having observed, the act of another, attempts to per- 
form it, the effort is named imitation. When through 
practice he is able to execute the act with a good 
degree of readiness, ease, and skill, the act is said to 
have become habitual, and the acquired disposition 
or tendency is called a habit. When the act is per- 
formed with no appreciable exercise of attention and 
with no conscious determination of will, it is said to 
be automatic. The road from laborious and painful 
imitation through the dominion of habit to apparent 
automatism is direct and natural. The possibility of 
thus transferring a large number of physical acts, 
necessary for the support of life, for the transaction 



248 WHEN IMITATION BEGINS. 

of business, and for the enjoyment of pleasure, from 
a position in which their proper performance demands 
serious and constant attention and much and vig- 
orous effort, to a position where they are executed 
with precision and dispatch and without conscious 
attention or effort, is a matter of almost supreme 
importance in the work of education, and to both 
the material and intellectual progress of the race. A 
brief study of the development in the child of the 
disposition and tendency to imitation, and of the 
nature and power of habit, will help to reveal its 
importance and value. 

When Imitation Begins. — It is difficult, probably 
impossible, to determine with exactness the time 
when the impulse to imitation first moves the child. 
Certain prerequisites are essential. The power of 
perceiving must have been considerably developed. 
The child must be able to see an act with some de- 
gree of distinctness before he can imitate it. He 
must be able to represent the act to himself or to 
form a notion of it. There must be some exercise 
of will and sufficient control over the muscles to 
execute the act. 

Preyer. — Preyer thinks he detected in his child 
an effort at imitation at the end of the fifteenth 
week, but not until the seventh month were the imi- 
tative acts so well executed as to be beyond question 
as to their nature. 

Darwin. — Darwin thinks his son attempted to imi- 
tate sounds at the age of four months, but is not ab- 
solutely certain of the imitation till the sixth month. 



EARLIEST IMITATIVE ACTS. 249 

Tiedemann. — Tiedemann says of his son at four 
months : " If he sees any one drinking, he makes a 
movement with his mouth as if he were tasting 
something." Other observers put the beginning of 
the imitative stage of development somewhat later, 
as late as the ninth month. It should be remem- 
bered that in the cases named special efforts were 
made to attract the attention of the children to cer- 
tain acts, and to excite the disposition to imitate. 
No safe conclusion in respect to children generally can 
be drawn from these few observations. Undoubtedly 
children differ widely in this as in all other respects. 
During the first year of a child's life it is a matter 
of no little difficulty to distinguish with certainty 
between impulsive and reflex movements and those 
produced by efforts at imitation. 

Earliest Imitative Acts. — Among the earliest imi- 
tative acts are movements of the lips, of the head, 
hands, and fingers. The child soon learns to nod and 
shake the head, to beckon with the hand or finger, 
to imitate the action of sneezing, blowing out a light, 
coughing, and many other familiar acts. A little 
later he begins to imitate successfully more difficult 
and complex acts, and attempts the imitation of 
articulate sounds. He soon masters, by this process, 
some short and simple words. 

Stimulus to Effort. — The pleasure resulting from 
successful effort is manifested by the young child in 
his numerous repetitions of acts and sounds which 
he has mastered in his struggles at imitation. We 
have here an illustration of nature's method of re- 



250 IMITATION IN THE HOME. 

warding her children. Effort and enjoyment- are 
inseparably bound together, and the pleasure serves 
to incite to further exertion and greater victories. 

Imitation in the Home. — Upon examination it 
will be discovered that the processes of home devel- 
opment and education during the first years of the 
child's life consist in little else than the excitation 
and direction of the imitative propensity by the 
parents and by older children, and the acquisition of 
skill on the part of the child in the performance 
of imitated acts, and in the utterance of imitated 
sounds. The instinctive act of creeping is attempted 
earlier and performed more readily and successfully 
if the young child sees older ones doing the same 
thing. This is true also of sitting, standing, walking, 
running, and other common movements of child- 
hood. 

Explanation of a Fact. — We have here a partial 
explanation of the fact that some children acquire 
easy and graceful forms of movement in early life, 
while the movements of others are exceedingly awk- 
ward and clumsy. Something of this is due to na- 
tive or inherited characteristics, but much of it may 
justly be attributed to the examples presented for 
imitation, and to the direction given to the imitative 
exertions of the children. The younger imitate the 
older in movement, manner, and speech ; and if the 
latter are uncouth and semi-barbarous, it will be un- 
reasonable to expect the former to be refined and 
highly civilized. Hence the importance of bringing 
children, even in the earliest period, into contact 



IMITATION IK LATER PERIODS. 251 

with persons whose language and behavior afford the 
best models for imitation. 

Imitation in Later Periods.' — Later, after the child 
has gone from the home into the streets and has en- 
tered the school, the impulse to imitation still con- 
tinues to exert its power. The small boy tries to 
walk and to talk and to behave generally as the big- 
ger boy does. The big boy follows as industriously 
and carefully as possible in the footsteps of the 
young man. The little girl imitates the larger girl, 
and both imitate the school teacher and other more 
mature people. " Following the fashion " in society 
is only imitation on a larger scale with a common 
pattern. 

Mental and Moral Imitation. — The processes of 
imitation go beyond physical movements, beyond 
manners and dress and other matters which affect 
personal appearance and conduct merely. By a less 
obvious but an equally real act of imitation, the 
young adopt the intellectual and moral peculiarities 
of the older with whom they associate. The son em- 
braces the moral, religious, and political faith of his 
father ; the daughter imbibes the teachings of her 
mother. The pupil becomes imbued with the spirit, 
tone, and temper of the teacher. Public education, 
as well as domestic, consists largely in stimulating 
and directing the imitative tendencies and processes. 
The teacher is not merely an instructor, consciously 
and purposely training, guiding, and feeding the 
knowing activities of his pupils ; he is also an object 
of conscious and unconscious imitation, fashioning 



252 FACT OF EXPERIEKCE. 

mind and heart, manners and character by what he 
himself is more than by what he does. More atten- 
tion should be given, in all departments of education, 
to this native disposition to imitate, and to results 
which may be accomplished through it. The teacher 
should be chosen as much for what he is, in man- 
ners, spirit, and temper, as for what he knows of 
science, art, or literature. 

Habit Requires Consideration. — The relation of 
habit to imitation and repetition and its general im- 
portance have already been alluded to. It requires 
a little further consideration on account of its pecul- 
iar nature, and of the great help or the serious 
hinderance which comes from it in every sphere of 
human activity. 

Fact of Experience. — This is a fact of common 
experience : Having performed any act, either phys- 
ical or mental, once, we discover that each successive 
repetition demands less effort. The second perform- 
ance was easier than the first ; the third was easier 
than the second, and so on, until finally scarcely any 
effort was required. The very familiarity of the fact 
makes us blind to its wonderful character. We say 
we do a thing easily and readily because " we have 
got used to it," without stopping to ask ourselves 
what it is "to get used" to a thing. Evidently some 
change must have taken place somewhere in our 
muscles, nerves, or brain ; else why should they 
move with so much more rapidity and with so 
much less expenditure of force, and at the same 
time with so much more precision. It may not be 



A "DISPOSITION" REMAINS. 253 

possible to discover the exact nature of the change, 
but of its reality there is little room for doubt. 

A "Disposition" Remains. — After the perform- 
ance of an act several times there remains, it is 
said, " a disposition to perform it whenever it is sug- 
gested" This disposition is also called a " tendency," 
and an " inclination." Without doubt some change 
has taken place in the nerves and muscles concerned 
in producing the movements of the parts of the body 
involved in the action. This change is purely physi- 
ological, and the resulting condition of body has a 
tendency to become permanent. When this occurs 
the habit is said to be fixed. " Getting used to a 
thing" consists in the production of this change of 
physical condition. It is possible that some psychical 
modification also is involved in the creation of this 
" disposition," but of its character, apart from phys- 
ical modifications, we have no knowledge. 

"Disposition" not Desire. — This "disposition" 
must not be confounded with desire. Desire may act 
in harmony with it and in the same direction, or it 
may act in opposition to it and in a contrary direc- 
tion. A person has contracted the habit of using 
opium or morphine ; that is, a " disposition " has been 
formed which impels him to use it. He earnestly 
desires to be freed from the power of this habit. A 
severe struggle takes place between this artificially 
created disposition and genuine desire. A child has 
formed the habit of disobedience. He finally be- 
comes convinced of the evil of the habit, and really 
desires to obey. In spite of the desire, the disposi- 



254 INFLUENCE OF ASSOCIATION. 

tion will continue to impel him to the old course of 
action. The personal experience of every individual 
will suggest an over-abundance of similar illustrations. 

Influence of Association. — The power and effect- 
iveness of this disposition are greatly increased by 
the influence of association. This is, however, only a 
special example of the operation of a general law 
considered in the study of memory. Places, persons, 
articles of furniture, etc., are associated with habitual 
acts. The sight of these excites the activity of the 
disposition, and often causes the performance of an 
act without the intervention of the will and without 
any distinct consciousness of the necessary effort. 
The person who wishes to break off certain habits 
will find it necessary to avoid certain places and 
certain persons, however much confidence he may 
have in his power of resistance. 

Habit Defined. — With these explanations and 
illustrations habit may be defined as a disposition 
or tendency of either body or mind created by the 
repetition of acts and states. The aggregate of such 
dispositions in an individual constitutes his habits. 
Habit and custom are nearly related, but are not 
the same. Habit is the internal disposition ; custom 
the external act frequently repeated. Customs lead 
to habits, and habits perpetuate customs. Old and 
useless customs are kept up by the force of habit. 

Habits a Necessity of Nature. — The formation of 
habits is a necessity of nature. The tendency to 
such formation is exhibited very strongly, even in 
early infancy. At this period habits are fixed easily 



VALUE OF HABITS. 255 

and rapidly from the fact that the physical organism 
is exceedingly plastic and impressible, and yields at 
once and without resistance to the changes demanded 
by any mode of activity. Mental habits are also in- 
duced with equal facility. The training processes in 
education have for their end the creation of right 
habits, and through these the production of practi- 
cal skill. Man has been well called "a bundle of 
habits," and personal experience testifies to the truth 
of the adage. Many a man would give much to be 
rid of habits fastened upon him in youth, and which 
have been clogs and fetters, making every step of 
progress in certain directions toilsome and painful. 
He has accomplished only half of what he might 
have accomplished but for these annoying and irri- 
tating shackles. On the other hand, many men owe 
a large measure of their success in literary and scien- 
tific labors and in practical affairs to the early for- 
mation of desirable habits. 

Value of Habits. — The reason is obvious. The 
habitual act demands for its proper execution less 
attention and less effort. Such acts can be performed 
with less outlay of time and strength ; and besides 
this saving of time and energy, the work is better 
done. It is of advantage to have a regular and or- 
derly routine in the business of daily life, whatever 
that business may be. By such an arrangement the 
passage from one duty and one form of labor to an- 
other is made without delay and with hardly con- 
scious effort, many of the movements and processes 
becoming almost if not quite automatic. 



256 ACTS BECOME AUTOMATIC. 

Acts Become Automatic. — It is only by handing 
over as many as possible of our every-day acts and 
duties to be cared for by the automatic forces, the 
lower nerve centers, that energy and opportunity can 
be found for higher forms of labor and for higher ac- 
quisitions in any department of activity. These can 
be thus remitted whenever they have been rendered 
thoroughly habitual, and not till then. The aim of 
the parent, the teacher, the student, the man of 
affairs, should be to free himself, as far and as 
completely as practicable, from the necessity of 
expending upon routine drudgery the power, either 
of body or mind, needed for other and nobler pur- 
poses. To a considerable extent this is done with- 
out conscious purpose or intention. Illustrations are 
abundant. 

Illustrations, etc. — The young child devotes his 
whole energy of mind and body to the process of 
walking. Walking to the man is nearly automatic. 
The boy learns to write with much and painful ef- 
fort ; the man thinks and his fingers move of them- 
selves. The girl, in her first practice on the piano, 
finds physical and psychical energy both exhausted 
in directing her fingers to the right keys ; the hands 
of the master need no direction, and seem to find the 
keys by instinct. Higher illustrations will suggest 
themselves. 

Habits of Feeling and Conduct. — The domain of 
habit extends beyond the physical and intellectual 
activities of man ; it embraces the feelings and the 
conduct. Habits of right feeling and right living are 



HABITS OF FEELING AND CONDUCT. 2o< 

of higher- importance to the individual and to the 
community than even good habits of body or of intel- 
lectual labor. Any mode of feeling, indulged and 
cherished, grows deeper and stronger, and soon ex- 
hibits a " disposition " to recur without apparent 
cause. At first the feeling may have been excited 
by particular persons, places, or circumstances, and 
may be associated with these so that it is aroused 
only at sight or at remembrance of them. Soon, 
however, it recurs without reference to persons or 
circumstances, and tends to assume the character of 
an habitual tone and temper of mind. Children in 
this way, through unwise indulgence on the part of 
parents and others, become permanently peevish, 
fretful, irritable, and ill-tempered at a very early 
period. Others, by wiser though apparently more 
severe and less affectionate regimen, are trained to 
habitual cheerfulness, amiability, and good temper. 
Currents of feeling, like currents of thought and cur- 
rents of nerve excitation, wear for themselves chan- 
nels in which they continue ever after to flow with 
constantly increasing rapidity and force. As a natu- 
ral result of this acquired tendency of mind, men, 
whatever their original disposition might have been, 
become, by degrees and often altogether uncon- 
sciously, gloomy, morose, and even " bearish," thus 
depriving themselves and their immediate associates 
of all possibility of making life comfortable and de- 
sirable. By taking advantage of this same psychical 
law persons, whose native temperaments and disposi- 
tions mav have been unfortunate, can train them- 



258 CHARACTER DEFINED. 

selves to habitual cheerfulness, hopefulness, and kind- 
ness of feeling by regular and persistent effort. 

Relation of Habit to Feeling and Character. — We 

touch here the province of morals and questions of 
conduct and character. The emotions, affections, and 
all other modes of feeling tend to the creation of 
desire or aversion. Desire excites and moves the will 
and action follows. Desires become permanent and 
resulting conduct becomes habitual. Habitual con- 
duct is an index and outflow of permanent native 
and acquired dispositions and tendencies of mind, 
that is, of character. 

Character Defined. — Character is sometimes de- 
fined as " what a man is." What "a man is" is the 
sum of the dispositions, inclinations, and states of his 
mind. If these are good, his character is good ; if 
these are bad, his character is bad. So far as habit 
results in mental and moral " habitudes " or perma- 
nent dispositions of soul, it produces character. Con- 
sequently the formation of habits becomes a ques- 
tion of morals. A man is morally bound "to make 
the most and best of himself," and to contribute 
whatever he is able to the happiness of his fellows 
and the general good. His ability to accomplish 
either of these objects will depend, to a very great 
extent, upon the habits to which he is trained in 
childhood, or which he voluntarily acquires in later 
periods. 

Habit in Moral Education. — The moral education 
of the child includes the inculcation of sound prin- 
ciples, the development of tender, wholesome, and 



HABIT IN MORAL EDUCATION. 259 

healthful sensibilities, and the formation of good habits. 
The training to right conduct of necessity commences 
before instruction, since the child commences to act 
while he is yet ignorant of the moral character of con- 
duct, and incapable of understanding and appreciating 
appeals to judgment or reason. His earliest habits, 
consequently, are involuntary and involve no respon- 
sibility on his own part ; nevertheless the beginnings 
of moral conduct and character are found in these. 
Required and compelled by conditions and the will 
of others to behave in a prescribed way, this kind of 
behavior gradually but yet rapidly becomes habitual 
to the child. The growing habit soon renders it 
easy ; the feeling of compulsion and restraint disap- 
pears, and a feeling of satisfaction akin to pleasure 
takes its place. In this way the child learns to obey 
the wishes of his parents, to abstain from violent 
expressions of irritation and ill-temper, to have re- 
gard for the rights of others, long before he compre- 
hends the moral distinction between right and wrong, 
or discovers any reason why such conduct should be 
preferred to its opposite. Having begun right-doing 
through physical compulsion, he presently continues 
this course of conduct through the gentler compul- 
sion of habit. By this process obedience, self-control, 
truthfulness, and the other virtues of childhood be- 
come habitual. The power of habit continues to be 
felt even in mature life, and not seldom serves as a 
strong bulwark against the onsets of temptation 
when other defenses have given way. 

Influence of Conduct upon Feeling. — It is some- 



260 INFLUENCE OF CONDUCT. 

times affirmed that correct external conduct, good 
behavior on the part of the young, secured by 
restraints and constraints, has no moral value, and 
neither indicates nor affects the real character. 
While there is a measure of truth in this affirma- 
tion, those who make it overlook a most important 
psychological law ; namely, that conduct reacts upon 
the mind, and tends to produce the mental states 
and feelings of which the behavior is the natural 
index and outgrowth. The law is true in respect to 
language as well as actions. Every feeling has its 
own legitimate mode of expression in words, tones, 
gestures, and positions, and if freedom of expression 
is refused the feeling soon begins to subside. On 
the other hand, if full liberty of expression is per- 
mitted and encouraged, the strength and urgency 
of the emotion or affection are correspondingly 
increased. Consequently, if the child is restrained 
from external expressions of anger and ill-will, these 
passions have less opportunity for development and 
growth. If he is required and encouraged to exhibit 
the external indications of kindness, good-will, and 
benevolence, both in language and conduct, the de- 
velopment and growth of these feelings are pro- 
moted. The internal character, the dispositions and 
tendencies of mind, are thus fashioned by modes of 
action which had their origin in the compulsion of 
circumstances, and are continued, to some extent, by 
the force of habit. In every view habit is a most 
potent and effective agent in moral devolopment 
and training. 



LAW IN THE FORMATION OF HABITS. 261 

Law in the Formation of Habits. — The processes 
by which habits are formed are subject to readily 
recognized laics. Water wears no deep and perma- 
nent channel so long as it is allowed to spread itself 
over a wide surface. The stream must be narrowed 
and deepened ; its force must be concentrated, and 
kept in action upon the same line of direction for 
months and years. In like manner the mental and 
physical energy of the child or the man must be 
concentrated upon the form or mode of action which 
is to be transformed into a habit. The act must be 
repeated indefinitely and without material variation. 
It is essential that the process be uniform in all de- 
tails ; otherwise the channel along which the nerv- 
ous and psychical energy is expected to run will be 
neither deep nor sharply defined. 

Illustrations. — The young child will contract the 
habit of putting his " playthings " in their proper 
place, the older child, his books and articles of cloth- 
ing, if obliged to do this every day and every time 
without deviation. The pupil will soon form the habit 
of doing all his school work in a neat, uniform, and 
accurate manner, if this is insisted on, at the outset, 
in all lessons and at all times and places. The stu- 
dent will create in his own mind a " disposition " 
to uniformity, precision, and thoroughness in literary 
and scientific work, if he allows himself no devia- 
tions under any conditions or excuses. A habit of 
rectitude in business, in all social and other relations 
will be established if the decisions of judgment and 
the demands of conscience are invariably regarded. 



262 HABIT SOMETIMES AX EVIL. 

Habit Sometimes an Evil. — The force of habit, if 
wrongly employed and badly directed, like any other 
beneficent and useful force, may become a most seri- 
ous obstacle to development and progress. This has 
already been incidentally implied. It is a work of 
more difficulty to unlearn an old habit than to learn 
a new one. A double labor is imposed, therefore, by 
the formation of bad habits in childhood or in youth. 
Habits of idleness, carelessness, dissipation, and of 
irregularity of any kind, having once been trans- 
formed into fixed dispositions of mind and thus con- 
verted into "second nature," are not uprooted and 
destroyed except by vigorous, long-continued, and 
often most painful effort. The sowing of " wild 
oats" is not a natural preparation for reaping an 
abundant harvest of cultivated grain. 

Habits an Obstruction to Progress. — It is true, 
adso, that habits, not morally objectionable, are some- 
times hindrances to intellectual progress and to effi- 
ciency in the work of learning or teaching. Mr. Sully 
says : " Taken in a narrow sense, habit is in a man- 
ner opposed to growth. By following out a train of 
ideas again and again in a certain way, we lose the 
capability of varying this order, of re-adapting the 
combination to new circumstances. Habit is thus 
the -element of persistence, of custom, the conserva- 
tive tendency ; whereas growth implies flexibility, 
modifiability, susceptibility to new impressions, the 
progressive tendency." The danger from this ele- 
ment in habit needs to be guarded against by stu- 
dents and by teachers who expect to keep fully up 



INFLUENCE OF HABIT. 263 

with the progress of events, with the improvements 
in the sciences and arts, and with the changing 
methods of study and instruction. 

Influence of Habit on the Sensibilities. — Another 
seemingly unfortunate but unavoidable result of habit 
is a matter of common observation and experience : 
Persons living from childhood in the midst of the 
most beautiful scenery become apparently blind and 
insensible to its beauty ; or dwelling amid the most 
sublime of Nature's works, they see in them noth- 
ing of sublimity. It is questionable whether these 
individuals, if transported to other places and sur- 
rounded by other scenes and objects of beauty and 
sublimity, would be susceptible to any depth of 
emotion. 

Habit and Domestic Feelings. — The feelings 
which have their origin in the domestic and social 
relations afford another illustration of the influence 
of familiarity. Members of a family living con- 
stantly together seldom exhibit great depth or in- 
tensity of emotion at sight of each other. When a 
meeting occurs, after a separation of considerable 
length, such intensity manifests itself. In this case 
the susceptibility to feeling is not destroyed, but the 
ordinary mode of manifestation is modified. Depth, 
and strength, and quietness of expression take the 
place of glowing heat and overflowing ebullition. 
Habitual and regularly recurrent feelings assume a 
calm and equable mode of expression, which may 
detract somewhat from the immediate keenness of 
the pleasure, but which contribute to its duration. 



264: TRANSMITTED HABITS. 

The flame does not flash and sparkle so much, but 
it burns longer and more steadily. 

Transmitted Habits. — Mention has been made of 
the transformation of habits in animals into instincts. 
Something of similar nature occurs in the human 
race. Special peculiarities both of mind and body 
are transmitted from parents to children frequently 
through several generations. These peculiarities have 
in most cases, without doubt, been acquired by force 
of habit, either physical or psychical. The disposi- 
tion or tendency thus created in the physical organ- 
ism and in the mind of the parent re-appears in 
the body and mind of the child. When these dis- 
positions are of an elevating character they are of 
great service to the fortunate inheritor, bringing to 
his aid in the " struggle of life' 1 the effective force 
accumulated during many previous years through 
the good habits of a virtuous ancestry. When these 
dispositions are degrading they become an "inherit- 
ance of woe," congenital fetters and clogs, impeding 
every step and making effort doubly wearisome and 
exhausting, and rendering the attainment of high 
excellence a matter of extreme difficulty. 

Inherited Tendencies Produced by Intemperance. 
— This most unfortunate condition finds peculiarly 
strong manifestation in those who have inherited 
dispositions and tendencies created by indulgence in 
the use of intoxicating liquors, of opium, and some 
other narcotic drugs. "The drunkard not only in- 
jures and enfeebles his own nervous system, but 
entails mental disease upon his family. His daugh- 



THE TOBACCO AND OPIUM HABITS. 26 5 

ters are nervous and hysterical ; his sons are weak, 
wayward, eccentric, and sink under the pressure of 
excitement of some unforeseen exigency, or the ordi- 
nary calls of duty. 

" If they pursue the course of their fathers, which 
they have more temptation to follow, and less power 
to avoid, than the children of the temperate, they 
add to their hereditary weakness, and increase the 
tendency to idiocy or insanity in their constitution ; 
and this they leave to their children after them." 
The guilt incurred by the formation and transmis- 
sion of such tendencies can hardly be over-estimated. 

The Tobacco and Opium Habits. — Recent in- 
vestigations have proved that large numbers of the 
boys in the public schools of some of our cities, in 
a few cases forty per cent., use tobacco either habit- 
ually or occasionally. In not a few instances they 
commence the practice as early as at eight years of 
age. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the perni- 
cious effects of this habit upon the muscle, nerves, 
and brain of the immature boy. His vitality is 
sapped, and he never becomes the man he might 
otherwise have been. The result is a general flabbi- 
ness of the whole nature, mental and moral as well 
as physical. 

By the law of heredity the evil effects go beyond 
the immediate victim, and entail a burden of ills 
and woes upon posterity. 

The opium habit is even more dangerous and 
more destructive than the tobacco habit. It is much 
more seductive and fascinating in its character. It 



266 A WORD OF ENCOURAGEMENT. 

seems to cast a fatal spell over its victim, and drags 
him steadily down to physical, intellectual, and moral 
ruin. The power of self-control and self-direction is 
soon lost, and the ability to resist the raging de- 
mands of an unnatural appetite utterly disappears. 
The sensibilities are blunted and moral discrimina- 
tion gradually fades away. The habitual user of 
opium becomes a pitiable wreck, and bequeaths to 
those who come after him the patrimony of his own 
wretchedness and misery. 

A Word of Encouragement. — A word should be 
added for the help and encouragement of such as 
have, through no fault of their own, received this 
terrible inheritance. They are placed at great dis- 
advantage ; they are compelled sometimes to strug- 
gle against almost insuperable obstacles ; but their 
condition, though discouraging, is not by any means 
hopeless. Congenital dispositions can be resisted, 
overcome, and partially at least eradicated from the 
constitution. The sons and daughters of unfortunate 
or vicious parents need not despair. "The law of 
heredity recognizes periods of limitation, as a neces- 
sity for the continuance of the race. If it were not 
for such a law, and the degenerative process were to 
be continued, without deviation or exhaustion, the 
reproductive powers would sooner or later terminate 
and the race become extinct. It is evident that the 
individual who is conscious of an inherited tendency 
to alcoholic excess, may do much to modify, if not 
to control, its force, by placing himself under such 
conditions of living as will tend to increase his con- 



TESTIMONY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 267 

stitutional vigor in the direction in which it is most 
needed." 

Testimony of Consciousness. — After all that is 
affirmed of the power of heredity, and in spite of all 
theorizing, ive have a consciousness that the will, 
unless utterly destroyed by the most vicious and de- 
grading habits, has self-directing power ; we feel that 
we can modify and, to a considerable degree, control 
circumstances ; that we are not doomed to drunken- 
ness or to any other form of degradation because 
an ancestor acquired and transmitted to us an un- 
fortunate tendency. Let it be freely conceded that 
hidden dispositions course in our veins ; that a 
" taint " vitiates our blood ; that concealed enemies 
lurk to pounce upon us at some unguarded moment ; 
that constant watchfulness is the only guaranty of 
safety; — yet we are not utterly helpless, mere floating 
wrecks, with no power of self-direction and no possi- 
bility of escape from the dangers which threaten us, 

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER XVII. AND DEFINITIONS. 

1. Connection between imitation, habit, and instinct. 

2. Imitation and habit explained. 

3. When an act becomes automatic. 

4. When imitation can begin in the child. 

5. Testimony of various writers on this point. 

6. The earliest imitative acts. Stimulus to such acts. 

7. Imitation in home education. 

8. Explanation of a well-known fact. 

9. Imitation in later periods, in the school, etc. 

10. Mental and moral imitation. 

11. Attention should be given to the education of the imitative 

disposition. 



268 DEFINITIONS. 

12. Why habit should be studied. 

13. A fact of experience. Getting used to things. 

14. A '"disposition" remains to repeat acts, etc. 

15. This disposition to be distinguished from desire. 

16. Influence of association upon this disposition. 

17. Definition of habit ; need of explanation. Custom. 

18. Habits a necessity of nature, will be formed. 

19. Value of good habits. Automatic acts, etc.; illustrations of 

these. 

20. Habits of feeling and conduct. 

21. Relation of habits to feeling and character. 

22. Character defined. 

23. Habit in moral education. 

24. Influence of conduct upon feeling, and upon character. 

25. Law in the formation of habits. Illustrations. 

26. Habit may be an evil. Unlearning difficult. 

27. Habit an obstruction to progress. 

28. Influence of habit on the sensibilities. 

29. Habit in connection with the domestic feelings, etc. 

30. Transmitted habits. Their influence. 

31. Inherited tendencies produced by evil habits. 

32. A word of encouragement. Testimony of consciousness. 



Imitation. — Copying a pattern. Performing an act after ob- 
serving it. 

Habit. — A disposition or tendency of either body or mind 
created by the repetition of acts and states. 

Character. — What one is in mind and heart. The sum of the 
dispositions, inclinations, and states of mind. 

Custom. — An external act frequently repeated. 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

MOTIVES AND CHARACTER. 

Personal Experience. — Before the performance of 
a voluntary act we are conscious of a mental pro- 
cess like the following : Some object of sense-per- 
ception or of thought having been brought to our 
attention, w^e examine it with such carefulness as to 
be able to estimate its nature and value. Its value 
to us will be determined by the amount of pleasure, 
satisfaction, or enjoyment of some sort which we 
believe it is capable of affording us. The pleasure 
may be that experienced through the senses. The 
object may be adapted to gratify the taste, or the 
smell, or the hearing, or the sight ; or it may be 
such as to minister to the higher capacities of our 
nature. It may be calculated to please the imagina- 
tion, the esthetic power, or the moral sensibilities. 

Judgment Guided by Experience. — In its decision 
as to the worth of the object the judgment must ob- 
viously be guided by the results of previous experi- 
ences. If it is an object of sense it must have been 
seen, handled, smelled, or tasted at some former 
time ; if not this identical object, one of the same or 
of a similar sort. Memory must bring into con- 
sciousness some representation or remembrance of 
satisfaction or pleasure previously enjoyed ; and the 



270 DESIRE EXCITED, ETC. 

mind must be able to anticipate a repetition of the 
former enjoyment. 

Desire Excited. — This remembrance and antici- 
pation excite a feeling of desire. The judgment pro- 
nounces the object desirable. This desire moves to 
an act of will, and we determine to get possession of 
the object. The necessary and appropriate physical 
act follows. This familiar mental process involves 
an activity of knowing, of feeling, and of willing. 
The order is invariable. The external voluntary act 
would not have been performed without the antece- 
dent mental act of willing ; there would have been 
no willing unless the feeling had preceded ; the feel- 
ing would not have been excited but for the knowl- 
edge ; the knowledge was conditioned upon the pres- 
entation of the object. 

Motive Defined. — That which moves or influences 
the will to an act of volition is called a motive. In 
the case here supposed what is the motive ? Is it the 
external object which excited or stimulated the feel- 
ing of desire ? or is it the desire which, in the psy- 
chical process, stood immediately behind the will and 
impelled it to action? The term motive, as com- 
monly used, includes both these, the external incit- 
ant and the internal resulting desire. 

Two Things Necessary to Volition. — Both are 
necessary to an act of volition. Here, as every- 
where else, we see the correlation between the inner 
world of mind and the outer material world. Within 
is the susceptibility or appetence of soul ; without is 
the object, the stimulus, exactly adapted to appeal to 



INSENSIBILITY- TO MOTIVES. 2 71 

the appetence and arouse it to activity. Either apart 
from the other would be powerless. 

In Strictness of Speech Desire is the Motive. — 

Strictly speaking, the desire, the immediate impelling 
psychical force which precedes every act of volition, 
is the motive. The objects which excite desire, 
whether they be material things, or mental repre- 
sentations, or processes of thought, or conclusions of 
reason, or impulses of conscience, are properly called 
stimuli, incitements, or incentives. In obedience to 
custom, and for " convenience sake," the term motive 
will also be employed to denote these. 

Insensibility to Motives Explained. — The neces- 
sity of a correlation between an external incentive 
and an internal susceptibility explains the reason 
why some individuals are entirely unaffected by mo- 
tives which have great power over others. It also 
suggests that, in the management and training of 
children, there should be a wise and careful adapta- 
tion of incentives to the condition of the child, and 
to the stage of mental and moral development which 
he has reached. The same regard to adaptability 
must be had in efforts to influence and to move to 
action men of different degrees of civilization, cult- 
ure, and refinement. It would be literally " casting 
pearls before swine " to attempt to influence the 
savages of Central Africa by motives which might 
be most effective when addressed to an audience of 
enlightened Americans or Europeans. 

Effect of Repetition, etc. — In the employment of 
incentives to create emotions and other feelings it will 



272 CONFLICT OF MOTIVES. 

be of importance to keep in mind the effect of repe- 
tition and familiarity upon the sensibilities. A touch- 
ing tale of misfortune and suffering, heard for the 
first time, excites deep and vivid manifestations of 
feeling and, if relief and help can be rendered, moves 
the will "to instant and vigorous activity. If repeated, 
each subsequent recital stirs less and less of emotion 
until finally, if the iterations are continued, the list- 
ener, who was at first affected even to tears, ceases 
to exhibit any evidences of pity or sympathy. The 
naturally keen and tender sensibilities of young 
children are not seldom blunted and rendered callous 
by unwisely repeated appeals to filial and fraternal 
affection, or to love of approval and esteem, or to 
any of the feelings peculiarly active in childhood. 

Conflict of Motives. — We are conscious in our- 
selves of what is called a " conflict of motives" or a 
struggle, of greater or less intensity, between oppos- 
ing desires excited by different objects. We observe 
abundant evidence of this same conflict in others, 
especially in the minds of children who have not ac- 
quired any considerable degree of control over the 
outward indications of psychical states. One incen- 
tive kindles desire which draws the child or the man 
in one direction, toward one course of conduct, to 
the performance of acts of a particular kind ; another 
incentive arouses desire which tends to impel him in 
an opposite direction, toward an entirely different 
course of life, and to the performance of acts alto- 
gether unlike in character. Under these circum- 
stances the child, or the adult of feeble will power, 



SELF-DIRECTING POWER. 273 

is carried along by the strongest current ; the deci- 
sion of the will is determined by the "preponderance 
of motives." Very little of that self-directing power, 
implied in what is called "freedom of the will," man- 
ifests itself. The person, whether child or man, of 
less strength of will, of less force of character, is 
almost helpless when brought into intimate associa- 
tion with others of greater strength of will and 
greater force of character. In judging of the merits 
and demerits of children, this fact should be taken 
into account. 

Self-directing Power. — The case is different with 
men of mature and well-developed and well-disci- 
plined mental and moral powers. They are able to 
" select , among the motives which present themselves, 11 
those which they consider u the most worthy; 11 and 
they " can intensify the force of these by fixing the 
attention upon them 11 They can shut the eyes to 
some allurements, and look steadily upon others. 
They can close the ears to some voices and open 
them wide to others. They can, by the self-deter- 
mining force of will, turn away from one class of 
enticements and yield themselves to the solicitations 
of another class. They can restrain the impulses of 
desires, even when they reach the intensity of pas- 
sions. 

Help from Habit. — In the struggle between con- 
tending motives the power of habit, when right habit 
is once formed, is of great service. Every act of re- 
sistance against the impulse of an unworthy motive 
of any kind renders the next act of resistance easier. 



274 PREDOMINANT MOTIVES. 

The struggle is less fierce and less protracted. The 
boy, who mastered and held in check yesterday the 
impulse of anger, will to-day conquer the impulse 
more easily, and to-morrow more easily still. The 
child, who yields once to the solicitations of duty 
and conscience, will yield more readily and more 
cheerfully when the same solicitations are again 
heard or felt. 

Predominant Motives. — By virtue of this law of 
habit certain motives finally become habitual, and 
the will becomes accustomed to surrender itself to 
their impulses and demands. These motives thus 
attain to the rank of permanent and dominant " dis- 
positions" of mind, and are recognized as elements 
of character. The " education of the will " consists 
essentially in the processes by which this condition 
of mind is brought about. 

Dr. Morell's Testimony. — Dr. J. D. Morell says 
with great truthfulness and force : " The education 
of the will is really of far greater importance, as 
shaping the destiny of the individual, than that of 
the intellect ; and it should never be lost sight of by 
the practical educator, that it is only by the amass- 
ing and consolidating of our volitional residua in 
certain given directions, that this end can be secured. 
Theory and doctrine, and inculcation of laws and 
propositions, will never of themselves lead to the 
uniform habit of right action. It is by doing, that 
we learn to do ; by overcoming, that we learn to 
overcome ; by obeying reason and conscience, that 
we learn to obey ; and every right act which we 



OBJECT OF PAEENT AND TEACHEK. 275 

cause to spring out of pure principles, whether by 
authority, precept, or example, will have a greater 
weight in the formation of character than all the 
theory in the world. 

Object of Parent and Teacher. — The object of the 
parent and of the true educator, in moral training, 
is to lead the child to act, both voluntarily and ha- 
bitually, from the highest and noblest motives. It 
should be the purpose of every man, and above all 
of every student and scholar, to train himself to 
obedience to this same law of conduct. Only in this 
way can consistency and uniformity of right conduct 
be secured. 

Motives Arranged in Ascending Series. — In the 
training of childhood it will be found necessary to 
arrange incentives in the order of a regularly ascend- 
ing series. Each must be employed in turn, as the 
inner susceptibility or appetence to which it appeals 
is developed. The development of the higher suscep- 
tibilities can be hastened by careful and judicious 
appeals, which do not overtax and exhaust their grow- 
ing strength. Their development can be retarded, 
and their proportions can be dwarfed, by studiously 
avoiding or neglecting to excite and stimulate their 
activity by proper means, and by appeals proportioned 
to their degree of maturity. If, in childhood, incen- 
tives are never employed which address the sense of 
propriety, of honor, and of duty, these motives will 
seldom be strong and effective in the periods of 
youth and maturity. They will scarcely ever become 
the dominant dispositions, the active and governing 



2 76 PARALLEL SERIES OF MOTIVES. 

forces, in the mind. In all cases the highest possible 
motive should be employed. 

Parallel Series of Motives. — Incentives may be 
arranged into several parallel series more readily 
and satisfactorily than into one single series. The 
following is designed merely as a suggestive arrange- 
ment which the student or teacher can vary accord- 
ing to the conditions and demands which may pre- 
sent themselves. 

1. First series. The satisfaction, enjoyment, pleas- 
ure, resulting from approval, commendation, esteem, 
praise, etc. Under this head will be placed the ap- 
proval, esteem, etc., of parents and other members of 
one's family ; of associates and friends, companions 
of one's own age, school-mates and others ; of older 
persons, instructors, and persons of- worth and in- 
fluence in the community; "last, but not least," of 
one's self, of the good every-where and of God Him- 
self. 

2. Second series. The satisfaction and pleasure 
resulting from activity, from the proper and legiti- 
mate exercise of one's powers. Under this head will 
be included the pleasure derived from the normal 
and rightly limited activity of the bodily powers ; 
and also from the proper exercise of all the intel- 
lectual powers, perception, memory, imagination, etc. ; 
likewise from the regulated activity of the sensibili- 
ties, the emotions, affections, and desires ; and most 
of all from the right exercise of the moral powers 
and feelings. The satisfaction resulting from right- 
doing in all the relations which one may sustain, to 



THE HIGHEST MOTIVE. 277 

himself, to relatives, to associates and friends, to the 
community, to the State, to all mankind, and to 
God. 

3. Third series. The satisfaction and enjoyment 
derived from possession. In this series will be in- 
cluded the pleasure resulting from anticipated pos- 
session as well as from actual, present possession, 
"the pleasures of hope," and the more enduring 
riches stored up by the accumulating power of faith. 
Among the many pleasure-giving possessions are the 
possession of approval, esteem, knowledge, power, 
wisdom, excellency of personal character, and the 
Divine approbation. This series embraces a great 
number of particulars which need not be enumer- 
ated, since they will readily occur to the mind of 
one seeking incentives of this class. 

The Highest Motive. — The highest incentive is 
the desire to be and to do right. This is duty in the 
broadest use of the term. The terms pleasure, enjoy- 
ment, satisfaction, although not strictly synonymous, 
have been employed here, without discrimination, to 
denote a state of mind resulting from the gratifica- 
tion of healthful instincts and of wholesome and 
morally right desires. The term happiness has been 
avoided. 

Happiness. — Happiness, though incapable of satis- 
factory definition, indicates a state of being resulting 
from the highest possible development and culture of 
all the powers and capacities of the soul, and the 
right employment of all its activities. True happi- 
ness is not simply pleasurable emotion. 



278 SUMMARY. 



SUMMARY OF CHAPTER XVIII. 

1. Testimony of consciousness in an act of choice. 

2. Judgment guided by the results of experience. 

3. Desire excited by remembrance and anticipation. 

4. Motive defined. Two elements, incitement and appetence. 

5. Insensibility to motives explained. 

6. Effect of repetition upon feelings. 

7. Conflict of motives. Condition of the child. 

8. Self-directing power in man. 

9. Value of habit in this conflict. 

10. Predominant motives and character. 

11. Extract from Dr. J. D. Morell. 

12. Object of parent and teacher. 

13. Motives must be arranged in ascending series. 

14. Three parallel suggestive series. 

15. The highest incentive, duty. 

16. What the term happiness indicates. 



INDEX 



Abstraction, 75 ; defined, 87. 

Acquisition, Desire of, 157. 

Acts, Early reflex, 233 ; reflex men- 
tal, 233 ; instinctive, 242 ; become 
automatic, 256. 

Action, Reflex, of activities, 171 ; im- 
pulsive or automatic, 228 ; of vital 
organs, 229 ; reflex, 246. 

Activity, Law of pleasurable, 118 ; 
regulated, 188. 

Activities, Mental order of, 170 ; re- 
flex influence, 171 ; automatic, 246. 

Esthetics, 123. 

Affections, 113; defined, 126, 148; 
egoistic, 127, 148 ; altruistic, 127, 
148 ; classes of, 128 ; domestic, 
128 ; defensive, 138, 148 ; malev- 
olent, 140, 148; moral, 183. 

Alarm, 160. 

Altruistic feelings, 127, 148. 

Ambition, 158. 

Analogy, 102; examples of, 103; 
basis of, 104. 

Analysis, 75 ; defined, 87. 

Anger, 142 ; tendency and effects, 
143. 

Appetites, 115 ; natural, 115 ; ac- 
quired, 116 ; involve morals, 116 ; 
relation to motives, 117; defined, 
126. 

Apprehension, 160. 

Approbation, Desire of, 155; feel- 
ings of need control, 181. 

Association, Laws of, 46 ; influence 
of feeling, 62 ; laws defined, 71. 



Attention, 56 ; defined, 71, 213, 226 ; 
condition of retention, 56 ; selects 
and determines association, 57 ; 
relation to repetition, 59 ; the 
word, 213 ; external and internal, 
214 ; produced by stimuli, 215 ; 
voluntary and non-voluntary, 218 ; 
statements of Hamilton, Sully, 
and Carpenter, 218, 219 ; influence 
of conditions, etc., 219-221 ; prime 
condition of memory, 223 ; impor- 
tance of, 224 ; nature of reflex, 234. 

Authority, Evidence of, asked, 192, 
193. 

Automatic, movements, 163. 

Aversion, 149. 

Beautiful, The feeling of, 122 ; how 
produced, 122 ; the morally beau- 
tiful, 184. 

Belief, accompanies judgment, 83. 

Body, Knowledge of, important, 7 ; 
intimately connected with mind, 
15, 209; feelings of, 114. 

Books, caution as to use, 4. 

Brain, 9. 

Bridgman, Laura, 24. 

Character, what, 258 ; relation to 
habit, 258; defined, 268. 

Child, the, Position of, 17; recog- 
nition of objects, 35, 36; use of 
terms by, 81, 

Children, Dealing with, as to con- 
duct, 191. 



280 



INDEX. 



Choice, 166. 

Classification, Processes involved in 
and basis of, 77. 

Comparison, Early activity of the 
power, 18. 

Compassion, 137. 

Concentration, Effect of mental, 222. 

Conception, Simple, 38 ; general, 76 ; 
defined, 76, 87. 

Concepts, Simple, 38; general, 74; 
formation of, 75 ; difference be- 
tween the simple or individual 
and the general, 76; differ from 
abstract ideas, 80; differ from 

judgments, 84 ; general defined, 
87. 

Conduct, Influence of, upon feeling, 
259. 

Conscience, Nature of, 178; use of 
the term, 179 ; defined, 186. 

Consciousness, defined, 1, 6; knowl- 
edge which it gives, 27 ; testifies 
to freedom of the will, 168. 

Contiguity, Law of, 50 ; applications 
of, 50-53. 

Contrast, Law of, 49. 

Curiosity, Early, 154 ; change with 
age, 155. 

Custom, relation to habit, 254 ; de- 
fined, 268. 

Deduction, Illustrations of, 93 ; basis, 
94; defined, 105. 

Definition, Nature of, 78. 

Descriptions, essentially classifica- 
tion, 78. 

Desire, 114; defined, 126, 161; a 
single feeling, 149 ; usual varie- 
ties, 149 ; how excited, 150 ; the 
universal motive, 151 ; some forms 
of, 154-157; precedes volition, 
167; moral, 183. 

Despair, 159. 

Diagrams, showing relations, 195, 
207. 

Discouragement, 159. 

Discrimination, Early activity of, 18. 



Disposition, produced by habit, 253 ; 
not desire, 253 ; influence of asso- 
ciation upon, 254. 

Doubting, State of mind in, 83. 

Dread, 160. 

Duration, Idea of, 29 ; units for 
measuring, 30. 

Duty, what it is, 206, 208. 

Education, First step in, 19; second 
step in, 23; influence of, 204. 

Egoistic, feelings, 127, 148. 

Elaborative, or thinking activities, 
106. 

Emotions, 113 ; instinctive, 118 ; ra- 
tional, 119 ; occasioned by wit, etc., 
120; defined, 126; egoistic, 127. 

Emulation, 156. 

Envy, 144. 

Esteem, Desire of, 155. 

Evidence, 101 ; rules as to circum- 
stantial, 102. 

Fallacies, 96; illustrative diagram, 
97; examples, 98. 

Eancy, 41 ; denned, 44. 

Eear, 160; instinctive, 242. 

Feelings, Bodily, 14 ; not represented, 
38; effect of upon retention, 60 
relation to thought, 61, 107, 110 
not definable, 108 ; varieties, 109 
motives, 112 ; as to classification, 
112; organic, 114; exhibited by 
animals, 117 ; occasioned by the 
beautiful, 121; by the sublime, 
124; egoistic and altruistic, 127, 
148; summary of, 162; various 
kinds, 179-183. 

Forces, 227 ; study of necessary, 228 ; 
impulsive, 246. 

Freedom, necessary to responsibility, 
173. 

Friendship, 130; value of, best 
taught, 131. 

Generalization, 76; defined, 87; 
hasty, 92. 



INDEX. 



281 



Good, Use of term, 149 ; defined, 
161; highest, 161. 

Gratitude, 131 ; origin of, 132 ; a 
rational feeling, 133 ; as a mo- 
tive, 134. 

Habit, Force of, 163 ; relation to 
imitation, 252 ; defined, 254, 268 ; 
relation to feeling, 258 ; some- 
times an evil, 262 ; influence upon 
the sensibilities, 263 ; relation to 
custom, 254. 

Habits, Value of good, 255; of feel- 
ing and conduct, 256 ; law in the 
formation of, 261 ; sometimes in 
the way of progress, 262 ; trans- 
mitted, 264; tobacco and opium, 
265. 

Hamilton, as to attention, 218. 

Happiness, No specific desire for, 
152 ; what it is, 153, 277. 

Hatred, 146. 

Health, Conditions of bodily, 211. 

Hearing, Nerves of, 13; knowledge 
by, 13. 

Hope, 159. 

Humor, 121. 

Ideas, of space, 28 ; of duration, 29 ; 
intuitive, 30 ; distinguished from 
truths, 30 ; influence of upon rep- 
resentation, 38 ; abstract, 79, 80. 

Imagination, 40, 44 ; subject to law, 
41 ; differs from fancy, 41 ; forms 
and uses, 42. 

Imitation, connection with habit and 
instinct, 247; when it begins, 
248 ; earliest acts, 249 ; in the 
home, 250 ; in later periods, 251 ; 
mental and moral, 251 ; defini- 
tion, 247, 268. 

Indignation, 140. 

Induction, 91, 92, 105. 

Influence, Reflex, of activities, 171. 

Ingratitude, 132. 

Instinct, Mysterious, 234; in ani- 
mals, 235 ; offices of, 236 ; limita- 



tions of, 237; relation to the 
senses, 238 ; exercise of, 238 ; dif- 
fers from other impulses, 239 ; 
various definitions of, 240 ; in 
man, 241 ; distinguished from in- 
tuition, 243 ; stupidity of, 244 ; 
defined, 246; relation to imita- 
tion and habit, 247. 

Instruction, Moral, in schools, 187. 

Intelligence, necessary to responsi- 
bility, 173. 

Interest, what it is, 61. 

Intuition, 32; moral, 175; differs 
from instinct, 243. 

Jealousy, 145. 

Judgment, 82 ; defined, 87 ; a judg- 
ment, 82 ; moral, 177 ; guided by 
law, 189; guided by experience, 
269. 

Judgments, varieties, 83, 84, 85 ; 
immediate and intuitive, 89. 

Keller, Helen, Rapid acquisitions 
of, 25. 

Knowing, Summary of activities of, 
106. 

Knowledge, First, of child, 19; de- 
sire for, 154 ; a baseless distinc- 
tion as to, 100. 

Law, Moral, 189 ; scope of, 191 ; in- 
quiries as to, 196-199 ; defined, 208. 

Love, Parental, 128 ; filial and fra- 
ternal, 129 ; word used for de- 
sire, 153. 

Malevolent, affections, 140, 141, 148. 

Malice, 146. 

Man, a complex being, 7. 

Memory, Early activity of, 19 ; de- 
fined, 45, 71 ; differences in power 
of, 65, 66; relation to attention, 
223. 

Methods, of studying man, 2, 4. 

Mind, 1, 6; what we know of, 7; 
state of affecting memory, 63. 



282 



INDEX. 



Moral, The, nature, 173 ; synopsis of 
nature, 185 ; intuition, 175, 186 ; 
perception, 175, 186; judgment, 
177, 178, 186 ; feelings, 180-183 ; 
law, 189 ; scope of law, 191 ; in- 
quiries as to law, 196-199 ; law 
denned, 208. 

Motive, Desire the universal, 151 ; 
strongest, 168. 

Motives, Conflict of, 272 ; can be 
selected, 273 ; predominant, 274 ; 
series of, 275-277 ; highest, 277. 

Movements, Automatic, 163 ; ran- 
dom, instinctive, reflex, 164 ; vol- 
untary, 165 ; impulsive, 229 ; il- 
lustration of impulsive, 231, 232 ; 
illustration of reflex, 232. 

Nerves, 10 ; office and classes, 11 ; 

of the special senses, 12-14. 
Nervous, system, 8 ; influence of 

condition of, 209. 
Notions, G-eneral, 74 ; how formed, 

75. 

Opium, Effect of habit of using, 265. 

Pains, Effect of attention to, 210. 

Patriotism, 133 ; instinctive and ra- 
tional, 134; influence of educa- 
tion upon, 134. 

Percept, 20; defined, 26. 

Perception, 20 ; conditions of, 21 ; 
activities involved in, 22 ; defined 
as an act and as a power, 26; 
moral, 175. 

Perceptions, Acquired, 23. 

Perceptive, summary of activities, 
34. 

Philanthropy, 135; effect of educa- 
tion, 136. 

Pity, 136. 

Power, Desire of, 157; change with 
age, 158. 

Preference, Peeling of, 166. 

Prejudice, 141, 142. 

Premises, 93, 95. 



Prepossessions, 142. 

Principles, Fundamental, of right, 
200-202; practical rules of life 
deduced from, 203. 

Productiveness, Conditions of men- 
tal, 211, 212. 

Progress, sometimes obstructed by 
habit, 262. 

Proof, proving, 98. 

Property, Right of private, 157. 

Proposition, 87. 

Psychology, defined, 6. 

Punishment, not revenge, 147. 

Purpose, Importance of a definite, 
212. 

Heading, Mental process in, 36. 

Reasoning, 90 ; implicit and explicit, 
91 ; demonstrative and probable, 
99 ; by analogy, 103 ; defined, 
105. 

Repetition, 59. 

Representation, Illustrations of, 37 ; 
real and ideal, 39, 40. 

Representative, power, 38 ; defined, 
44 ; summary of powers, 72. 

Reproduction, 45, 46 ; influence of 
bodily and mental conditions on, 
55 ; passive, 67 ; limited, 68 ; fun- 
damental law of, 72. 

Resemblances, 48. 

Resentment, not retaliation, 139. 

Respiration, Automatic, 228. 

Responsibility, Peeling of, 168. 

Retention, 38, 39 ; a fact, 45 ; con- 
ditions of, 55, 56. 

Revenge, 146. 

Reverie, 69. 

Right, things so considered, 176 ; 
what it is, 187; applied to inani- 
mate things, 188 ; idea of, 199 ; 
fundamental principles of, 200- 
202; use of term, 205; defined, 
208. 

Rights, 208. 

Satisfaction, Peelings of, 180. 



INDEX. 



283 



Self-love, 152. 

Selfishness, 152. 

Sensation, 17, 26 ; relation to per- 
ception, 21, 34. 

Sensations, First, material of knowl- 
edge, 20. 

Senses, The, knowledge derived by, 
12-14; original and acquired 
power, 23 ; examples of acquired 
power, 24. 

Sensibilities, 108; denned, 126. 

Sensorium, 21 ; denned, 26. 

Sight, 13. 

Signs, Natural, 53 ; artificial, 54. 

Similarity, Law of, 47. 

Sleep, Importance of, 211. 

Smell, 12, 13. 

Society, Desire of, 154. 

Soul, The, 1. 

Space, 28. 

Stimuli, to attention, 215-217. 

Study, Methods of, 1-4 ; obstacles 
to, 5. 

Sublime, Feeling of the, 124 ; mor- 
ally, 184. 

Succession, Idea of, 29. 

Suggestion, Fundamental law of, 72. 

Superiority, Desire of, 156. 

Syllogism, 93 ; illustrative diagrams, 
95-97 ; defined, 105. 



Sympathy, 137. 

Taste, 13; mental, 123. 

Teacher, First work of, 23 ; second 
work of, 43. 

Tendencies, Inherited, etc., 264. 

Terms, of a syllogism, 94. 

Terror, 160. 

Testimony, 99. 

Thinking, 73; of children, 74. 

Time, 30 ; effect of lapse of on re- 
tention, 60 ; value of systematic 
division of, 211. 

Tobacco, The habit of using, 265. 

Tribunals, Action of legal, 191. 

Truths, how expressed, 31 ; charac- 
teristics of intuitive, 31. 

Volition, 166 ; desire precedes, 167 ; 
two elements necessary to excite, 
270. 

Will, The, influence in reproduc- 
tion, 67; nature of illustrated, 
165 ; freedom of, 167 ; defined, 
172. 

Willing, Steps in the process of , 166. 

Wit, 121. 

Wrong, some things so considered, 
175. 



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